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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nowadays, a large part of our personal data, ranging from medical and finan-
cial records to our social activity, are stored online in cloud servers. Frequent data
breaches threaten to expose these data to malicious third parties, often with severe
consequences (estimated to several billion of US dollars annually). To prevent such
undesirable situations policymakers impose strict regulations on companies storing
user data, e.g., the recent GDPR European Union regulation requires that data are
stored encrypted and claims that “encrypted storage is relatively safe only if the data
owner, not the cloud service, holds the decryption keys”. Thus, the following ques-
tion arises: how can one efficiently directly query and compute on encrypted data
without first decrypting these data, a subject that has been the focus of a rapidly
growing line of research over the past few years.
Searchable Encryption (SE) enables a data owner to outsource a database
to a server in a private manner so that the latter can still private search queries
without decrypting the database. In a typical SE scheme, the data owner prepares
an encrypted index which is sent to the server. To perform a search query, the data
owner sends a token to the server that allows her to utilize the encrypted index and
retrieve the encrypted results (answering the requested query). SE schemes have
1
been proven to be very practical at the expense of well-defined leakages. These
leakages reveal the search pattern (whether a query q has been made in the past or
not), and the access pattern that consists of the volume pattern (number of tuples
contained in the query result) and the overlapping pattern (which tuples in the result
of query q appeared in the result of a previous query).
Existing techniques can reduce the above leakages at the expense of signifi-
cantly increasing the queries’ computational cost, e.g., use of oblivious algorithms
and oblivious RAM [4, 5]. Recently, Zheng et al. [6], Eskandarian et al. [7], and
Priebe et al. [8] proposed oblivious relational encrypted databases combining trusted
hardware with oblivious algorithms to minimize the leaked information to just the
size of accessed tables. Note that trusted hardware alone [9, 10] is not sufficient
because it leaks the memory access pattern if not paired with oblivious methods.
In contrast to the above cryptographic solutions with rigorous security guaran-
tees, several schemes and encrypted database systems have been proposed (mainly
in database venues) achieving the desired performance but now at the cost of more
leakage. CryptDB [11] and Monomi [12] utilize deterministic and order preserving
encryption1 in order to support point/range queries and joins. These seminal works
triggered a plethora of subsequent related works (e.g., [13, 14]), which were adopted
later by commercial products, such as Google Big Query and Microsoft SQL 2016.
The aforementioned works achieve very practical performance but it was recently
shown that they are susceptible to various attacks [15]. For example the leaked
1Deterministic encryption leaks the distribution of the input data. Order preserving encryption
leaks the distribution of the input data and their order.
2
statistical and order information from these systems allowed [15] to recover actual
patient records in plaintext.
1.1 Prior SE Schemes
In 2000, Song et al. [16] presented the first SE scheme for private keyword
search, secure under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA)2. Goh [18] realized that CPA
security is not sufficient for the case of SE schemes. Curtmola et al. [19] introduced
the state-of-the-art security definitions for SE for both, non-adaptive settings, i.e.,
maintaining security only if all the queries are submitted at once in one batch, as well
as adaptive settings, i.e., maintaining security even if the queries are progressively
submitted, and provided constructions that satisfy these definitions. The work of
Curtmola et al. [19] led the way for several new SE schemes [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28], some of which allow updates [23, 24, 25, 27, 28], are parallelizable [25],
reduce the I/O costs [29, 30, 31, 32] and the number of cryptographic operation
during search [3], as well as extend SE to support more expressive queries, such
as boolean, substring, wildcard, phrase, range, range aggregate, join, group-by and
general SQL queries [2, 6, 7, 8, 26, 33, 34].
2A scheme is secure against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA) if the ciphertexts do not reveal any
information about the plaintext even if the adversary can observe the encryption of the messages
of her choice. For a formal definition please see [17].
3
1.2 Contributions/Organization of the dissertation
The main challenge of establishing SE valuable for real-world applications is to
provide solutions that are (i) provably secure and robust against known and unknown
attacks, (ii) very efficient and ready for practical deployment, (iii) expressive enough
to support the demands of modern applications, i.e., support various types of static
and dynamic queries. In this thesis, we propose new SE schemes for more efficient,
more expressive and more secure encrypted search.
Improving I/O Costs ([32]). Scalable and efficient SE schemes require that
space, read efficiency and locality overheads are as low as possible. Towards this
goal, in Chapter 3, we design and evaluate the first SE scheme with tunable local-
ity/read efficiency and linear space, and despite from the fact that asymptotically it
is worse than prior works, it is in practice more efficient than both in-memory and
external-memory state-of-the-art SE schemes—12× and 577×, respectively. Our
construction can be tuned to achieve various trade-offs between space, read effi-
ciency, locality, parallelism and communication overhead; an important feature for
further optimizing its performance for generic memory architectures.
Reducing the Number of Cryptographic Operations ([35]). Previous SE
schemes require from the server (or sometimes the client) to perform cryptographic
operations to retrieve the result, the number of which is at least equal to the size
of the query result. The main reason is that for security purposes a query result r
is stored in |r| random positions indexed by |r| values, each of which is produced
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by a cryptographic operation. SE schemes with optimal locality could potentially
address this problem, but surprisingly current approaches with good locality, either
increase the number of cryptographic operations (due to false positives), or reduce
only the number of cryptographic operations performed by the server (e.g., [32]).
In Chapter 4, we take a more aggressive approach which aims at reducing the
total number of cryptographic operations required by the entire search protocol.
Our main idea is to utilize compression to securely reduce the size of the plaintext
indexes before producing the encrypted searchable indices. Our solution can use
any existing SE scheme as a black-box and any combination of lossless compression
algorithms in order to improve the search performance of the underlying SE scheme.
We experimentally demonstrate up to 188× savings in search time for the keyword
search problem. Combining our locality-aware schemes [31, 32] with [35] can lead
to search time improvements of up to 3-4 orders of magnitude compared with
prior state-of-the-art SE schemes.
Dynamic SE with Small Client Storage ([36]). Recent research has focused
on Dynamic SE (DSE) schemes that can efficiently support modifications in the
encrypted dataset, without the need to re-initialize the protocol. From a security
perspective, developing secure DSE schemes is challenging, due to the additional
information that may be revealed to the server because of updates. Two relevant
security notions have been proposed for DSE schemes, namely forward and back-
ward privacy. Forward privacy ensures that a new update cannot be related to any
previous operation (up until the related keyword is searched). Backward privacy
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ensures that if a document containing keyword w is first deleted and then a search
of w occurs, the result of this search does not reveal anything about the deleted
document. Many DSE schemes have been recently proposed but the most efficient
ones share the same limitation: they require maintaining an operation counter for
each unique keyword, either locally stored on the client, or accessed obliviously on
the server, during every operation.
In Chapter 5, we propose three new schemes that overcome the above limi-
tation and achieve constant permanent client storage with improved search perfor-
mance, both asymptotically and experimentally, compared to prior state-of-the-art
works. Our first two schemes adopt a “static-to-dynamic” transformation which
eliminates the need for oblivious accesses during searches. Therefore, they are the
first practical schemes with minimal client storage and non-interactive search. Our
third scheme is the first quasi-optimal forward-and-backward DSE scheme with only
a logarithmic overhead for retrieving the query result (independently of previous
deletions). While it does require an oblivious access during search to keep permanent
client storage minimal, its practical performance is up to 4 orders of magnitude
faster than the best existing scheme with quasi-optimal search.
SEAL—SE with Adjustable Leakages ([37]). Recent attacks have exploited
the access and search pattern leakages mentioned above to recover the plaintext
database or the posed queries, casting doubt to the usefulness of SE to encrypted
systems. In many cases, the practicality and applicability of these attacks are ques-
tionable, since these attacks (i) do not attack state-of-the-art schemes, (ii) assume
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that the attacker knows a great percentage of the input distribution, (iii) assume
that the query distribution is known to the attacker, or even (iv) assume that the
input dataset has a specific structure, e.g., every tuple of a specific numeric attribute
has a unique value and all the numeric values appear exactly once.
In Chapter 6, we operate under the assumption that all these attacks provide
an actual threat and we propose effective and efficient mitigation techniques against
them. We propose SEAL, a new family of SE schemes with Adjustable Leakages,
in which the amount of privacy loss is expressed in leaked bits of search or access
patterns and can be defined at setup. Our experiments show that protecting just a
few bits of leakage (e.g., three to four bits of access pattern) is enough for existing and
even new more aggressive attacks to fail, and also renders SEAL’s query execution
time practical for real-world applications (a little over one order of magnitude slow-
down compared to traditional SE-based encrypted databases). For the construction
of SEAL we developed two adjustable primitives that can be of independent interest,
an adjustable ORAM and an oblivious adjustable padding algorithm. SEAL can be
used for building efficient encrypted databases (supporting point, range, group-by
and join queries) that are robust against all-powerful attacks that can serve as a
benchmark for measuring the robustness of previous/future leakage-abuse attacks
(i.e., showing the success rate of an attack as a function of the leaked information).
Finally, we present a more efficient adjustable construction for ranges that reduces
the access pattern leakage and the volume pattern leakage implicitly by modifying
an existing construction [2] and not by using SEAL as a black-box.
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Dissertation Organization. Chapter 2 introduces the necessary background.
Chapters 3-6 (as we describe above) present our proposed approaches for more effi-
cient, expressive and secure SE. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and provides
future research directions.
Other Authored/Co-authored Works. In [31], we ask whether it is possible to
build a SE scheme with: (i) linear space, (ii) constant locality, and (iii) subloga-
rithmic read efficiency. We answer this question in the affirmative by designing the
first such SE scheme, strictly improving upon the previously best known scheme by
Asharov et al. [30] (with logarithmic read efficiency).
In [2, 3], we extend SE to work for more expressive queries, such as pri-
vate range and range aggregate queries. We construct new novel Range SE (RSE)
schemes with realistic security/performance trade-offs. We reduce range search to
multi-keyword search using range-covering techniques with tree-like indexes. We
demonstrate that, given any secure SE scheme, the challenge boils down to (i) for-
mulating leakages that arise from the index structure, and (ii) minimizing false
positives incurred by some schemes under heavy data skew. In [3], we propose
generic and specialized ways to provide locality-aware RSE schemes.
In [38], we propose GraphOS, a specialized graph database management sys-
tem with oblivious query processing, i.e., the first system that minimizes the informa-
tion leaked to the cloud server to just the number of nodes and edges in the graph.
GraphOS achieves less leakage than all existing secure graph databases. Moreover,
it improves the performance of the previous state-of-the-art scheme, both asymp-
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totically and experimentally, e.g., for our tested scenarios it requires 10–1062× less
time to perform a BFS/DFS traversal and 9–719× less time to compute the Min-
imum Spanning Tree. On the technical side, GraphOS is based on a combination
of secure hardware, of novel specialized for trusted hardware oblivious RAM and
oblivious data structure schemes that improve prior state-of-the-art approaches.
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Chapter 2: Preliminaries
We denote by λ ∈ N a security parameter. PPT stands for probabilistic
polynomial-time. We write out ← Alg(in) to indicate the output of an algorithm
Alg and (clientout, serverout)↔ Prot(clientin, serverin) to indicate the execution of
a protocol Prot between a client and a server.
2.1 Negligible function
A function ν: N→ R is negligible in λ, denoted by negl(λ), if for every positive
polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large λ, ν(λ) < 1/p(λ).
2.2 Randomized Encryption (RND).
We refer to a randomized symmetric encryption scheme with three polynomial-
time algorithms as RND, i.e., RND = (Gen, Enc, Dec), such that Gen takes as input
a security parameter λ and returns a secret key k, Enc takes as an input a secret key
and a message and outputs a ciphertext and Dec takes as an input the secret key k
and a ciphertext and outputs the message that was encrypted. An RND scheme is
secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) if the ciphertexts do not reveal any
information about the plaintext even if the adversary can observe the encryption of
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the messages of his choice. For a formal definition see [17].
2.3 Pseudorandom functions (PRF)
LetGen(1λ) ∈ {0, 1}λ be a key generation function , and F : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}` →
{0, 1}`′ be a pseudorandom function (PRF) family. F is a secure PRF family if for
all PPT adversaries Adv,
|Pr[K ← Gen(1λ); AdvF (K,·)(1λ) = 1]− Pr[AdvR(·)(1λ) = 1]| ≤ v(λ),
where R : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}`′ is a truly random function.
2.4 Collision-Resistant Hash Function.
H is a collision-resistant hash function if two inputs a and b have the same
H(a) = H(b) with negligible probability. For a formal definition see [17].
2.5 Keyword Search vs. Database Search
SE was originally meant for private file/keyword search, but in [2, 32] we re-
alized that SE can also be used for database search, and in particular for point
and range queries. Keyword search and database search are very similar problems
assuming for simplicity that in the latter case we want to support queries on a sin-
gle attribute. Then, we can map the notion of keywords to the notion of attribute
values, and the notion of documents to the notion of tuples, which allows the uti-
lization of SE for database search. The only difference between these two problems




(D, stA)← A(1λ) (D, stA)← A(1λ)
(stC, I0)←Setup(k,D) (stS , I0)←SimSetup(LSETUP(D))
for 1 ≤ i ≤ q for 1 ≤ i ≤ q
(wi, stA)← A(stA, Ii−1,M1, . . . ,Mi−1)* (wi, stA)← A(stA, Ii−1,M1, . . . ,Mi−1)*
(Xi, stC, Ii)↔Search(stC, wi, Ii−1) (Xi, stS , Ii)↔ SimSearch(stS ,LSEARCH(D, wi), Ii−1)
let M = M1 . . .Mq, I = I0 . . . Iq and X = X0 . . .Xq let M = M1 . . .Mq, I = I0 . . . Iq and X = X0 . . .Xq
output v = (I,M,X ), stA output v = (I,M,X ), stA
* Let Mk be all the messages from client to server in the Search/SimSearch protocol above.
Figure 2.1: SE ideal-real security experiments.
map to the same document, in the database search problem, by definition of the
problem, two different values of the same attribute will never map to the same tuple.
For example, a patient cannot have more than one date of birth or SSN number.
Therefore, the database search problem has less structural leakage.
Database search for multiple attributes. We can further extend SE to support
private database search on multiple attributes. The first solution is to create m
copies of the database, where m is the number of attributes, and use SE to encrypt
each copy with a different key. This solution expands the space by a factor of m,
but achieves optimal leakage, since it treats each attribute separately. The second
solution considers only one copy of the database, but it increases the leakage. In
particular, we create a single encrypted index for the values of all attributes by
setting as searchable value vi of attribute attrj, the value attrj||vi. In this case a
tuple id will be found in exactly m searchable values, leaking more information than
before (e.g., the set of tuples matching queries on two different attributes).
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2.6 Searchable Encryption (SE) Definition
Let D be a collection of documents. Each document D ∈ D is assigned a
unique document identifier and contains a set of keywords from a dictionary ∆. We
recall D(w) denotes the document identifiers of documents containing keyword w.
SE schemes focus on building an encrypted index I on the document identifiers. For
simplicity, we only consider the document identifiers instead of the actual documents
since these are encrypted independently and stored in the server separately from
the encrypted index I; whenever the client retrieves a specific identifier during a
search, he can send it to the server in an extra round and the server can send the
corresponding documents back. Finally, N is the data collection size, i.e., N =∑
∀w∈∆ |D(w)|. A SE protocol considers two parties, a client and a server and
consists of the following algorithms/protocols [19]:
• k ← KeyGen(1λ): is a probabilistic algorithm performed by the client. It
receives as input a security parameter λ and outputs a secret key k.
• (stC, I) ← Setup(k,D): is a probabilistic algorithm performed by the client
prior to sending any data to the server. It receives as input a secret key k and
the data collection D, and outputs an encrypted index I. Index I is sent to
the server. stC is sent to the client and it contains only the secret key k.
• (X , st′C, I ′)↔ Search(stC, w, I): is a protocol executed between the client and
the server, where the client inserts the secret state stC and a keyword w,
while the server inserts an encrypted index I. At the end of the protocol the
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client learns X , the set of all document identifiers D(w) corresponding to the
keyword w and the updated secret state st′C, while the server’s output is the
updated encrypted index I ′.
We provide the security definition for the above SE scheme that corresponds
to the real-ideal world paradigm [19], with a slightly modified syntax in order to
match the security definition of OSE.
Definition 1 Suppose (KeyGen, Setup, Search) is a SE scheme based on the above
definition, let λ ∈ N be the security parameter and consider experiments Real(λ) and
IdealLSETUP,LSEARCH(λ) presented in Figure 2.1, where LSETUP and LSEARCH are leak-
age functions to be defined next. We say that the SE scheme is (LSETUP,LSEARCH)-
secure1 if for all polynomial-size adversaries A there exist polynomial-time simula-
tors SimSetup and SimSearch, such that for all polynomial time algorithms Dist:
|Pr[Dist(v, stA) = 1 : (v, stA)← Real(λ)]−
Pr[Dist(v, stA) = 1 : (v, stA)← IdealLSETUP,LQUERY(λ)]|
≤ negl(λ) ,
where probabilities are taken over the coins of KeyGen and Setup algorithms2.
Figure 2.1 presents the real and ideal games for (semi-honest) adaptive adver-
saries, as introduced in [39]. These games are used to formally prove the security of
1In prior works (LSETUP,LSEARCH) is mentioned as (L1,L2), where LSETUP or L1 refers to the
total setup leakage, i.e. leakage prior to the query execution, and LSEARCH or L2 refers to the total
query leakage, i.e. leakage during the query execution.
2A function ν: N → N is negligible in λ, negl(λ), if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all
sufficiently large λ, ν(λ) < 1/p(λ).
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an SE scheme. They are partitioned into two worlds, the real and the ideal one. The
real world represents a real SE scheme, where the adversary has access to the Setup
and Search algorithms. More specifically, the real scheme creates a secret key to
which the adversary does not have access. The adversary selects a document collec-
tion which is given as an input to the Setup algorithm. Furthermore, stA denotes a
state maintained by the adversary. The adversary observes the output of the Setup
algorithm which is the encrypted index. Then, she selects a polynomial number of
queries, and for each of these queries she observes the corresponding tokens. Having
these tokens allows her to retrieve the encrypted result. In the ideal world, the ad-
versary interacts with the simulator. The simulator S, neither has access to the real
document collection, nor to the real queries. Instead, the simulator only has access
to predetermined leakage functions and by using these functions and her state she
attempts to “fake” the algorithms Setup and Search. The adversary can only have
access to one world, either to the real one, or to the ideal one. We consider only the
strongest types of adversaries, i.e., adaptive adversaries that can select their own
new queries based on previous ones. The adversary attempts to detect the world to
which she has access. We prove that an adversary can distinguish the output of the
real world from that of the ideal world only with negligible probability. This means
that an adversary cannot learn anything more, than the predefined leakage.
As is common in SE definitions, we use two leakage functions, LSETUP and
LSEARCH. LSETUP is associated with what is leaked from the index alone, which
means what is leaked prior to the query execution), whereas LSEARCH represents the
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leakage produced by the queries (during the query execution). In particular
LSETUP(D) = N
is the size pattern, where N =
∑
∀w∈∆ |D(w)|. Namely LSETUP leaks just the size of
the index. Also
LSEARCH(D, w) = (id(w),D(w))
is the access pattern leaking the identifiers of documents matching the query for
keyword w, as well as a deterministic function of the keyword w, id(w). The history
of LSEARCH leakage also defines the search pattern leakage, which leaks whether two
queries are the same.
As mentioned before, we can use an SE scheme for database search by corre-
sponding the notion of document identifiers to tuple identifiers or encrypted tuples
(encrypted using RND), and the notion of keywords to searchable attributes. In the
case of database search, the LSETUP leakage is identical and corresponds to the num-
ber of tuples. The LSEARCH leakage in the database search differs from the previous
case because it only contains the size of the encrypted results or similarly the size
of the access pattern as shown below. We refer to this leakage as LDBSEARCH
LDBSEARCH(D, w) = (id(w), |D(w)|)
We consider the two cases separately because when performing database search the
leakage is considered less significant than the keyword search problem. In particular,
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SE in database search achieves leakage that is very close to the optimal one achieved
by ORAMs. Their difference is that SE additionally leaks the search pattern.
The above security definition and leakages apply only to static SE schemes (in
Chapter 5.1 we provide the security definition and leakages for Dynamic SE (DSE)
schemes).
2.7 Oblivious Primitives
Oblivious RAM (ORAM). Oblivious RAM (ORAM), introduced in [40], is a
compiler that encodes the memory such that accesses on the compiled memory do
not reveal access patterns on the original memory. An ORAM scheme consists
of two algorithms/protocols ORAM = (OramInitialize, OramAccess), where
OramInitialize initializes the memory, and OramAccess performs the oblivious
accesses. We provide the formal definition in Section 6.3.3.
Oblivious dictionary (ODICT). An oblivious dictionary is an oblivious data
structure that can support oblivious queries from an arbitrary domain. ODict
offers the following protocols (see [41] for a detailed description):
• (T, σ) ← ODictSetup(1λ, N): Given a security parameter λ, and an upper
bound N on the number of elements, it creates an oblivious data structure T .
The client sends T to the server and maintains locally the state σ.
• ((value, σ′), T ′) ↔ ODictSearch((key, σ), T ): Given the search key key
and σ, returns the corresponding value value, the updated T ′ and σ′.
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• (σ′, T ′) ↔ ODictInsert((key, value, σ), T ): Given a key-value pair key,
value and σ, it inserts this entry in the dictionary. It returns the updated T ′
and σ′.
In Chapter 5, we use in a black-box manner an oblivious map (OMAP) which
is a privacy-preserving version of a key/value map data structure that aims to hide
the type and content of a sequence of operations performed and can be implemented
using an oblivious dictionary.
2.8 Compression Schemes
Our implementation uses (variations of) two different compression schemes, as
we detail in the following.
FastPfor. FastPfor [42] is a modification of PforDelta [43]. Given a list of n integers,
the algorithm begins by computing the deltas between two consecutive integers, and
then it proceeds to compress the deltas. For example, let I = {2, 5, 10, 17}, then
the deltas would be I ′ = {2, 3, 5, 7} where I ′[0] = I[0] and I ′[i] = I[i]− I[i− 1](i >
0). The deltas are then split into chunks of 128 deltas and each of the chunks is
compressed separately. For each chunk, the scheme chooses the smallest b, such that
a majority of elements (controlled by a threshold, say 90%) can be encoded using b
bits. The chunks are then stored using 128 b-bit locations, in addition to some extra
storage for the values that could not be represented by the b bits (called exceptions).
FastPfor enhances PforDelta because it stores the exceptions more efficiently.
EWAH. EWAH (Enhanced Word-Aligned Hybrid) [44] is a bitmap index compres-
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sion algorithm, which is an enhanced modification of WAH (Word-Aligned Hybrid)
[45]. Both algorithms belong to the RLE (Run Length Encoding) compression fam-
ily. Given a set of n integers, we first create a bitmap in which we set the i-th
element of the bitmap to 1 if and only if i is present in the list of input numbers. In
WAH, the input bitmap is then split into groups of 31 bits. The groups are classified
into two categories; if all the bits in a group are identical we consider it to be a filled
group, otherwise a literal group. For example, 0000000000000000000000000000000
(031 in short) is a filled group. Filled groups can be further classified into 0-fill
groups (all bits are 0) and 1-fill groups (all bits are 1). WAH compresses a sequence
of consecutive filled groups of the same type together using just one word. The
scheme stores each literal group using one word (32 bits).
For instance, if the input bitmap is 1020130111125 (160 bits), then WAH parti-







2615). Then, WAH encodes G1 using (010
201307), i.e. the first bit is set
to 0 denoting that it is a literal word and the remaining 31 bits contain G1. Fur-
thermore, it encodes G2, G3, G4, G5 together using (100
27011), i.e. the first bit is
set to 1 indicating that it is a filled word, the second bit is set to 0 indicating that
it is a 0-filled word and the remaining bits are used to store how many consecutive
0-groups are stored together. Finally, it encodes G5 using (00
11120) and encodes G6
using (002615).
EWAH is a modification of WAH because it addresses the latter’s necessity
to allocate too much space to store literal groups. Unlike WAH, EWAH divides an
uncompressed input bitmap into 32-bit groups, whereas WAH uses 31-bit groups.
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Then it encodes a sequence of p (p 6 65535) fill groups and q (q 6 32767) literal
groups into a marker word followed by q literal words (stored in their original form).
The first word in EWAH is always a marker word.
2.9 Attacks on deterministically-encrypted systems.
[15] proposed the frequency analysis and `p-optimization attacks that apply
to databases encrypted with the use of deterministic schemes such as CryptDB [11].
The frequency analysis attack is the most basic and well-known inference at-
tack in the area of cryptography. We define Ck and Mk to be the ciphertext and
message spaces, respectively of the deterministic encryption scheme. Given a de-
terministically encrypted column c over Ck and an auxiliary dataset z over Mk,
the attack works by assigning the i-th most frequent element of c to the i-th most
frequent element of z.
The `p-optimization attack is a family of attacks against deterministic encryp-
tion. The main goal is to find an assignment from ciphertexts to plaintexts that
minimizes a given cost function, e.g., the `p distance between the histograms of the
dataset. This attack minimizes the total mismatch identified in frequencies across
all plaintext and ciphertext pairs.
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Chapter 3: Fast Searchable Encryption with Tunable Locality
Since the first work on SE was proposed in 2000 [16], most follow-up works
considered scenarios where the encrypted index could fit in memory. However, for
very large indexes and databases that must be stored on disk (e.g., see the CW-MC-
OXT-4 dataset from the recent work of Cash et al. [1] whose encrypted index had
size around 904 GB), these in-memory schemes cannot scale since random access is
expensive. In these scenarios, the practical performance of SE schemes depends on
the locality, namely the number of non-continuous locations that the server accesses
for each query. Most SE schemes have poor locality (see the first five rows of
Table 3.1), accessing one random location per result item—this random allocation
of results in memory is necessary for achieving the desired security.
The work of Cash et al. [1] experimentally showed that in-memory SE cannot
scale to large datasets, and therefore proposed new SE schemes with good locality
guarantees. While trying to reduce1 locality, it was observed that a number of ad-
ditional entries per query must be read (usually referred to as false positives). The
ratio of the total number of entries read over the size of the initial query result was
1Cash and Tessaro [29] and Asharov et al. [30] define locality as the number of non-continuous
reads that the server makes per result item. Larger locality implies more non-continuous reads.
Throughout this work we follow this notation and by reducing locality we mean improving locality,
therefore O(1) locality means optimal locality.
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defined as read efficiency. Soon after, Cash and Tessaro [29] presented, along with a
lower bound (see Table 3.1), a scheme that requires Θ(N logN) space, O(logN) lo-
cality and optimal O(1) read efficiency, where N is the number of document-keyword
pairs in the document collection. Asharov et al. [30] presented three schemes: One
with Θ(N logN) space, optimal read efficiency and optimal locality (N logN scheme
in Table 3.1) and two other schemes with linear space, optimal locality and very
small (asymptotically) read efficiency (OneChoiceAlloc and TwoChoiceAlloc2 in Ta-
ble 3.1). Finally, Asharov et al. [50] further improved the efficiency of TwoChoiceAl-
loc by proposing a new scheme that works for bigger keyword-list sizes, i.e., up to
N1−1/o(log log logN), which has read efficiency that depends on the frequency of the
queried keywords as shown in Table 3.1. Motivated by the above positive results
and the impossibility result of [29], we propose in [31] a theoretical approach that
asymptotically improves the best known scheme OneChoiceAlloc [30].
Among the above schemes, the N logN scheme is the fastest in practice (no
false positives and no random access) and would be the scheme of choice if one could
afford to store Θ(N logN) space. For example, for the CW-MC-OXT-4 dataset [1]
whose encrypted index has size approximately 904 GB and 2,732,311,945 entries,
this would mean storing approximately 28.3 TB. In this thesis, we focus on SE
schemes with good locality guarantees that occupy linear space. Such schemes are,
2TwoChoiceAlloc has very low read efficiency, i.e., Θ(log logN log log logN) but is based on the
assumption that all keyword lists in the dataset have size less than N1−1/ log logN . We tested this
assumption for 4 real datasets: One containing crime records in Chicago since 2001 [46], the Enron
email dataset [47], the USPS dataset [48] and the TPC-H dataset [49]. The Enron email dataset
does not violate the assumption, which is not the case for the other datasets where almost half
of the contained attributes violate it. For the crimes dataset, for example, the assumption was
violated in 12 out of 21 attributes for 31% of the keywords on average.
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Scheme Locality Read Efficiency Storage
Kamara et al. [23] Θ(w) O(1) Θ(N +m)
Curtmola et al. [19], Liesdonk et al. [21] Θ(w) O(1) Θ(N ·m)
Kamara et al. [25] O(w logN) O(logN) Θ(N ·m)
Cash et al. [1] and [26] Θ(w) O(1) Θ(N)
Stefanov et al. [24] O(w log3N) O(log3N) Θ(N)
Chase et al. [20] O(1) O(1) Θ(N ·m)
Cash et al. [29] O(logN) O(1) Θ(N · logN)
Asharov et al. [30] (N logN scheme) O(1) O(1) Θ(N · logN)
Asharov et al. [30] (OneChoiceAlloc) O(1) Θ(logN log logN) Θ(N)
Asharov et al. [30] (TwoChoiceAlloc)∗ O(1) Θ(log logN log log logN) Θ(N)
Asharov et al. [50] (TwoChoiceAlloc+)∗∗ O(1) ω(1) · ε−1(n) +O(log log logN)∗∗∗ Θ(N)
Demertzis et al. with O(1) locality [32] O(1) O(N1/(s+1)) Θ(N · s)
Demertzis et al. with O(L) locality [32] O(L) O(N1/s/L) Θ(N · s)
Demertzis et al. [31] O(1) O(logγ N), for γ = 2
3
+ δ and δ > 0 Θ(N)
Lower bound [29] O(1) O(1) ω(N)
Table 3.1: Comparison of the most representative SE schemes. We denote with
N the number of keyword-document pairs, with m the number of unique keywords
and with w the size of the result of a keyword search query. Our schemes can be
parameterized in terms of locality L. Our most practical scheme is achieved by
setting L = 1, yielding read efficiency O(N1/(s+1)) and space equal to Θ(N ·s). Note
that for L = N1/s (which gives constant read efficiency), we can prove our scheme
is secure using as leakage only the size of the access pattern (as used in previous
works). ∗Assuming no keyword list has size more than N1−1/ log logN .∗∗∗Assuming
no keyword list has size more than N1−1/o(log log logN).∗∗∗For a keyword-list with size
n = N1−ε(n).
for example, OneChoiceAlloc, TwoChoiceAlloc and TwoChoiceAlloc+.
Our Practical Locality-Aware SE Scheme. In this chapter, we present our
practical SE scheme for private keyword and database search (point queries) with
tunable locality. For a parameter s that controls the space (the space is s ·N), our
most efficient scheme has O(1) locality and O(N1/(s+1)) read efficiency. In particular,
our scheme achieves up to 577× less false positives for all practical database sizes
when compared to OneChoiceAlloc in a large database (approximately 1 TB). This
translates into big improvements in practical performance in an external memory
setting. We stress here that our scheme’s leakage profile is slightly different (not
necessarily worse) than OneChoiceAlloc and its worst-case asymptotic read efficiency
is worse than OneChoiceAlloc. There are two reasons that explain why we are bet-
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ter in practice despite worse asymptotics: One reason is the hidden constants in
the polylogarithmic complexity of OneChoiceAlloc. Second, and most importantly,
our asymptotic complexity is worst-case (meaning that there are some queries that
we answer optimally or close to optimally) while OneChoiceAlloc’s complexities are
tight (meaning that there are no queries that are answered optimally). Our scheme
is designed to work fast in in-memory as well, where the bottleneck is not the
random memory accesses, but computation. In particular it achieves up to 12×
speed-up compared to the state-of-the-art in-memory SE scheme by Cash et al. [1].
Our scheme can also be tuned to achieve locality L and improved read efficiency
O(N1/s/L). This is quite important in a parallel setting with L processing units.
Using this tuning, each processor can have optimal locality and O(N1/s/L) read
efficiency. Interestingly enough, for the case where L = N1/s (that gives optimal
read efficiency), our scheme has exactly the same leakage profile as previous works.
3.1 Scheme with Optimal Locality
Our core scheme is inspired by the scheme of Asharov et al. [30], but is different
is many ways. Asharov et al. proposed a scheme with optimal locality, optimal read
efficiency and O(N logN) space. This scheme roughly works as follows: It uses
` = logN + 1 arrays A0, A1, . . . , A`
3 of size N . Array Ai consists of N/2
i chunks
and stores all keyword lists of size 2i at randomly-chosen chunks (note it is assumed
here that all keyword list sizes are powers of two—we do not have this assumption).
This ensures that the size of data read from each array Ai is always the same, which
3The actual scheme uses hash tables instead of arrays but we use arrays here for clarity.
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1 < |D(w)| ≤ 2
2 < |D(w)| ≤ 4
4 < |D(w)| ≤ 8
8 < |D(w)| ≤ 16
16 < |D(w)| ≤ 32
32 < |D(w)| ≤ 64
BucketA5[3]BucketA5[2]BucketA5[1]
|A5[2]| = |A5[3]| = 26
Figure 3.1: Example for N = 64 and s = 7. When s = 2, our scheme with optimal
locality stores only levels 6 and 3, mapping all the queries of levels 0, 1, 2 to level 3
and all the queries of levels 4, 5 to level 6. The worst case read efficiency is N1/2 = 8
occurring when we map a query of size 1 to level 3.
is important for security. Therefore, to retrieve the results for a certain keyword
w, one needs to read the right bucket at level i that contains the list. This bucket
number is stored in an encrypted form in a separate dictionary and can be retrieved
using the token for the keyword w. It is easy to show that such an approach reaches
the aforementioned bounds.
Our main idea is to reduce the space of the above scheme by storing only
s evenly distributed levels, where s is a small constant in practice (e.g., in our
experiments we set s = 2 or 4). In particular we pick p = d`/se and we store only
the levels L = {`, `−p, `−2p, . . . , `− (s−1) ·p} . However, this creates many issues.
For example, if level i is not stored, then the queries of size 2i can no longer be
answered. To avoid this problem we choose to store at level i ∈ L keyword lists
D(w) such that
2j < |D(w)| ≤ 2i ,
where j ∈ L is the smaller level following i in L. (We stress that if i is the smallest
level we ignore the lower bound in the above relation.) To store a keyword list whose
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size falls in the above range, we pick a random bucket at level i that has enough
space (we never split a keyword list across two buckets). While this looks like an
easy fix, it creates further problems as we detail in the following paragraph.
In particular, we can no longer guarantee that all keyword lists with sizes
(2j, 2i] can fit in a single bucket at level i, which is important for maintaining our
optimal locality. This is because, depending on the order that we store the keyword
lists, there might be one that will have to reside in different buckets, ruining our
optimal locality. For example, assume two consecutive levels that we store are
levels 1 and 3 and the total number of elements we have is N = 16. There are
three keywords in our data set w1, w2 and w3, with |D(w1)| = |D(w2)| = 4, and
|D(w3)| = 8. All these lists will be stored at level 3, which has two buckets of size 8.
If we choose to store w1 and w2 in different buckets, then w3 will have to be divided
across the two buckets, increasing its locality from 1 to 2. This also affects the
security of the scheme since there exist inputs that could trigger the aforementioned
overflow and others that could not.
We address this problem by slightly increasing the space of each level i ∈ L
from N to 2N + 2i+1—see Lemma 1. In particular, we are doubling the size of
each bucket in each level and adding one more bucket per level. This allows us to
guarantee that regardless of the order of the input keyword lists there will always
be enough space to store an entire keyword list in one bucket.
Lemma 1 Assume level i can store 2N + 2i+1 entries and let W be the set of
keywords with list sizes ≤ 2i. Regardless of the order in which we store keywords
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w ∈ W at level i, there is always going to be enough space within a single bucket (of
size 2i+1) for all keywords w ∈ W.
Proof 1 Let level i be split in at most Λ + 1 buckets, so
2N + 2i+1 = Λ · 2i+1 + y , (3.1)
where 0 ≤ y < 2i+1 is the size of the last bucket. We prove our claim by contradic-
tion. Suppose there exists a keyword w ∈ W whose list has size κ ≤ 2i and for which
there is not enough space in any bucket of level i. This means that all Λ buckets in
level i have been filled with at least 2i+1 − κ + 1 items and the last bucket has been
filled with at least y − κ + 1 items. In that case, if we count the number of items
that have been considered so far we have
# items considered ≥ Λ · (2i+1 − κ+ 1) + y − κ+ 1
=
2N + 2i+1 − y
2i+1
· (2i+1 − κ+ 1) + y − κ+ 1
≥ 2N + 2
i+1 − y
2i+1








≥ N (since i ≥ 0) .
Therefore we show that the total number of items considered so far is at least N ,
which is a contradiction. 
The arrangement of the mappings in our scheme is shown in Figure 4.1. In
27
particular, we present two cases, where in both N = 64: (1) We keep all the levels
by setting s=7 and store all the keyword-lists of size |D(w)| in level dlog |D(w)|e.
(2) We set s = 2 and follow our algorithm which keeps only levels 3 and 6. In the
latter case, all keyword-lists of size less than or equal to 8 are mapped to level 3 and
the remaining ones to level 6.
Complexities. Clearly the above approach answers queries with optimal locality.
Also, the read efficiency is O(2logN/s) = O(N1/s). To see that, note that the max-
imum penalty in terms of false positives is paid by keywords lists D(w) with size
2j + 1 which are answered by the buckets of size 2i (this is in case i > `− (s− 1) · p,




< 2i−j ≤ 2ddlogNe/se = O(2logN/s) = O(N1/s) .
For i = `− (s− 1) · p we have R ≤ 2i but since `− (s− 1) · p ≤ p we have the same
bound. The space of this approach is O(s ·N).
3.2 Tuning the Locality of Our Scheme
Our scheme above achieves optimal locality. However, there are scenarios
that we might want to increase slightly the locality to gain in read efficiency—this
could be a parallel processing setting. One naive way to increase locality from 1
to L so that to gain in read efficiency is to partition our original data set into
N/L data sets and apply our optimal locality scheme separately on each one of
the smaller datasets. By using our previously described scheme, this would yield
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O((N/L)1/s) read efficiency (actually, this approach of data partitioning can work for
every locality-optimal scheme). We propose here a new scheme with read efficiency
O(N1/s/L) and locality L. This is much better in practice, and asymptotically
better for any L = ω(1). The idea is as follows:
In our previous scheme, we chose to store at level i lists that have sizes in
(2j, 2i], where i and j are adjacent levels in L with i > j. To achieve locality L, we
can choose to store at level i keyword lists D(w) such that
L · 2j < D(w) ≤ L · 2i .
(Again, if i is the smallest level we ignore the lower bound in the above relation.)
Among those lists, the ones with size ≤ 2i are stored as in the previous scheme; The
ones with size > 2i are split into multiple chunks of size 2i and one chunk of size
less than 2i. Then these chunks are stored as before. Note that because we again
end up storing chunks of size ≤ 2i at level i, Lemma 1 can be recast and still holds,
guaranteeing that even with this new, modified algorithm, there will always be a
bucket with enough space to store the relevant chunks.
Complexities. The locality for keyword lists of size greater than 2i is at most L,
while the read efficiency for those lists is optimal. For keyword lists of size less or
equal to 2i, the maximum penalty is achieved for the list of size L · 2j + 1, in which
case the read efficiency is
R ≤ 2
i


















1 ≤ |D(w)| ≤ 2
2 < |D(w)| ≤ 16
16 < |D(w)| ≤ 64
Figure 3.2: Example for N = 64, s = 2 and L = 2. Our scheme stores levels 0, 3, 6.
The red arrows depict the queries whose answers contain false positives but with
optimal locality, while the blue arrows show queries with optimal read efficiency and
constant locality.
Again, the above holds for i > `−(s−1)·p. As opposed to before, for i = `−(s−1)·p
the above, improved bound does not hold (in particular it is O(N1/s)), since keyword
lists with size 1 must be answered by level i. To avoid that, we also keep level 0,
which answers keyword lists with size ≤ L. See Line 1 of Algorithm Setup. Only
the size of the array A0 can be N , instead of 2N + 1.
The space remains O(s ·N). Note our initial scheme with optimal locality is a
special case of the above scheme for L = 1. The detailed algorithms of our schemes
are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.2 illustrates an example for s = 2 and
L = 2. Note that algorithm Setup takes as input the parameters L (locality) and
s (number of levels kept). We observe that our scheme keeps levels 0,3,6. The red
arrows illustrate that these queries will be answered by the level above (including
false positives), while the blue arrows introduce our new policy. In our new policy,
given a stored level i, the logL levels above it will be stored and answered by the
level i. For example, a keyword list of size 16 will be divided into two chunks of size
23 and each of these chunks will be stored in level 3.
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Technical Details of Our Construction. In Figures 3.3 and 3.4 we illustrate our
construction in more detail. In particular, the KeyGen algorithm takes as input the
security parameter and computes the secret keys that are used in the randomized
encryption scheme and the pseudorandom functions. The Setup algorithm takes
as input the document collection, the secret keys, and the parameters s and L
and in lines 1-6 it initializes the encrypted dictionary (it uses a hash table for
the implementation of the encrypted dictionary) and the arrays Ai (each array Ai
contains buckets of size 2i+1 — a collection of consecutive cells where each cell stores
an encrypted (w, id) pair). In lines 7-15 the Setup algorithm places the keyword lists
in the arrays Ai, while storing in the dictionary the bucket in which a keyword list
or a chunk of the keyword list is stored. Finally, in lines 17-20 the entries of a bucket
are randomly permuted and the arrays Ai are encrypted; each entry is encrypted
using RND encryption and the produced key is a function of the keyword. This
approach is only used in the keyword search scenario where we expect from the
server to directly output the document identifiers. However, in the database search
scenario, we encrypt each entry using RND encryption without choosing a key as
a function of the keyword, since the server does not perform any decryption but
outputs only the encrypted result to the client. In Figure 3.4, the Search algorithm
executes the Token algorithm which produces the corresponding query tokens which
are used in order to locate the entry of the dictionary which corresponds to the
queried keyword. The same algorithm partially decrypts L entries of the dictionary
to further detect the correct buckets and the correct array Ai and filters out the
false positives; the server attempts to decrypt all the entries inside a bucket but
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only the entries containing the queried keyword will have the last λ-bits to be 0.
The same procedure could be used in the database search scenario to obtain the
tuple identifiers of the answer. However, in the next section we provide a more
efficient optimization to address this task since the tuples can be stored directly in
the encrypted arrays Ai.
Scheme with Read Efficiency O(R). It is easy to see that the above scheme
can be tuned to achieve read efficiency O(R) and worst-case locality O(N1/s/R) by
setting L = N1/s/R. We also note that for L = N1/s our scheme has optimal read
efficiency O(1) and has exactly the same leakage profile with prior SE schemes (such
as Scheme 2). In the latter case, if we change the arrays Ai into hash tables, then
the encrypted dictionary is not required.
3.3 Optimizations of Our Scheme
We now describe various optimizations that can be applied to our scheme.
The first two are used in our implementation.
Optimization 1 - Decryption of the Result at the Client. In the current
scheme, the decryption of the result (namely the identifiers of the documents con-
taining the searched keyword) take place at the server side (see Line 6 of Algorithm
Search). In particular the server performs 2i+1 decryption attempts, where 2i is the
size of the bucket from which we retrieve the answer. We can reduce the decryption
cost to be proportional to the size of the result, by assigning the decryption to the
client. This optimization can be used in keyword search by increasing the number of
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k← KeyGen(1λ)
1: (k1, k2, k3)←$ {0, 1}λ.
2: RND = (Enc,Dec) is CPA-secure encryption scheme.
3: F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}∗ is a PRF and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a
collision resistant hash function.
4: return (k1, k2, k3).
I ←Setup(k,D)
1: Parse k as (k1, k2, k3). Let s and L be publicly-known parameters.
2: Let N = |{D(w)}
w∈W| and ` = dlogNe. Set p = d`/se. Let L = {`, ` −
p, . . . , `− (s− 1) · p}. If L > 1 set L = L ∪ {0}.
3: Initialize a hash table HT that can store up to N elements.
4: for each evenly distributed level i ∈ L do
5: Initialize an array Ai of size 2N + 2
i+1.
6: Divide Ai in Λi buckets of size 2
i+1 and one bucket of size yi < 2
i+1.
7: Let Ai[1], Ai[2], . . . , Ai[Λi + 1]} be the set of those buckets.
8: for each keyword w ∈W in a random order do
9: Find adjacent j and i in L such that L · 2j < |D(w)| ≤ L · 2i (if i is the
smallest level, we ignore the lower bound).
10: Split D(w) into a set Cw of chunks containing qw chunks of size 2i and
one chunk of size rw < 2
i.
11: count = 0.
12: for each chunk c ∈ Cw do
13: count = count+ 1.
14: Let A be the set of buckets in Ai that have enough space for chunk
c (say those are Ai[j1], Ai[j2], . . . , Ai[jf ]).
15: Pick one bucket a ∈ A (say Ai[x]) uniformly at random and store c
in a at the first available position.
16: HT.add(H(Fk1(w)||count), [i||x]⊕ H(Fk2(w)||count)).
17: Add random (key, value) pairs to HT so that the total number of elements
it stores is N .
18: for each stored array Ai (i.e., i ∈ L) do
19: for each bucket b ∈ Ai do
20: Randomly permute all entries (w, id) within b.
21: Replace each entry (w, id) of b with RND.Enckey(id||0λ) where
key = Fk3(w).
22: Let A = {Ai : i ∈ L}.
23: return (HT,A).
Figure 3.3: KeyGen and Setup algorithms for our scheme with locality L, read effi-
ciency O(N1/s/L) and space Θ(s ·N).
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t← Token(k, w) . Token is executed by the client.
1: Parse k as (k1, k2, k3).
2: tag ← F (k1, w), vtag← F (k2, w), etag← F (k3, w).
3: return (tag,vtag,etag).
(X ,k, I)↔ Search(k, w, I)
1: t← Token(k, w).
2: Parse t as (tag,vtag,etag) and I as (HT,A).
3: for count = 1 to L do
4: evalue← HT.get(H(tag||count)).
5: if evalue is not NULL then
6: [i, offset] ← evalue ⊕ H(vtag||count).
7: for all entries e in bucket Ai[offset] do
8: if RND.Decetag(e) outputs id||0λ then
9: Add id to the result set X .
10: return (X ,k, I).
Figure 3.4: Token and Search algorithms for our scheme with locality L, read effi-
ciency O(N1/s/L) and space Θ(s ·N).
interactions; one round is required for the server to send the encrypted document-ids
to the client and the client to decrypt them in order to request from the server in
the second round to return the actual documents. In database search we only need
one round of interaction, since using RND allows us to directly encrypt and store
the tuples (instead of tuple-ids) in the encrypted index. It is highlighted that in
this case the server does not perform any partial decryption of the tuples, i.e., the
server identifies a super set of the result and returns this to the client (this super
set of the result may contain false positives, which the client is responsible to filter
out). This optimization requires the following changes:
• First, do not permute the entries in the bucket, as is done in Line 19 of
Algorithm Setup. This will not violate our security since we will not allow any
decryptions to take place at the server side.
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• Second, instead of encrypting each entry in the bucket with a secret key derived
from the respective keyword (see Line 20 of Algorithm Setup), encrypt all
entries across all buckets with a single secret key that is stored at the client
and is never revealed to the server.
• Finally, during the search, the server just sends the whole bucket encrypted
to the client. Since the entries within the bucket are not randomly permuted,
the entries corresponding to each keyword are consecutive. If the client knows
the start and end point of each keyword, then he can decrypt only the part of
the bucket that contains the actual result while skipping the remaining cells.
We note here that in order for the client to get the start and end values, our scheme
can use an extra encrypted dictionary (like the one used to store offset and level
i). To avoid increasing the space though, one could store only one dictionary with
the start and end information, retrieve those and then derive (from start and end)
the bucket offset and the level and request those from the server. The above ob-
servations can significantly accelerate the search procedure. Note that the above
improvements are not applicable in Scheme 2 since in their case each bucket con-
tains pieces of the result in arbitrary positions.
Optimization 2 - Storing One Level Less. Recall that in our scheme with
constant locality we answer queries with size bigger than 2`−p+1 by retrieving one
bucket from level ` (which both have size 2`+1). Since 2`+1 ≥ N , the aforementioned
queries require reading information that is at least equal to the size of the dataset.
We propose not storing level `, but only the levels ` − p, ` − 2p, . . . , ` − (s − 1)p,
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reducing the number of stored levels from s to s− 1. To accommodate the queries
with size > 2`−p+1, we just have the server return the whole level ` − p + 1. This
does not asymptotically increase the read efficiency for level `. In summary, with
this new approach, we can store space O(s ·N) for a read efficiency of O(N 1s+1 ), and
constant read locality. This optimization applies to the locality L scheme as well.
Optimization 3 - More Efficient Level Selection by Increasing Leakage.
The basic algorithm for constant locality stores s out of ` = dlogNe levels which
are evenly distributed. This means that selecting a level is a function of N . For
instance, let us assume that N = 232 and s = 4. In this case our basic algorithm
preserves levels 32, 24, 16, and 8. Yet in the case where the maximum keyword list
has size 4, then we observe that all queries are answered in level 8 and the remaining
levels have no use. Thus, given statistical information about the stored dataset we
can construct a better level selection algorithm. Note that an SE scheme using this
optimization should increase LSETUP by this additional statistical information. An
example of such information that can be used is the minimum and maximum word
lists. For real datasets this optimization can radically improve the performance of
our proposed schemes, but in the experimental evaluation we do not consider it to
present fair comparisons to related work.
Optimization 4 - Fault Tolerance. Existing fault-tolerance file system architec-
tures are using the notion of replication to address failures. A typical replication
factor for those systems is at least 3, meaning that the initial dataset with size N
will be expanded three times. For instance, the default replication factor of Apache
Hadoop File System (HDFS) is set to be 3 [51]. We can change our scheme to
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replicate all keyword/id pairs in all s levels (Lemma 1 will still hold). In this way,
for s = 3, our scheme can get fault-tolerance for free (since we are storing s · 2N
space), while other schemes would have to explicitly triple the space they are using.
3.4 Security Analysis and Leakage Profile
Our main construction for general values of L leaks the following information
(when searching fo keyword w):
1. LSETUP(D), as defined in Section 2.6. This is leaked by all previous schemes.
2. A deterministic function of the queried keyword id(w) (search pattern). This
is leaked by all previous schemes.
3. The bucket identifier bucket(w) where w is read from. In particular, bucket(w)
contains information about the portion of the memory read to retrieve the
result of a specific keyword (the level i and the offset of the bucket), which
depends on the order in which the keywords were considered in the Setup
algorithm. We believe this leakage is not meaningful since the order is decided
at random. This information is not leaked by previous schemes.
We emphasize here also that our scheme, due to the first optimization in Section 3.3
and as opposed to all previous schemes, does not explicitly leak the exact size of
the access pattern (it just leaks an upper bound on the size of the access pattern
through the size of the bucket read). To summarize, we can now formally write our
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leakage functions as
LSETUP(D) = N and LnewSEARCH(D, w) = (id(w), buckets(w)).
Leakage Functions for the Case L = N1/s. Unlike the general case, our scheme
with L = N1/s has exactly the same leakage profile as previous schemes (e.g., Scheme
2): it just leaks LSETUP(D) and LSEARCH(D, w) (or LDBSEARCH(D, w) in the case of the
database scenario), as mentioned in Section 2.6.
Theorem 1 Given F is a pseudorandom function, H is a collision-resistant hash
function and RND is a CPA-secure encryption scheme, the SE scheme of Figures 3.3
and 3.4 is (LSETUP,LnewSEARCH)-secure according to Definition 1 and in the random
oracle model.
Additionally, for the case when the locality L = N1/s, the scheme is (LSETUP,LSEARCH)-
secure (or (LSETUP,LDBSEARCH)-secure in the case of the database scenario) according
to Definition 1 and in the random oracle model.
Proof 2 For simplicity, we provide the proof of Theorem 1 for constant L using the







are shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, respectively.
For the first part of the proof (which is the same for both cases of Theorem 1)
we must show that no PPT algorithm Dist can distinguish, with more than negligible
probability, between the index Ireal = (HTreal,Areal) output by Setup(k,D) and the
index Iideal = (HTideal,Aideal) output by SimSetup(LSETUP(D)). This is because
• Both Areal and Aideal are sets of s arrays
A`, A`−p, A`−2p . . . A`−(s−1)·p ,
where in both cases Ai has 2N + 2
i entries (A0 is included for L > 1). Areal
contains the encryption of values using a CPA-secure scheme, while Aideal
contains random values of the same format.
• Similarly, Dist cannot distinguish HTreal from HTideal, since both have N en-
tries, HTreal encrypts entries by “xoring” with the output of a pseudorandom
function and HTideal contains random values.
For the second part of the proof and according to Definition 1, we need to prove
that there does not exist a PPT algorithm Dist that can distinguish between the
outputs of Search(k, w, I) and the outputs of SimSearch(stS ,LnewSEARCH(D, w)) and
SimSearch(stS ,LDBSEARCH(D, w)). This is because:
• Both the Search and SimSearch produce the same tokens and operations for
the same repeated keywords. SimSearch uses the search pattern leakage Prev
included in stS .
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Case for locality L = 1.
• For a given keyword, SimSearch and Search access the same [i, offset] pair, in-
cluded in the LnewSEARCH(D, w) leakage and therefore the distributions are trivially
indistinguishable. Note that for SimSearch to access a specific [i, offset] pair we
program the random oracle H accordingly—see Line 9 in Figure 3.5.
Case for locality L = N1/s.
• For a given keyword, SimSearch and Search do not necessarily access the same
[i, offset] pairs. However, the [i, offset] pairs accessed by both algorithms are
distributed identically. In particular the real [i, offset] pairs accessed by Search
are distibuted uniformly at random (due to such placement by Setup), while
SimSearch chooses uniformly at random [i, offset] pairs among the pairs that
she did not choose before—see Line 11 in Figure 3.6. Again, for SimSearch
to output a specific [i, offset] pair dictated by the simulator we program the
random oracle H accordingly—see Line 12 in Figure 3.6.
3.5 Dynamic SE (DSE)
In this section, we present an extension to our current work that allows up-
dates. Allowing updates is a twofold challenge because it requires the following: a)




1: Let N ← LSETUP(D), ` = logN , p = d`/se.
2: Let L = {`, `− p, . . . , `− (s− 1) · p}. If L > 1 set L = L ∪ {0}.
3: k← KeyGen(1λ).
4: Initialize a hash table HT of size N random entries and mark them as
“unrevealed”.
5: for each evenly distributed level i ∈ L do
6: Initialize an array Ai of size 2N + 2
i+i with random elements.
7: Divide Ai in Λi buckets of size 2
i+1 and one bucket of size yi < 2
i+1.
8: Let Ai[1], Ai[2], . . . , Ai[Λi + 1]} be the set of those buckets and mark all
the buckets as “unrevealed”.
9: Let Prev an empty hash table.
10: Set I to be the set A = {Ai : i ∈ L} and encrypted dictionary HT .
11: Set stS to include I, Prev and k.
12: return (I, stS).
(X , stS , I)↔ SimSearch(stS ,LnewSEARCH(D, w), I)
1: Parse stS as A = {Ai : i ∈ L}, HT , Prev and k = k1, k2.
2: Let (id(w), buckets(w))← LSEARCH(D, w).
3: if Prev.get(id(w)) 6= null then
4: return (Prev.get(id(w)), stS , I). . stS contains the exchanged
client-server messages.
5: else
6: Set X ← ∅, tag = F (k1, id(w)), vtag = F (k2, id(w)) and count = 1.
7: for each (i, offset) ∈ buckets(w) do
8: Pick uniformly at random an “unrevealed” entry e = (key, value)
from hash table HT .
9: Program the random oracle H such that H(tag||count) = key and
H(vtag||count) = value⊕ [i, offset].
10: Add e to the set X and mark e as “revealed” and count = count+ 1.
11: Use (tag, vtag) to simulate the messages exchanged between the client
and the server and store them in stS .
12: Prev.add(id(w),X ).
13: Update stS with new values of Prev, the choices that the random oracle
made.
14: return (X , stS , I).
Figure 3.5: Simulator algorithms SimSetup and SimSearch for scheme with O(L)
locality and O(N1/s/L) read efficiency.
Proposed Solution. Our DSE scheme is based on a solution proposed by De-
mertzis et al. [2, 3] for Range SE schemes. It is also used by commercial databases,
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(X , stS , I)↔ SimSearch(stS ,LSEARCH(D, w))
1: Parse stS as A = {Ai : i ∈ L}, HT , Prev and k = k1, k2.
2: Let (id(w), |D(w)|)← LSEARCH(D, w).
3: if Prev.get(id(w)) 6= null then
4: return (Prev.get(id(w)), stS , I). . stS contains the exchanged
client-server messages.
5: else
6: Find table Ai for maximum i such that 2
i < |D(w)| (if |D(w)|=1 set
i = 0).
7: q = d|D(w)|/2ie.
8: Set X ← ∅, tag = F (k1, id(w)), vtag = F (k2, id(w)).
9: for count = 1 to q do
10: Pick uniformly at random an “unrevealed” entry e = (key, value)
from hash table HT .
11: Pick uniformly at random an offset of an “unrevealed” bucket b at
level i.
12: Program the random oracle H such that H(tag||count) = key and
H(vtag||count) = value⊕ [i, offset].
13: Add e to the set X and mark e and b as “revealed”.
14: Use (tag, vtag) to simulate the messages exchanged between the client
and the server and store them in stS .
15: Prev.add(id(w),X ).
16: Update stS with new values of Prev and the choices that the random
oracle made.
17: return (X , stS , I).
Figure 3.6: Simulator SimSearch for scheme with O(N1/s) locality and O(1) read
efficiency.
such as Vertica [52] (organizes the updates in log-merge trees). This commonly
used technique is preferable for the following reasons: i) it can use our very efficient
static SE scheme as a “black box”, ii) it enables easy leakage formulations, iii) it
captures forward/backward privacy. The leakage of this approach is essentially the
entire history of the LSETUP,LSEARCH leakages of every index that was once ”active”
at the server. The main idea is that we organize n sequential updates to a collec-
tion of at most log n independent encrypted indexes. In particular, for each new
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tuple, the data owner initializes a new SE scheme by creating a new SE index that
contains only the specific tuple. The single-tuple index is subsequently uploaded to
the untrusted server. Whenever two indexes of the same size t are detected there
are downloaded by the data owner, decrypted and merged to form a new SE index
of size 2t, again with a fresh secret key. The new index is then used to replace the
two indexes of size t. Clearly, a merge may have a cascading effect, i.e. subsequent
merges. In this case, all merges are executed at the same time to avoid redun-
dant work, that is constructing and uploading intermediate indexes. Deletions are
simulated by inserting cancellation tuples. For further details, we refer the reader
to [2, 3]. The space is linear in the size of the input and the number of updates.
The locality of this approach is O(L · log n) and the read efficiency is O(N1/s/L).
In Chapter 5, we discuss in more depth how we can transform a static SE to a DSE
with forward and backward privacy.
3.6 Experiments
In this section we experimentally evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme. We compare our scheme only with linear-space approaches. If one can afford
N logN space, the best scheme (both asymptotically and in practice) is Scheme 1
of Asharov et al. [30]. As such, we compare our work with the static construction of
Cash et al. [1] and Scheme 2 of Asharov et al. [30]—see Table 3.1. We refer to the
former as PiBas and to the latter as OneChoiceAlloc. We compare our scheme only
with the basic construction of Cash et al. [1] (i.e. PiBas) because the more optimized
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proposed schemes (with good locality) are sub-optimal compared with the schemes of
Asharov and introduce new leakages (in LSETUP leakage). Nevertheless, our scheme
can be tuned with the use of the third optimization presented in Section 3.3 to
achieve the same performance as the most optimized scheme of Cash et al. [1].
Moreover, we do not compare our scheme with Scheme 3 of Asharov et al. [30]
because it assumes that no keyword list has size more than N1−1/ log logN as shown is
Table 3.1. Instead, we explain in Section 3.6.4 why this assumption is not realistic
and we experimentally show the superiority of our scheme compared to Scheme 3 of
Asharov et al. [30], by adopting the same assumption.
We organize the experimental section as follows. Section 4.3.1 presents the ex-
perimental setting and the technical details of our implementation. Section 3.6.2 fo-
cuses on the comparison of our work with PiBas and OneChoiceAlloc in an in-memory
setting, while Section 3.6.3 compares our scheme with PiBas and OneChoiceAlloc
in an external memory setting where optimal read efficiency is guaranteed in our
scheme and PiBas and optimal locality in OneChoiceAlloc. Then, we compare our
scheme with OneChoiceAlloc, where optimal locality is guaranteed in both schemes,
and we focus on the comparison of the number of false positives in both approaches.
Finally, in section 3.6.3 we provide experiments in parallel scenarios where we can
tune locality to further reduce the number of false positives while assuring optimal
locality per parallel processing unit (in particular, for overall locality L, we can have










































Figure 3.7: Index costs
3.6.1 Setup
We carried out the implementation of our scheme, as well as the implemen-
tation of PiBas and OneChoiceAlloc in Java and conducted our experiments on a
64-bit machine with an Intel Xeon E5-2676v3 and 64 GB RAM. We utilized the
JavaX.crypto library and the bouncy castle library [53] for the cryptographic op-
erations. In particular, for the PRF and randomized symmetric encryption imple-
mentations we used HMAC-SHA-256 and AES128-CBC respectively for encryption.
For our in-memory experiments we used single-threaded implementations, since a
parallel implementation would favor our scheme compared to the schemes of our
competitors. The experiments were conducted on a real dataset [46] consisting of
6, 123, 276 records of reported incidents of crime. We consider the query attribute
to be the location description which contains 173 distinct keywords (this is the x-
axis in Figures 3.8(a),3.9). Among these keywords the one with minimum frequency
contains 1 record, while the one with maximum frequency comprises 1, 631, 721
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records. The specific dataset is used for the in-memory setting comparison. Our
external memory experiments use the above dataset for the comparison with opti-
mal read efficiency and locality O(N1/s). For the external memory comparison with
optimal locality we created a synthetic dataset. Note that in both, our locality-
optimal scheme and OneChoiceAlloc the only factor that affects the number of false
positives is the number of records. Thus, we create two synthetic datasets where
the first contains N = 237 − 1 records and one keyword list for each possible size
which is a power of 2, such that |D(wi| = 2i. The second synthetic dataset has the
same data structure, only now it comprises N = 247 − 1 records.
Implementation Details. We implement our locality-optimal algorithm using the
first two optimizations described in Section 3.3. In particular, the client sends a to-
ken to the server and the server uses this token to locate and return the chunk that
contains the answer of the query. This means that it is the responsibility of the
client to decrypt and filter out the resulting false positives. We use optimization 1
to reduce the client’s workload. In addition, we use optimization 2 to further re-
duce the required server space. We implement our read efficiency optimal algorithm
without encrypted dictionary using for Ai hash tables.
The implementation of PiBas is straight-forward and was carried out as pro-
posed in the work of Cash et al. [1]. We implemented the work of Asharov using a
dictionary as was proposed for the general case. In particular, the dictionary con-
tains the size of the result for each keyword. Thus, the client sends a token to the
server and the server using the dictionary locates the first bucket in which the first
result is placed and also the number of total buckets that it has to return to the
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Figure 3.8: Search costs
client. The client is responsible for decrypting the buckets in order to filter out the
false positives.
Both our scheme and OneChoiceAlloc can be implemented to return the ex-
act result without any false positives as shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, where the
server herself can filter out the false positives. However, doing this decreases the
performance of both schemes. Only for the experiment in Figure 3.10(b), we im-
plement OneChoiceAlloc to filter out the false positives at the server, since our read
efficiency optimal scheme and PiBas do not contain false positives (we also provide
an experiment for OneChoiceAlloc where the client performs the filtering — see Fig-
ure 3.10(a)). Note that carrying out the filtering on the server can be an efficient
solution when the application has strict bandwidth limitations, because then the
false positives are removed before transferring the data over the network.
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3.6.2 In-memory Comparison
Index Costs. In the first set of experiments we evaluate the required index size and
construction time of our scheme for different dataset sizes N . The results are shown
in Figures 4.5(b) and 4.5(a) respectively. The construction time includes the I/O
cost of transferring the dataset from the disk to the main memory, while the index
size represents only the size of the encrypted index, since the size of the encrypted
documents (or tuples) is the same for all schemes. Moreover, we partition the initial
dataset into 12 sets of 500K tuples each, chosen uniformly at random from the entire
dataset. Then, we begin with the first partition and consider the other partitions
in each step in order to represent the construction time and index size as the size
of the input gradually increases. For the initialization of our scheme we selected
s = 2. According to our analysis and using the first optimization implies storing 2
levels and having read efficiency O(N1/3). In this way we have space requirements
comparable to OneChoiceAlloc whose space is approximately 3N , while our case
requires approximately 4N space; in both cases an encrypted dictionary of size N
is required. Recall that due to Lemma 1, our scheme requires to store in each
preserved level i an array of size 2N and one extra chunk of size 2i+1. These space
requirements are included in our figures. As expected, our schemes require slightly
more storage and time for constructing the index compared to OneChoiceAlloc. We
observe that PiBas requires less storage than both our scheme and OneChoiceAlloc,
but the construction time performance is worse because of the need for more PRF
evaluation per keyword/identifier pair. In particular, our schemes require index
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size from 85 to 1015 MB and construction time from 25 to 283 sec, while PiBas
requires index size from 31 to 366 MB and construction time from 28 to 317 sec
and OneChoiceAlloc requires index size from 69 to 824 MB and construction time
from 21 to 230 sec. In addition to these outcomes though, it is worth mentioning
that in our scheme the Setup algorithm is highly parallelizable, and therefore the
cost of the specific algorithm can be distributed to different machines. In the case
of PiBas and OneChoiceAlloc it is not straight-forward how we could parallelize the
construction of the index.
Search Cost. Figure 3.8(a) illustrates the total time required by the server and
client to perform every possible query excluding the communication cost. All
schemes require transferring the result size through the network. However, our
scheme and OneChoiceAlloc need to transfer more data than PiBas for each query.
Our approach transfers on average 35× more information compared with PiBas
and in the worst case this number becomes equal to 126×, while OneChoiceAlloc
always transfers 324× times more data compared with PiBas. More specifically,
Figure 3.8(b) shows the number of records returned by our approach, OneChoiceAl-
loc approach and PiBas approach, which transfers the exact result without false
positives. For visualization purposes, we sort the queries based on their result size
and we query each of them. Our schemes reached up to 12× speed-up compared
to PiBas and achieved 347× speed-up in comparison with OneChoiceAlloc. This
experiment confirms our non-trivial claim that optimal locality can be successfully
used to achieve more efficient SE schemes even for in-memory architectures or fast
external storage devices, i.e. solid state drives. Note that our scheme yields the
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Figure 3.9: Search Time
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Figure 3.10: External memory comparison for the real dataset
above speed-up by reducing the workload of the server and client in the two fol-
lowing manners: i) the server is only responsible for returning the required chunks
without evaluating a PRF for each result item; ii) the chunks contain the results of
each query together, thus allowing her to decrypt only the requested result. These
two features offered by our construction can, neither be integrated with PiBas, nor
with OneChoiceAlloc.
The purpose of this experiment is to illustrate the amount of less work per-
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formed by the client and the server in our approach, and for this reason we exclude
the communication cost. Nevertheless, we also conducted the experiments while
taking into account the communication cost and observed that having on average 1
Gbps transfer rate in Figure 3.9(a) yielded results similar with the ones presented in
Figure 3.8(a) when we compared our scheme with PiBas and OneChoiceAlloc. Ad-
ditionally, for 200 Mbps transfer rate or more our scheme becomes the most efficient
one for all possible queries as shown in Figure 3.9(b), while when the transfer rate
is less than 200 Mbps some queries may become slower than PiBas. In comparison
with the OneChoiceAlloc scheme our scheme is always more efficient regardless of the
transfer rate, because our scheme transfers less false positives. For applications with
limited communication bandwidth we suggest using the original protocol, where the
server filters out the false positives herself , or the scheme with locality L = N1/s.
The latter scheme described in section 3.2 can be tuned to always be more efficient
than PiBas. By tuning read efficiency to be optimal, less PRF evaluations are per-
formed in our scheme compared with PiBas. Additionally, in the next section, we
will show that this scheme is always more efficient than OneChoiceAlloc especially
for queries with results size > 27 tuples.
3.6.3 External Memory Comparison
We have already mentioned that any scheme lacking locality cannot be used
for big data applications (due to the cost of accessing data on the disk at random
locations). In this section, we first compare our optimal read efficiency scheme (with
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no-optimal locality L = N1/s), with PiBas which has worst-case locality and One-
ChoiceAlloc which has optimal locality in external memory scenarios, where random
accesses become the dominant factor. This comparison provides a very interesting
outcome. Despite the fact that PiBas has worst-case locality and OneChoiceAlloc has
optimal locality, both have similar performance, while our scheme achieves up to 60x
faster search time compared to OneChoiceAlloc. Our scheme requires 5N space (N
for level 0 and 4N for 2 additional levels — an encrypted dictionary is not required),
while OneChoiceAlloc requires 4N space (including the encrypted dictionary). Then,
we compare our optimal locality scheme with OneChoiceAlloc. In Section 3.6.2, we
experimentally showed the superiority of our scheme over OneChoiceAlloc. We now
measure only the number of false positives produced by each approach, since it is
the only factor that differs between the two schemes and impacts their performance
in practice.
Figure 3.10(a) depicts the end-to-end search time for the real dataset. PiBas
and our scheme return to the client the exact answer, while in this experiment One-
ChoiceAlloc returns the answer with false positives. We observe that OneChoiceAlloc
is faster than PiBas, while our scheme is up to 60x faster than OneChoiceAlloc and
for the queries with size ≤ 27 tuples it has the same performance as PiBas and at
most 2.8x speed-down compared to OneChoiceAlloc. This is due to the block size
whose size is 4K and can contain at most 27 encrypted keyword,id pairs. If the
result size is smaller than 27 we still have to retrieve a whole block from the disk.
Furthermore, if level 7 is the next stored level after 0 , then a query with size 26
requires from the server to read 26 blocks and for each of these blocks to perform a
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Figure 3.11: External memory comparison (N = 237 − 1)
random access. In this case, for all query results with less than 27 tuples our scheme
works identically to the scheme of PiBas.
In this experiment, we implemented OneChoiceAlloc to conduct the filtering of
the false positives on the server side (as was originally proposed in the paper [30]).
Now, PiBas,OneChoiceAlloc and our scheme return to the client the result without
false positives, so the communication cost and client work become the same for all
schemes. Figure 3.10(b) compares the server search time for the threes schemes.
We surprisingly observe that when the server filters the false positives, then for the
majority of the queries PiBas is slightly better than OneChoiceAlloc. OneChoiceAl-
loc is designed to have optimal locality, while PiBas has worst-case locality. The
reason, why in Figure 3.10(a) and in Figure 3.10(b) OneChoiceAlloc and PiBas have
similar performance is because for each piece of the result PiBas pays a PRF evalu-
ation (approximately 43 µsec) and a random access (approximately 10 msec), while
OneChoiceAlloc requires 3 logN log logN PRF evaluations (approximately 13msec
per result item) and no random accesses. OneChoiceAlloc has optimal locality, but
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(b) FP for different sizes
Figure 3.12: External memory comparison using parallelism (N = 247 − 1)
requires significantly more cryptographic operations and the benefit gained from
locality is nullified by the cost of the additional cryptographic operations. In Fig-
ure 3.10(b), we observe that our scheme requires up to 4 orders of magnitude less
search time on the server than OneChoiceAlloc.
Below, our scheme has again optimal locality. Figure 3.11(a) depicts the worst-
case read efficiency compared with OneChoiceAlloc for the first synthetic dataset of
size N = 237 − 1 and for different numbers of levels s in our scheme. For s ≥ 4 our
scheme always outperforms OneChoiceAlloc, and therefore we consider the interesting
cases to be s = 2 and s = 4.
In Figure 3.11(b) we compare the number of false positives of our approach
and OneChoiceAlloc, for all possible queries for s = 2, 4. For s = 2 (which requires
the same space with OneChoiceAlloc), our approach outperforms OneChoiceAlloc for
almost all possible queries, reaching maximum speed-up approximately 577×. This
is because our scheme does not penalize queries with the worst-case bound.
We conduct the same experiments on a dataset of size close to 1 petabyte and
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the resulting outcomes are illustrated in Figures 3.12(a)and 3.12(b) (see Our Scheme
for L = 1 and the parallel OneChoiceAlloc for L = 32). Figure 3.12(b) shows that
only for a small portion of all possible queries OneChoiceAlloc has less false positives
than our scheme.In the worst case, our scheme reaches 86× speed-down compared to
OneChoiceAlloc, but for the biggest portion we achieve significantly higher speed-ups
up to 760×.
Since it is impractical to handle a dataset of size close to 1 petabyte without
exploiting parallelism, we tune the locality L of our scheme to be equal to the number
of parallel processing units (the locality per processor remains O(1)). In this case
we always achieve a smaller number of false positives for all queries. For comparison
reasons we created a parallel implementation of the OneChoiceAlloc scheme based
on the (naive) idea proposed in Section 3.2. We could not further improve the
parallel approach of OneChoiceAlloc. Figures 3.12(a) and 3.12(b) report the results
of the same experiments, but now using 1, 8, 16, 32 parallel processing units for
our scheme, and always 32 parallel processing units for the OneChoiceAlloc scheme.
Recall that when L > 1 we also have level 0, but only for level 0 we store an array
of size N instead of 2N + 2. The vast improvement is achieved because for s = 3
our complexity is O(N1/3/L) (as explained in Section 3.2) while the complexity of
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Figure 3.13: External memory comparison (N = 247 − 1)
3.6.4 Comparison with TwoChoiceAlloc
In the experimental evaluation section 4.3 we purposely did not include the
comparison of our work with the Scheme 3 proposed by Asharov et al. in [30] (Two-
ChoiceAlloc), due to their assumption of not considering word lists of size more than
N1−1/ log logN . This assumption cannot be taken into consideration for real world
datasets. For instance, let us examine the real dataset of crime records that was
used in our experiments that contains 21 attributes. Then, for 12 attributes out of
the total of 21, their assumption is violated. Therefore, it becomes infeasible to use
the TwoChoiceAlloc scheme on these attributes. Moreover, even though the assump-
tion holds for the 9 remaining attributes note that these contain only unique values
or have very small cardinality, i.e. the following attributes: id, case number, date
and time, X coordinate, Y coordinate, longitude and latitude. For these attributes
TwoChoiceAlloc can be used, but even then our scheme yield a smaller number
of false positives. More specifically, we applied to our scheme the assumption of
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N1−1/ log logN by computing the level that has chunks bigger than the answer to a
query of size N1−1/ log logN . Since it is impossible to consider such sizes (or bigger),
we evenly select the appropriate levels out of the remaining excluding those that
have chunks with size bigger than the answer of the query. This can be illustrated in
an example where N = 247 − 1. Then, the assumption that we do not have a query
result of size bigger than N1−1/ log logN means that the possible query sizes range
from 1 to 239. Therefore, our algorithm will select evenly distributed levels start-
ing from level 1 up to level 36 excluding all levels higher than 36. Figures 3.13(a)
and 3.13(b) compare the two schemes showing that for the same amount of space
which is equivalent to setting our redundancy factor s = 2 since TwoChoiceAlloc
requires 4 ·N space, our scheme is always better than TwoChoiceAlloc. In addition,
TwoChoiceAlloc assumes that the size of each word list is a power of 2 and N is also
assumed to be a power of 2. Hence, in the worst case the TwoChoiceAlloc scheme
requires padding the dataset, thus yielding a final size that reaches 8 ∗ N . In this
case and in order for both schemes to use the same space we tune our redundancy
factor to be equal to 8 so we also show the case of our scheme having redundancy
factor s = 8.
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Chapter 4: Efficient Searchable Encryption Through Compression
Since the first work on SE schemes proposed in 2000 [16], all follow-up works
with linear size encrypted index (e.g., [1, 23, 26, 30]) require the server to perform
cryptographic operations (PRF evaluations) to retrieve the result, the number of
which is at least equal to the size of the query result. The main reason is that
for security purposes a query result r is stored in |r| random positions indexed by
|r| values each of them produced by a PRF. The server, given a token t(w), has to
expand it on |r| sub-tokens (using PRF evaluations) to locate, retrieve and return to
the client all the |r| pieces of the result. A PRF evaluation corresponds to the most
expensive operation in the search algorithm. The main question we are therefore
asking in this Chapter is:
Can we design SE schemes that retrieve the keyword search result r with less
than |r| cryptographic operations?
It is worth noting that previous SE schemes with constant locality (ones that
require few random accesses to retrieve the result) (e.g.,[30, 31, 32]) have partially
addressed this problem by reducing the number of cryptographic operations required
by the server and not the total number of cryptographic operations.
In this work we take a more aggressive approach and aim at reducing the total
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number of cryptographic operations required by the protocol. We propose a novel SE
scheme for private keyword and database search using compression that addresses
the above question. Our SE scheme is the first in which the document identifiers
matching a queried keyword can be retrieved with potentially less cryptographic op-
erations than the result size |r|1. Informally we achieve that by storing an encryption
of a compressed index instead of a traditional encrypted index. While combining
compression and encryption can create security problems [54], we leverage the al-
ready existing leakage of searchable encryption to overcome this. We formally prove
that our scheme can use any secure SE scheme as black-box (including the recent
locality-aware SE schemes [30, 31, 32]), and any set of lossless compression algo-
rithms improving the search efficiency of the used black-box by orders of magnitude
without affecting its security.
We experimentally evaluate our scheme and show that, for the case of keyword
search, it achieves up to 188× speedup in terms of search time, compared to the most
practical in-memory SE scheme. For the case of database search (where there are no
overlaps across results and thus less structural leakage—see Section 2.5), we show
that our saving is still high, up to 62× for the location description attribute; up to
203× for binary attributes (see section 4.3). Our SE scheme can be used as black-
box in [2, 3] for further improving the performance of private range/aggregation
queries and in [33] for improving boolean queries.
We combine our scheme with Oblivious RAM (ORAM) approaches and pro-
1Our scheme offers better search time for result sizes greater than 1; otherwise our scheme
requires one cryptographic operation, just like other SE schemes. Thus, our scheme does not have
performance benefits when all documents contain different words as well as in the database search
for unique-key attributes.
59
pose Oblivious SE (OSE), a scheme that answers private keyword and point queries
with ORAM-style security guarantees. Our OSE scheme reduces the index search
time to access one million tuples using a state-of-the-art ORAM scheme approxi-
mately from 21 hours to 20 minutes. Our OSE scheme can be used in the recent
works for oblivious querying processing [6, 55, 56] in order to further improve their
performance.
4.1 Supported Leakage Functions
In total we present four SE constructions in this chapter that satisfy Defini-
tion 1 presented before. Each such scheme has different leakage, as we detail in the
following.
• A simple SE construction for keyword search (SE-K);
• A simple SE construction for database search (SE-D);
• An ORAM-based SE construction for keyword search (OSE-K);
• An ORAM-based SE construction for database search (OSE-D).
Every construction leaks different amount of information. In Table 4.1 we show all
the leakages in detail. We now explain the intuition behind these leakages.
Leakages for SE-K. Our simple SE construction for keyword search leaks only the
size of the index N and number of the indexed documents n during setup. During
a query for w, it leaks (id(w),D(w)) where id(w) is a random-looking λ-bit number
that we map to each keyword w, called alias of w (capturing the search pattern,
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construction LSETUP LSEARCH
SE-K (N, n) (id(w),D(w))
SE-D N (id(w), |D(w)|)
OSE-K (N, n) |D(w)|
OSE-D N |D(w)|
Table 4.1: Different leakages in our constructions.
i.e., whether a keyword query has been repeated or not). The set D(w) captures
the access pattern, revealing which document overlaps between previously queried
documents.
Leakages for SE-D. The main difference here is in the query leakage, where we
leak the size of the access pattern, instead of the access pattern itself. Also, since
N = n in the database search scenario, only N is naturally leaked.
Leakages for OSE-K and OSE-D. As opposed to construction SE-K and SE-D,
our ORAM-based constructions only leak the size of the result that is returned. We
can consider this leakage to be ideal for any scheme that supports sublinear-time
search, since in order to hide the size of the result we will need to either download
the entire encrypted index, or equivalently to pad the result to the maximum size.
In both cases the size of each query answer will be proportional to the input size,
i.e. O(N).
4.2 Our Approach
Our approach consists of two main steps: Given the dataset D, in the first
step we compress each list D(w); The second step uses the output compressed lists
(for all keywords w) as input to the SE setup algorithm. When an encrypted search
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query is performed, the accessed list is much smaller (due to compression)—once
we receive the compressed list, we can decompress it and retrieve the result. Note
that while asymptotically the time required for the search is the same as other
schemes, the number of cryptographic operations are only proportional to the size
of the compressed list—this leads to significant savings in practice as we show in the
experiments. We now describe various components of our approach in more detail.
Uniform document identifier reassignments. Prior SE schemes assume that
for each document identifier we pick a random string of τ bits. Note that perform-
ing compression on random strings leads to almost negligible compression. In our
approach, instead of assigning a random string of τ bits to each document identifier
we assign an id chosen uniformly at random from the range [0, n − 1], where n is
the total number of documents in our collection. This uniform reassignment of doc-
ument identifiers is equivalent to having random strings of τ bits (this will be part
of our security proofs). However, our approach leads to more efficient compression
of the encrypted keyword lists.
Compression and partitioning. As mentioned earlier, instead of storing D(w) =
{id1, . . . , ids} in the encrypted index, we will store an encrypted version of that
list, namely the string Y = Compress(D(w)), computed using some compression
algorithm. Note that Y ’s size is at most s log n bits meaning that the number of
cryptographic operations required to retrieve the compressed result is reduced—the
actual result can be easily retrieved from the compressed result with no crypto-
graphic operations.
We further partition Y to chunks of λ − log n bits (we use log n bits to store
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idw,1 idw,2 idw,3 idw,4 idw,5 idw,6
Y =
log n bits
≤ 6 · log n bits
Partition(Y)







Figure 4.1: Our scheme first compresses the keyword lists and then performs the
partitioning. Note that the packed words need to be stored with a rank, so that the
decompression can work correctly.
the rank of the chunk as we explain below), where λ is the security parameter. This
assures we “pack” the maximum amount of information into one PRF evaluation.
For example, we can partition Y into words G1, G2 etc., ending up with approxi-
mately µ = |Y|
λ−logn words G1, G2, . . . , Gµ. Finally, we store in the encrypted index
the compressed list Γ(w) = {G1, . . . , Gµ}. Notice that in the actual construction
we store for each word its rank i by attaching log n bits so that decompression
works correctly. Thus, each compressed word will have size λ bits. Our approach is
described in Figure 4.1.
4.2.1 Choosing Compression Algorithms
We note that there are more than 20 different algorithms for bitmap/inverted
list compression — see [57], and therefore identifying the most suitable compres-
sion algorithm is a challenging task. In our approach we selected two compression
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algorithms EWAH and FastPfor that take into consideration the specialized struc-
ture of SE/OSE, i.e. how we can efficiently compress |D(w)| uniformly distributed
document identifiers for each keyword w. We choose our compression algorithm for
each keyword list in a greedy fashion: Find the best compression algorithm for each
keyword list D(w) individually, from a set of compression algorithms C and store
some extra metadata to denote which compression algorithm was used. Below, we
explain the reasons we chose EWAH and FastPfor and in which ranges we expect
that each compression algorithm will be used in practice.
We chose EWAH for keyword lists of very large size. In particular, we modify
the EWAH algorithm to yield compressed words of size φ = λ− log n, instead of the
original 32 bits. Setting the compressed words to have size φ bits means that the
maximum number of required compressed words will be O(n
φ
). Intuitively, we expect
that we can benefit from this algorithm only when |D(w)| > n
φ
. If |D(w)| < n
φ
then
with high probability the expected load of each compressed word will be ≤ 1, since
the distribution of document identifiers is uniform. In the latter case, we represent
each document identifier with O(λ) bits, leading to no compression. EWAH achieves
savings only if D(w) > n/φ. For example, in the extreme case that |D(w)| = n,
then EWAH will compress all the document identifiers in exactly one compressed
keyword with λ bits; in this case EWAH achieves the best possible compression
ratio.
We chose FastPfor for keyword lists with small, medium and large sizes. In
the extreme case, that |D(w)| = n, FastPfor will compress keyword w using approx-
imately O(n) bits, since it will require at least 1 bit per delta. Thus, we expect that
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EWAH will be superior for very large keyword-lists, i.e. |D(w)| > c1 ·n/λ (for some
constant c1); FastPfor will handle the remaining keyword-lists. However, there is
not a clear separation of the ranges where each of the above compression algorithms
will be better and so we follow a greedy selection as we described above.
In the case that the compressed keyword-lists have size greater than log n ∗
|D(w)| bits, we use the original uncompressed representation. Notice that the greedy
selection is a viable solution and does not significantly affect the Setup time, since
the encryption cost is the dominant factor.
4.2.2 Our SE Construction
Our main SE construction is shown in Figure 4.2. Note the random document
identifier reassignment (Line 2 of the Setup algorithm), compression (Line 4 of the
Setup algorithm) and partitioning (Line 5 of the Setup algorithm). In particular,
Setup works as follows. After parsing the input index D the algorithm compresses
each keyword list D(wi) individually by greedily selecting the best compression
method from the set of lossless compression algorithms C (described in Section 4.2.1).
Then, Setup performs partitioning as described above to obtain the index Γ, which
is padded with up to N entries and encrypted using any SE scheme as a black-box.
As shown in Figure 4.2 the algorithms KeyGen and Search perform only calls
to the blackbox algorithms SE.KeyGen and SE.Search, respectively.
The Search algorithm is applied to an input keyword w, in order to retrieve the
list {1||G1, 2||G2, . . . , µ||Gµ} and decompresses the bit string G1||G2|| . . . ||Gµ using
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k ← KeyGen(1λ)
1: k ← SE.KeyGen(1λ).
2: return k.
(stC, I)←Setup(k,D)
1: Set N = |{D(w)}
w∈W|. Let n be the number of documents (n ≤ N).
2: Reassign document identifiers using a random permutation p : [n] → [n]
(i.e., document i becomes document p(i)).
3: for each w ∈W do
4: (Y , c)← COMPRESS(D(w), C). . C is a set of compression
algorithms; c are the bits encoding this choice.
5: Write Y as G1||G2 . . . ||Gµ where Gi is a bit string of λ− dlog ne bits
(pad the last bit string if needed).
6: Set Γ(w) = {c, 1||G1, 2||G2, . . . , µ||Gµ}.
7: Pad Γ to have N entries. . We insert a dummy keyword which contains
the necessary number of dummy values.a
8: I ← SE.Setup(k,Γ).
9: Set stC to include k.
10: return (stC, I).
(X , stC, I)↔ Search(stC, w, I)
1: (c, result)← SE.Search(stC, w, I).
2: Write result as {1||G1, 2||G2, . . . , µ||Gµ}.
3: X ← DECOMPRESS(G1||G2|| . . . ||Gµ, C, c).
4: return (X , stC, I).
aThis dummy keyword is never returned as part of any query.
Figure 4.2: Our more efficient SE construction using any SE and a set C of com-
pression algorithms as black-box.
the same compression algorithm c ∈ C that was used for compression. Finally, it
outputs the real document identifiers {id1, id2, . . .}.
Note that the utilized black-box SE scheme must leak the actual access pattern
(e.g., [1, 32]2), since otherwise our construction is not correct. This is because ran-
domizing the identifiers in the black-box SE scheme would cause the decompression
2In the literature of SE schemes for the keyword search problem, some of the prior works [30, 31]
focus for simplicity only on retrieving the document identifiers of a queried keyword w and not on
getting the actual documents. These schemes do not leak the actual access pattern, but only its
size. However, it is easy to extend these schemes, such that they return the actual documents and
leak the actual access pattern.
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(I, stS)← SimSetup(LSETUP(D))
1: (N, n)← LSETUP(D).
2: (I, st)← SE.SimSetup(N).
3: Let A = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of document identifiers.
4: Let Previous and Access be empty hash tables.
5: return (I, (st, A,Previous,Access)).
(X, stS , I)← SimSearch(stS ,LSEARCH(D, w), I)
1: Parse stS as (st, A,Previous,Access).
2: Let (id(w), R1, R2, . . . , Rs)← LSEARCH(D, w).
3: if Previous.get(id(w)) 6= null then
4: return (Previous.get(id(w)), stS , I).
5: else
6: for i = 1, . . . , s do
7: if Access.get(Ri) = null then
8: Pick idi uniformly at random from A and set A = A− {idi}.
9: Access.put(Ri, idi).
10: else
11: idi ← Access.get(Ri).
12: (Y , c)← COMPRESS(id1||id2|| . . . ||ids, C).
13: Write Y as G1||G2 . . . ||Gµ where Gi is a bit string of λ− dlogNe bits
(pad the last bit string if needed).
14: Set Γ(w) = {1||G1, 2||G2, . . . , µ||Gµ}.
15: (X , stS , I)← SE.SimSearch(stS ,Γ(w), I).
16: Parse X as (c, result) and compute X ′ ← DECOMPRESS(result, C, c).
17: Previous.put(id(w),X ′).
18: Update stS with the new values of (st, A,Previous,Access).
19: return (X ′, stS , I).
Figure 4.3: Simulator algorithms SimSetup and SimSearch for SE (keyword search
problem)
algorithm to produce garbage. In addition, in the keyword search problem it is not
necessary for the used black-box SE to leak both N and n; there are SE schemes
that leak only N . However, our construction additionally leaks n—this allows us to
define the domain from which we draw the document identifiers.
We will now prove security of our SE-K construction, assuming the black-box
SE scheme we use is (L1,L2)-secure where L1 leaks only the size of the index N (but
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not the number of documents n) and L2 leaks the search pattern and access pattern.
We provide the proof for the keyword search problem; proofs for the database search
problem are easily derived from the proof we present.
Theorem 2 Let LSETUP, LSEARCH be the leakages defined in Section 4.1 for the
SE-K construction. If the SE scheme used as a black-box in our construction of
Figure 4.2 is (L1,L2)-secure according to Definition 1, then our SE-K construction
of Figure 4.2 is (LSETUP, LSEARCH)-secure.
Proof 3 Our black-box SE scheme is (L1,L2)-secure, we use its SE.SimSetup and
SE.SimSearch algorithms.
Our simulator SimSetup(LSETUP(D)) and SimSearch(LSEARCH(D, w)) is described
in Figure 4.3. For the first part of the proof, we must show that no PPT algorithm
Dist can distinguish, with more than negligible probability, between the index Ireal
output by Setup(k,D) and the index Iideal output by SimSetup(LSETUP(D)). This is
because both Ireal and Iideal have the same number of entries and the black-box SE
is (L1,L2)-secure.
For the second part of the proof we need to prove that Dist cannot distinguish
between the outputs of Search(k, w) and the output of SimSearch(stS ,LSEARCH(D, w)).
First, both Search and SimSearch produce the same messages, i.e. tokens and
results, for the same repeated keywords. SimSearch uses the search pattern leakage
Previous included in stS . Second, for a keyword w that has not been queried before, it
is enough to show that the distribution of Γ(w) in Line 6 of Setup and the distribution
of Γ(w) in Line 14 of SimSearch are identical. If so, the security will follow from
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the existence of a simulator of the black-box secure SE scheme. It is easy to see
that the aforementioned distributions are identical. In the real game, the document
identifiers that are compressed are chosen uniformly at random due to the random
permutation at Line 2, and in the SimSearch algorithm the identifiers are again
picked uniformly at random from A at Line 8, every time a new keyword comes in.
The simulator also correctly simulates the overlapped document identifiers between
different queries using its state stC and the access pattern leakage—see Lines 2 and
11.
Choosing the black-box SE. Our solution can achieve a high degree of par-
allelism, good locality trade-offs and dynamism, when selecting the SE black-box
scheme to be the optimal read efficiency scheme proposed in [32]. According to [50],
the latter scheme achieves optimal space and locality trade-offs since it matches
a lower-bound for schemes with optimal read efficiency. The composition of our
scheme with the above provides very efficient search time for both in-memory and
external memory settings in the standard SE leakage profile. The schemes of [32]
with non-optimal read efficiency have different leakage profile; however our scheme
can use them as a black-box inheriting all the different trade-offs that they provide,
but in that case our scheme will inherit also their leakage profile.
4.2.3 Our OSE Construction
Our OSE-K/OSE-D construction is shown in Figure 4.4 and is based on mod-
ifying the SE construction presented in the previous section. The main difference is
69
that instead of using a SE scheme as a black-box, we now use an Oblivious RAM
scheme for that purpose. We summarize these modifications.
• The Setup algorithm uses Lines 4 to compute the optimal worst-case num-
ber of compressed words µ0, i.e., it computes for each used compression al-
gorithm the worst-case required number of compressed words (for a given
n and |D(w)|) and chooses the most efficient one (we will explain the intu-
ition behind this point below). In Line 8, list Γ(w) is padded to contain
exactly µ0 compressed words. In Line 9, Γ is padded to have 2 · N entries.
In Line 10, Setup computes the encrypted index using OramInitialize, i.e.,
(stC, I)← OramInitialize(k,D) and in Line 11 it outputs (stC, I).
• The Search algorithm calls OramAccess as many times as necessary to re-
ceive the entire compressed result, i.e., ∀i ∈ [0, µ+ 1) we call
(X , st′C, I ′)↔ OramAccess(stC, stC.pos(G||i), I) .
The client’s state stC, comprises all the information that the client needs to
know in order to retrieve each Gi, i.e., a mapping indicating that Gi is stored in
index j (this mapping is called position map and we denote it as stC.pos(Gi)—
we will further explain the notion of position map below).
Important observation concerning security. We observe that in the SE con-
struction (Figure 4.2) a keyword-list of |D(w)| size may be compressed into µ com-
pressed words in one execution, while in another execution it may be compressed
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k ← KeyGen(1λ)
1: return k ←$ {0, 1}λ.
(stC, I)←Setup(k,D)
1: Set N = |{D(w)}
w∈W|. Let n be the number of documents (n ≤ N).
2: Reassign document identifiers based on a random permutation p : [n]→ [n].
3: for each w ∈W do
4: Compute (µ0, c)← WORST-COMPRESSION(|D(w)|, n, C).
5: (Y , c)← COMPRESS(D(w), c).
6: Write Y as G1||G2 . . . ||Gµ where Gi is a bit string of λ− dlog ne bits
(pad the last bit string if needed).
7: Set Γ(w) = {c, 1||G1, 2||G2, . . . , µ||Gµ}.
8: Pad Γ(w) to have exactly µ0 bit-strings of the form x||Gx.
9: Pad Γ to have 2 ·N entries. . We insert a dummy keyword which contains
the necessary number of dummy values.a
10: (stC, I)← OramInitialize(k,Γ).
11: return (stC, I).
(X , st′C, I ′)↔ Search(stC, w, I)
1: i = 0.
2: while Gi 6= ⊥ do
3: (Gi, st
′
C, I ′)↔ OramAccess(stC, stC.pos(w||i), I).
4: I ← I ′, stC ← st′C , i← i+ 1.
Write result as {1||G1, 2||G2, . . . , µ||Gµ}.
5: X ← DECOMPRESS(G1||G2|| . . . ||Gµ, C, c).
6: return (X , st′C, I ′).
(I, stS)← SimSetup(LSETUP(D))
1: Let (N, n)← LSETUP(D, w) and (I, st)← SimOramInitialize(2 ·N).
2: return (I, st).
(X , stS , I)↔ SimSearch(stS ,LSEARCH(D, w), I)
1: Let s← LSEARCH(D, w), (N, n)← LSETUP(D, w).
2: Compute (µ0, c)← WORST-COMPRESSION(s, n, C).
3: for i = 1, . . . , µ0 do
4: Pick a random index ind.
5: Compute (X , st, I ′)↔ SimOramAccess(stS , ind, I).
6: Set I ← I ′ and update stS with the new values of st.
7: return (X , stS , I).
aThis dummy keyword is never returned as part of any query.
Figure 4.4: Our OSE-K construction and the simulator algorithms SimSetup and
SimSearch using an Oblivious RAM and a set C of compression algorithms as black-
box.
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into µ+ 1 compressed words. However, as we proved this does not induce any secu-
rity issues, since in both cases the distributions of the document identifiers are the
same. Therefore, even if the adversary queries the same keyword multiple times,
the simulator will simulate the query only the first time and for any subsequent
execution of the same query she will use the search pattern leakage to return the
previously chosen result (see Line 11 of Figure 4.3). A very important difference
between the SE and OSE constructions is that the latter does not leak the search
pattern, i.e., whether two encrypted search queries are the same. Let us consider the
case of an adversary querying the same keyword w1 multiple times in our OSE con-
struction. In that case Setup will always produce the same number of compressed
words µ, while SimSetup might yield a different number of compressed words in
every execution.
In order to address the aforementioned problem, it is required that all keyword
lists of the same size s to have the same number of compressed words. To achieve
this, WORST-COMPRESSION (in Line 4) computes for each c ∈ C the worst-
case compression (given n, s and C) and returns the best algorithm c, and the worst-
case number of compressed words µ0 for c. Now, we first compress the list D(w) as
before (see Lines 5-7) and then pad it to size µ0 (Line 8).
We note here that computing µ0 is easy for some algorithms, e.g., WAH,
EWAH but for other algorithms, such FastPfor, it is not. It is also possible that the
worst-case compression for some algorithms to be very close to the uncompressed
size, e.g. VB compression algorithm described in [58]. For compression algorithms
in which computing the worst-case compression is either not viable in practice or
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the compression ratio is close to 1, we use an alternative methodology. We choose
for each n and s a predefined µ0, and we store the overflowed lists (µ − µ0) in a
local stash in the client side. It is a good practice to choose µ0 to be the expected
number of compressed words (for a given n and s).
We will now prove the security of our OSE-K construction, assuming the black-
box ORAM we use is secure and assuming that µ0 > µ always hold for Lines 4-8.
Theorem 3 Let LSETUP, LSEARCH be the leakages defined in Section 4.1 for OSE-K.
If the ORAM scheme used as a black-box in the construction of Figure 4.2 is secure,
then our OSE-K construction of Figure 4.2 is (LSETUP, LSEARCH) secure.
Proof 4 The deployed black-box ORAM scheme is considered to be secure, so our
proof uses its SimOramInitialize and SimOramAccess. Our simulators
SimSetup(LSETUP(D)) and SimSearch(LSEARCH(D, w)) are shown in Figure 4.4.
For the first part of the proof, we show that no PPT Dist algorithm exists that
can distinguish, with more than negligible probability, between the index Ireal and
the index Iideal since both have the same number of entries and the black-box ORAM
scheme is secure. For the second part of the proof, we show that no PPT algorithm
Dist exists that can distinguish, with more than negligible probability, between the
index Search and the index SimSearch, for the following reasons; (i) both Search and
SimSearch produce indistinguishable messages, (ii) in both cases Dist observes the
same number of ORAM accesses, (iii) ORAM being secure implies that Search and
SimSearch are indistinguishable with non-negligible probability.
Choosing the ORAM black-box. Our OSE schemes can use any secure ORAM
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as a black-box. For instance, we propose using any Square Root ORAM, hierarchical-
based ORAM or tree-based ORAM. The main efficiency metrics for an ORAM
scheme are: (i) Amortized overhead, (ii) Worst-Case Overhead, (iii) Storage, (iv)
Client Storage. In our solution we assume for simplicity reasons that the client lo-
cally stores a position map, i.e., a data structure that maintains mappings of specific
keyword,id pairs to their currently stored indexes j in the ORAM. Different families
of ORAM schemes stores a position map in different ways. For instance, PathO-
RAM proposes a solution that increases the overhead and recursively outsources
the position map in an oblivious manner. This work we suggest that any tree-based
approach with the minimum worst-case overhead even if it stores the position map
locally on the client, such as the non-recursive PathORAM, to be a good candi-
date for constituting the ORAM black-box. We can outsource the position maps
using the notion of oblivious data structures described in [41] without increasing
the worst case overhead (we create a single-linked list connecting all Gi together,
each Gi will store the position of Gi+1, we store G1 in an oblivious data structure
and the remaining Gi in PathORAM). Creating a practical OSE scheme combining
PathORAM with the idea of oblivious data structure requires in total, O(N) space,
O(log2N) worst-case overhead for result sizes smaller than O(log2N) ids, O(logN)
worst-case overhead for result sizes greater than O(log2N) and client storage of
O(log2N) · ω(1) ids. We omit providing further details on combining PathORAM
with oblivious data structures, as our OSE construction is generic and can improve
the search performance of an OSE scheme using any ORAM as black-box. We fur-
ther refer the reader to the recent work of Chang et al. [59] for a comprehensive
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evaluation of various ORAM protocols.
4.3 Experiments
In this section we experimentally evaluate the performance of our proposed
schemes. We call the SE construction of section 4.2.2 as microSE and the OSE con-
struction of section 4.2.3 as microOSE. We select the SE black-box scheme to be the
basic construction of Cash et al. [1] as it is the state-of-the-art in-memory SE scheme
with linear size encrypted index (it requires N encrypted entries) and we refer to it
as PiBas. We did not choose the scheme with optimal read efficiency of Demertzis
and Papamanthou [32] since it requires sN space; for s = 1 both schemes have the
same performance; for s > 1 the optimal read efficient scheme of [32] outperforms
PiBas at the cost of more space. Furthermore, we denote by “microSE(PiBas)” that
microSE uses PiBas as a black-box. We choose PathORAM [5] to be the black-box
ORAM scheme for microOSE (microOSE(PathORAM )) and for simplicity we store
the position map locally.
We evaluate the performance of microSE(PiBas) and compare it to one of the
original PiBas scheme in order to illustrate the superiority of microSE; similarly we
compare microOSE(PathORAM ) to PathORAM.
4.3.1 Setup
We carried out the implementation of our schemes, PiBas and PathORAM
in Java. Our experiments were conducted on a 64-bit machine with an Intel Xeon
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E5-2676v3 and 64 GB RAM. We utilized the JavaX.crypto library and the bouncy
castle library [53] for the cryptographic operations3. In particular, for the PRF and
randomized symmetric encryption implementations we used HMAC-SHA-256 and
AES128-CBC, respectively, for encryption. The compression algorithms that we use
are FastPfor [60] and EWAH [61] (with compressed keywords of size λ bits). We
consider the following two datasets in our experimental setting. The first dataset
is a real dataset [46] consisting of 6, 123, 276 tuples with 22 attributes of reported
incidents of crime in Chicago [46]. This is a typical database table, which does
not have intersections between the keywords (database search). We consider the
first query attribute to be the location description attribute which is an attribute
following a skewed distribution containing 173 distinct keywords (this is the x-axis in
Figures 4.6(a),and 4.6(b)). Among these keywords the one with minimum frequency
contains 1 record, while the one with maximum frequency has 1, 631, 721 records.
We also consider the attribute date that does not follow a skewed distribution, in
order to show the difference between a skewed and a “non-skewed” distribution in
the database search case. The date attribute contains 58, 404 distinct keywords
(this is the x-axis in Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b)). Among these keywords the one
with minimum frequency contains 1 record, while the one with maximum frequency
has 14, 564 records. In Figure 4.9(a). we provide the mean and best compression
ratio for all the 22 attributes.
3We highlight that our Java implementation does not use hardware supported cryptographic
operations. However, this does not affect our conclusions on the superiority of our proposed
constructions. The use of hardware supported cryptographic operations will drastically improve
both, the original constructions of PiBas and PathORAM, as well as our own microSE(PiBas) and













































Figure 4.5: Index costs
For our second dataset, we use the Enron email dataset [47], which consists of
30, 109 emails from the “sent mail” folder of 150 employees of the Enron corporation
that were sent between 2000− 2002. We extracted keywords from this dataset. The
words were first stemmed using the standard porter stemming algorithm [62], and
then we removed 200 stop words.This dataset contains 76, 577 distinct keywords
(this is the x-axis in Figures 4.8(a) and 4.8(b)). Among these keywords the one
with minimum frequency contains 1 id, while the one with maximum has 24, 642.
4.3.2 microSE/microOSE Evaluation
Index Costs. In the first set of experiments we evaluate the required index size
and construction time of our scheme for different dataset sizes N . The results are
shown in Figure 4.5. The construction time includes the I/O cost of transferring the
dataset from the disk to the main memory, and the index size represents only the
size of the encrypted index. Moreover, we partition the initial dataset into 12 sets
of 500K tuples each, chosen uniformly at random from the entire dataset. Then, we
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(b) # PRF evaluations
Figure 4.6: Search costs - Crime Dataset (Location attribute)
begin with the first partition and consider the other partitions in each step in order
to represent the construction time (Figure 4.5(a)) and the index size (Figure 4.5(b)),
as the size of the input gradually increases. Since we perform the same amount of
work for every partition while building up the index, the storage and construction
time required is linear in the number of partitions (or input size). Figure 4.5 re-
flects this observation. We observe that both microSE(PiBas) and PiBas have the
same index costs, since microSE(PiBas) performs padding to have exactly the same
encrypted index size with PiBas, the same applies for microOSE(PathORAM ) and
PathORAM. We highlight that the padding in the case of microSE affects only the
setup costs since the inserted dummy records are never returned as part of any query,
while in the case of microOSE it may slightly affect the query costs (depending on
how we handle the overflowed lists), but the returned compressed response cannot
exceed the uncompressed.
Search Cost. In this set of experiments, we illustrate the total time required by
the server to retrieve and find the tuple-ids or document-ids for each query. For
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visualization purposes, we sort the queries based on their result size in descending
order and we query each of them, i.e. x-axis for value x=0 depicts the query with the
largest result size. In Figure 4.6(a) we observe the search time and in Figure 4.6(b)
the number of cryptographic operations for the location description attribute both
for microSE and microOSE. Similarly, in Figure 4.7(a) we observe the search time
and in Figure 4.7(b) the number of cryptographic operations for the date attribute.
In the case of microOSE, we calculate a specific µ0 for a given size, by estimating
heuristically its expected value for a given n, |D(w)| and we store the overflowed
lists in a local stash γ on the client side. We experimentally observed that local
stash γ was always smaller than the stash of PathORAM.
The maximum speed-up for the location description attribute is 62× both for
microSE and microOSE, while for the date attribute the corresponding number is
21×. The location description attribute presents a more skewed distribution, as
it contains high-frequency keywords. Note that more tuple-ids per keyword lead
to a better compression ratio. microSE and microOSE have the same performance
because in both cases they take advantage only of the size of each query.
In Figure 4.8(a), we observe the search time and in Figure 4.8(b) the number
of PRF evaluations for the Enron dataset. In the case of SE we achieve up to 188×
speed-up, while in the case of OSE the speed-up was similar since in both cases the
compression takes advantage of the number of documents and the size of each query.
In Figure 4.9(a), we use microSE for all the 22 attributes of the Crime dataset
and we report the best and the mean speed-up that we achieve. We observe that
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(b) # PRF evaluations
Figure 4.8: Search costs - Enron Dataset
is achieved. The reason is that the first 2 attributes contain unique values, so every
value has result size 1, which is the minimum number of cryptographic operation that
we have to perform. We also observe that attributes 8, 9 achieve higher compression
ratio than the other attributes (up to 166×, 203× respectively); the reason is
that these are binary attributes (true or false) and the sizes of their values are
proportional to the database size (attribute 8: whether an arrest was made or not,
attribute 9: whether the incident was domestic-related or not).
Dynamic costs. In this set of experiments, we consider the case of dynamic mi-
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microSE(Pibas) - Incremental Updates
microSE(Pibas) - Static Construction
(b) Update Costs
Figure 4.9: Additional Experiments (Crime Dataset)
croSE which is addressed as described in [2]. For these experiments, we fix the
consolidation step s that is described in the original paper, to 2. This means that
after every 2 new indexes, we initiate a consolidation phase that merges one or
more indexes in order to construct a new one. The batch size is set to 100, 000
updates. Figure 4.9(b) plots the time required for dynamic microSE(Pibas) (la-
beled as “Incremental Updates”) to maintain the index, when considering 10Mbps
network bandwidth. This experiment includes the time required for downloading,
decrypting, reconstructing (merging), re-encrypting and uploading the indexes. As
a reference, the plot also includes the cost required by static microSE(Pibas) to
build the same index (including the time for uploading the index), assuming that
the whole dataset is made available at once (labeled as “Static Construction”). We
can also use the same approach in order to extend microOSE to the dynamic setting;
the update costs will follow the same pattern but they will be scaled by a constant
factor.
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Chapter 5: Dynamic Searchable Encryption with Small
Client Storage
Recent research has focused on dynamic searchable encryption (DSE) schemes
that can efficiently support modifications in the encrypted dataset, without the
need to re-initialize the protocol. From a security perspective, developing secure
DSE schemes is challenging due to the additional information that may be revealed
to the server because of updates. Two relevant security notions have been proposed
for dynamic SE schemes—forward and backward privacy . Forward privacy [24,
63] ensures that a new update cannot be related to previous operations (until the
related keyword is searched). Besides the obvious benefit of allowing the encrypted
dataset to be built “on-the-fly” (crucial for certain applications, e.g., encrypted e-
mail storage starting from a new mailbox), forward privacy is essential for mitigating
certain leakage-abuse attacks that depend on adversarial file injection [64].
On the other hand, backward privacy ensures that if a document containing
keyword w is deleted before a search for w, the result of this search does not re-
veal anything about this document. Backward privacy is much less studied than
forward privacy. It was first proposed in NDSS 2014 by Stefanov et al. [24] and for-
mally defined recently in CCS 2017 by Bost et al. [65] who proposed three types of
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backward-privacy. During a search, BP-I reveals only the identifiers of files currently
containing w and when they were stored, BP-II additionally reveals the timestamps
and types (insertion/deletion) of all prior updates for w, and BP-III additionally
reveals for each prior deletion which insertion it canceled.
Challenge 1: DSE with small client storage. The majority of practical DSE
constructions from the literature (e.g., [28, 65, 66, 67]) require the client to lo-
cally store a table that holds for every keyword in the dataset a counter aw that
counts the number of updates for w (some schemes store an additional counter for
searches). This allows for very efficient schemes in practice, e.g., insertion of the
entry (w, id, add) after aw updates can be done by encrypting (w, id) and placing the
ciphertext in a hash map (stored at the server) at position F (k, (w, aw + 1)), where
F is a pseudorandom function (updates also can contain deletes which are handled
by inserting cancelation tuples). Later, to search for w the client simply looks up
the value of aw and queries the map at locations F (k, (w, 1)), . . . , F (k, (w, aw).
With some variations, this is the basic blueprint of many existing schemes.
This local word counter gives very efficient schemes but it has an obvious drawback:
increased client storage. Compared to storing an inverted index for DB locally,
the client needs to store a table W of unique keywords which, depending on the
dataset, may be rather large. E.g., for the Enron e-mail dataset, |DB| ≈ 2.6M and
|W | ≈ 77K, i.e., the client has to go through the trouble of deploying a DSE (and
leaking information) just to reduce its local storage by 33×. When using SE to























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































smaller, i.e., in the case of a real dataset with crime incidents in Chicago [46] (used
in [32, 35]) with |DB| ≈ 6M tuples, 22 attributes, and |W | ≈ 17M, the reduction
in local storage for supporting point queries for these attributes will be 5× at best
(similar results are observed in TPC-H benchmark [49]). In general, for relational
database search many attributes may contain unique values, (e.g., every record may
contain a different value) and in these cases the improvement in local storage will
be negligible. The aforementioned examples clearly illustrate that in many cases
storing locally a counter per word is problematic. Moreover, if we would like to
support the capability to access the encrypted database from multiple devices, this
approach would be especially cumbersome as it entails synchronization and state
transfer among them.
Using oblivious primitives. To avoid this, previous works (e.g., [1, 28, 65, 67]) have
proposed to store W at the server encrypted. This would trivially violate forward
privacy, unless one uses an oblivious map (OMAP) [41] that hides from the server
which word entry is accessed every time. One downside of this is that the con-
struction of [41] and subsequent improvements [69] require a logarithmic number of
rounds of interaction. The only existing DSE that avoids this is the forward-private
scheme of [70] (later made backward private in [65]). However, it uses the recursive
Path-ORAM construction of [5] and it relies on heavy garbled circuit computation
to make it non-interactive. Therefore, its potential for adoption in practice is quite
limited and it serves mostly as a feasibility result. Hence, we ask whether it is
possible to design a practical backward-and-forward-private DSE with small client
storage (e.g., polylog(|DB|) or, ideally, constant) and non-interactive search, which
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is the main motivation of our SDa and SDd schemes (see Table 5.1).
Challenge 2: DSE with (quasi-)optimal search. With a plaintext dataset,
the nw document identifiers of files currently containing w can be optimally retrieved
with nw operations. The same performance can be achieved for DSE (e.g., [28, 67]),
albeit for insertion-only schemes (where nw = aw, the total number of updates for
w). With deletion-supporting DSE nw can be arbitrarily smaller than aw. The
only two backward-private schemes that come close to achieving this optimal per-
formance are from [66]. At a high-level, they replace the nw accesses necessary for
retrieving the result with oblivious accesses and achieve a polylogarithmic overhead
over the optimal cost (see Table 5.1 for more details). According to Definition 5,
these schemes achieve quasi-optimal search time. However, their “black-box” use
of oblivious primitives results in schemes with rather poor performance, especially
due to communication cost (e.g., [66] reports Sim 1MB communication for returning
just nw = 100 identifiers). Therefore, we aim to develop a DSE with quasi-optimal
search and much better practical performance—our QOS scheme (see Table 5.1).
Our novel DSE schemes. In this Chapter, we present novel schemes that address
the above challenges as follows:
(i) We present a black-box reduction from any result-hiding static SE to a backward-
and-forward private DSE. We instantiate it with [1] and call the resulting
scheme SDa. It has O(aw + logN) search cost, where aw denotes the total
number of updates for keyword w, and O(logN) amortized update cost. Most
importantly, SDa is the first DSE with O(1) permanent client storage without
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using oblivious primitives, hence it greatly outperforms all existing schemes
for searches.
(ii) During amortized updates the temporary client storage of SDa may grow ar-
bitrarily large (up to O(N)). To avoid this, we present a version with de-
amortized updates called SDd that has the same search overhead as SDa and
it outperforms state-of-the-art low-client-storage DSE schemes in many sce-
narios (see our experimental evaluation in Section 5.4).
(iii) Finally for delete-intensive query workloads, we present QOS, a DSE with
quasi-optimal search time O(nw log iw) and O(1) client storage that vastly
outperforms existing quasi-optimal schemes during searches, where nw denotes
the number of files containing keyword w and iw the number of insertions for
w. Indeed, for large deletion percentages (approximately 40−80%, depending
on the deployment setting) it outperforms all other schemes.
All our constructions are forward-and-backward private (BP-II for SDa and SDd,
BP-III for QOS). In addition, our schemes are secure in the programmable random
oracle model but this assumption can be removed with standard techniques without
decrease in asymptotic efficiency, similar to previous works, e.g., [1, 67].
A detailed comparison with other DSE can be seen in Table 5.1 where we only
focus on schemes with small client storage. We also consider WO+Mitra (WO
stands for storing search/insertion counters for each w at an oblivious map), the
result of combining the most efficient backward-private scheme from [66] with the
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“word counter + oblivious map” approach described above (this technique can be
used with other schemes, e.g., Fides, Janus from [65] and Janus++ from [71], but
Mitra outperforms all of them both in terms of performance and security). All
schemes in Table 5.1 use OMAPs, except for SDa; they can achieve O(1) storage by
storing the stashes at the server and generating keys with a PRF. One general con-
clusion from the table is that our schemes achieve much better search performance
at the cost of increased overhead for updates. We note that this trade-off can be
favorable, e.g., it seems suitable for OLAP databases and data warehouses [? ] in
which search is more crucial than the update performance.
We implemented our three schemes and compare their search, update, and
storage performance with existing forward-and-backward private DSE (Section 5.4).
In particular, we compare them with the best low-client-storage scheme, Mitra [66]
with the word counter stored in an oblivious map, and Horus [66], the faster quasi-
optimal scheme. In terms of search time, SDa and SDd take less than 0.1ms for
retrieving a result of 100 elements from a dataset of 1M records. Moreover, for
small results, they are up to 34× and 20× faster than Mitra, with the added ben-
efit of being non-interactive. Turning to quasi-optimal schemes, QOS takes 1.3ms
for the same setting, vastly outperforming Horus (4-16531× throughout our ex-
periments). Where our schemes perform worse is in updates (as is evident from
the asymptotic analysis in Table 5.1), e.g., for our tested cases QOS is roughly 2×
slower than Horus (with the same blowup factor for communication size), whereas
Mitra is up to 21× faster than SDd (in the worst case). All these results are for
10% deleted entries. For larger delete percentages we show that QOS has the po-
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tential to become the most efficient solution. It outperforms both Mitra and SDd
after different ratios between 40-80%, depending on the number of insertions.
5.1 Dynamic Searchable Encryption (DSE)
In this section, we extend the definition of SE (provided in Section1) for the
dynamic case. A dynamic symmetric searchable encryption scheme (DSE) Σ =
(Setup, Search,Update) consists of algorithm Setup, and protocols Search,Update
that are executed between a client and a server:
• Setup(λ) on input λ outputs (K, σ,EDB) where K is a secret key for the
client, σ is the client’s local state, and EDB is an (initially empty) encrypted
database that is sent to the server. The notation Setup(λ,N) refers to a setup
process that takes a parameter N for the maximum supported number of
entries.
• Search(K, q, σ;EDB) is a protocol for searching the database. Here, we con-
sider search queries for a single keyword i.e., q = w ∈ Λ∗. The client’s output
is DB(w). The protocol may also modify K, σ and EDB.
• Update(K, op, w, id, σ;EDB) inserts an entry to or removes an entry from DB.
Input consists of op = add/del, file identifier id and keyword w. The protocol
may modify K, σ and EDB.
In the above, we mostly followed the description of [28, 65, 66]. Given the
above API, on input the data collection the client can run Setup, followed by N
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calls to Update to “populate” EDB. Assuming the scheme is forward private (see
below) this leaks nothing more than running an initial setup operation on the DB.
Other works [67, 72] model Update as “file” addition or deletion, where the protocol
adds/removes all the relevant keywords to/from DB. This is functionally equivalent
as this process can be decomposed to multiple calls of the above Update protocol.
At a high level, Σ is correct if the returned result DB(w) is correct for every
query (for a formal definition, see [1]). The privacy of Σ is parametrized by a leakage
function L = (LSETUP,LSEARCH,LUPDATE) that describes the information revealed to
the server throughout the protocol execution. LSETUP refers to leakage during setup,
LSEARCH during a search operation, and LUPDATE during updates. Standard search
leakage types form the literature include search pattern that reveals which searches
are related to the same w, and access pattern that reveals DB(w) during a search
for w. Note that access pattern leakage is unavoidable if the client wishes to retrieve
the actual files and not just their identifiers (unless the files themselves are stored
in a protected manner, e.g., Oblivious RAM). Schemes that avoid this leakage are
called result hiding.
Informally, a secure SSE scheme with leakage L should reveal nothing about
the database DB other than this leakage. This is formally captured by a standard
real/ideal experiment with two games RealDSE, IdealDSE presented in Figure 5.1,
following the definition of [24].
Definition 2 ([24]) A DSE scheme Σ is adaptively-secure with respect to leakage
function L, iff for any PPT adversary Adv issuing poly(λ) queries/updates q, there
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b← RealDSE(λ, q)
1: N ← Adv(1λ).
2: (K, σ0, EDB0)← Setup(1λ, N).
3: for k = 1 to q do
4: (typek, idk, wk)← Adv(1λ, EDB0, t1, . . . , tk−1).
5: if typek = search then
6: (σk, DB(wk);EDBk)← Search(K,wk, σk−1;EDBk−1).
7: else if typek = update then
8: (σk;EDBk)← Update(K, add/del, (idk, wk), σk−1; EDBk−1).
9: Let t1, . . . , tk be the messages from client to server in the Search/Update
protocols above.
10: b← Adv(1λ, EDB0, . . . , EDBq, t1, t2, . . . , tq).
11: return b
b← IdealDSEL (λ, q)
1: N ← Adv(1λ).
2: (stS , EDB0)← SimSetup(1λ,LSETUP).
3: for k = 1 to q do
4: (typek, idk, wk)← Adv(1λ, EDB0, t1, . . . , tk−1).
5: if typek = search then
6: (stS ; tk, EDBk)← SimSearch(stS , LSEARCH)(wk);EDBk−1).
7: else if typek = update then
8: (stS ; tk, EDBk)← SimUpdate(stS , LUPDATE)(wk);EDBk−1).
9: Let t1, . . . , tk be the messages from client to server in the Search/Update
protocols above.
10: b← Adv(1λ, EDB0, t1, t2, . . . , tq).
11: return b
Figure 5.1: Real and ideal experiments for the DSE scheme.
exists a stateful PPT simulator Sim = (SimSetup, SimSearch, SimUpdate) such that
Pr[RealDSE(λ, q) = 1]− Pr[IdealDSEL (λ, q) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
Forward and backward privacy. DSE schemes with forward and backward pri-
vacy aim to control what information is revealed in relation to updates. Informally,
a scheme is forward private if it is not possible to connect a new update to previous
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operations, when it takes place. E.g., it should be impossible to tell whether an
addition is for a new keyword or a previously searched one.
Definition 3 ([65]) An L-adaptively-secure DSE scheme that supports single-keyword
additions/deletions is forward private iff the update leakage function LUPDATE can
be written as: LUPDATE(op, w, id) = L′UPDATE(op, id) where L′ is a stateless function,
op = add/del, and id is a file identifier.
Backward private DSE schemes limit the information that the server learns
during a search for w for which some entries have been previously deleted. Ideally,
the scheme should reveal nothing about these deleted entries and, at the very least,
not their corresponding file identifiers [24]. Bost et al. [65] gave the first formal
definition for three types of backward privacy with different leakage patterns, from
Type-I which reveals the least information to Type-III which reveals the most. In
order to present their definition, we need to first define some additional functions.
Let Q be a list with one entry for each operation. For searches the entry is
(u,w) where u is the timestamp and w is the searched keyword. For updates it is
(u, op, (w, id)) where op = add/del and id is the modified file.
TimeDB(w) = {(u, id) | (u, add, (w, id)) ∈ Q ∧ ∀u′, (u′, del, (w, id)) /∈ Q}, is the
function that returns all timestamp file-identifier pairs of keyword w that have been
added to DB and have not been deleted.
Updates(w) = {u|(u, add, (w, id)) ∈ Q or (u, del, (w, id)) ∈ Q}, is the function
that returns the timestamp of each insertion/deletion operation for w.
DelHist(w) = {(uadd, udel) | ∃ id : (uadd, add, (w, id)) ∈ Q ∧ (udel, del, (w, id)) ∈
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Q}, is the function that returns for each deletion timestamp the timestamp of the
corresponding insertion it cancels.
Using the above functions, backward privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 4 ([65]) An L-adaptively-secure SSE scheme has backward privacy:
• BP-I (BP with insertion pattern): iff LUPDATE(op, w, id) = L′(op) and
LSEARCH(w) = L′′(TimeDB(w), aw),
• BP-II (BP with update pattern): iff LUPDATE(op, w, id) = L′(op, w) and
LSEARCH(w) = L′′(TimeDB(w),Updates(w)),
• BP-III (weak BP): iff LUPDATE(op, w, id) = L′(op, w) and
LSEARCH(w) = L′′(TimeDB(w),DelHist(w)),
where L′ and L′′ are stateless functions. We stress that the above definitions (even
BP-I) reveal the files currently containing w due to TimeDB(w)—this is in order
to account for the leakage from retrieving the actual files. One could define an even
stronger definition that avoids this leakage (in practice this could be achieved by using
oblivious storage, or when limited to applications that look to return just the iden-
tifiers and not the files). None of our constructions explicitly leaks TimeDB(w);
indeed we never use it in our proofs for simulation.
DSE with optimal search time. The majority of existing DSE schemes adopt the
approach of “storing” deletions as regular entries. During searches, they are used to
filter out which insertion entries have been removed. This approach implies that the
search cost will be Ω(aw), i.e., linear in the total number of total updates for w, as
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opposed to the optimal cost O(nw), linear in the number of files currently containing
w. Notable exceptions to these are the construction of Stefanov et al. [24] (which,
however, is not backward private) and two constructions from the recent work of
Ghareh Chamani et al. [66] which have quasi-optimal search time according to the
following definition.
Definition 5 ([66]) A DSE scheme Σ has optimal (resp. quasi-optimal) search
time, if the asymptotic complexity of Search is O(nw) (resp. O(nw· polylog(N))).
5.2 From Static to Dynamic Schemes
5.2.1 Amortized construction
Our starting point is a static, result-hiding searchable encryption scheme
SE, which we modify to store triplets of the form (w, id, op) (instead of the stan-
dard w, id), where op = add/del. The main idea behind our DSE construction
called SDa (Figure 5.3), is to organize N (without loss of generality, let N be
a power-of-two) updates into a collection of logN independent encrypted indexes
EDB0, . . . , EDBlog(N−1) for sizes 2
0, . . . , 2log(N−1), each one created with a separate
invocation of SE.Setup with a fresh key.
Initially, all EDBi are empty. For the first update the client sets up an en-
crypted index for the singleton set (w, id, op) using SE.Setup and sends it to server
who stores it as EDB0. For future updates, let j be the smallest value for which
EDBj is empty. The server first sends to the client all EDBi for i < j and deletes
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Figure 5.2: SDa : from static to dynamic (amortized version). These are the en-
crypted indexes after five consecutive insertions 1− 5. Inserting element 1 requires
the creation of EDB0 which will contain element 1. Inserting element 2 requires
downloading EDB0 (to obtain element 1), creating EDB1 which will contain ele-
ments 1 and 2, and deleting EDB0. Searching for a keyword w requires to search all
the active (non-deleted) encrypted indexes and return to the client all the individual
search results.
SE.DecryptAll function) and runs SE.Setup for the union of their entries, together
with the current update (w, id, op). Note that the total size of the returned EDBi
is 2j − 1, thus the output of SE.Setup is a new encrypted index of size 2j; this is
sent to the server who stores it as EDBj. At all times, the client stores locally the
corresponding keys and states of the different non-empty instance of SE as K and
σ.
For searches, the parties run SE.Search for each (i.e., non-empty) instance of
SE and return all the individual search results. Since SE is result-hiding, the client
needs to do the extra work of decrypting the returned values and extracting the pairs
(id, op). The final answer is the result of “filtering out” the deleted entries. Figure
5.2 illustrates the collection of the encrypted indexes after each of five consecutive
inserts.
Security. We assume that the underlying SE scheme is adaptively secure. Regard-
ing forward privacy, note that each update (w, id, op) results in running SE.Setup
with a freshly chosen key. The size of the encrypted index (2j in the above de-
scription) is fully determined by the number of previous updates, thus an update
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operation can be perfectly emulated by the setup simulator of SE, even if the setup
leakage of SE is just the database size. This implies that the information the server
sees during updates, is independent of any previous entries in EDB (including en-
tries about w) which gives us forward privacy. Regarding backward privacy, things
are also straight-forward. Firstly, since SE is result-hiding and we store deletions
as regular entries, the server does not learn the indexes of files that previously con-
tained w. Moreover, during searches the server learns |DB(w)| as well as how many
result elements come from each of EDBi. In order to simulate the second part, we
only need to know when each update for w took place—this information together
with the total update count so far, determines in which EDBi each update resides.
We previously defined this information as Updates(w)), hence our scheme is BP-II.
Observe that SimSearch does not always need Updates(w) to simulate the
search transcript. It suffices to know which index each update should be mapped,
to according to its timestamp. The actual leakage can be much smaller—depending
on the update counter upd it may be as small as |Updates(w)| (e.g., if upd = 2i for
some i ∈ N, the largest index has just been rebuilt and the previous ones are empty,
hence all the entries for w will come from the same index and SimSearch does not
need their individual timestamps).
Theorem 4 Assuming SE is an adaptively-secure result-hiding static searchable en-
cryption scheme, SDa is an adaptively-secure DSE according to Definition 2 with
LUPDATE(op, w, id) = ⊥ and LSEARCH(w) = Updates(w).
Proof 5 (Sketch) Building a simulator Sim is straight-forward, given the existence
96
Let SE = (Setup, Search, DecryptAll) be a result-hiding, static searchable
encryption scheme.
(K, σ,EDB)← Setup(1λ)
1: Set EDB to be an empty vector of indexes EDBi
2: Set K, σ to be empty vectors
(K, σ;EDB)↔ Update(K, op, w, id, σ;EDB)
Server:
1: Find the minimum j such that EDBj = ∅
2: Send to client EDB0, . . . , EDBj−1
Client:
3: Set A← ∅
4: for i = 0, . . . , j − 1 do
5: A← A ∪ SE.DecryptAll(K[i], σ[i], EDBi)
6: K[i]← ⊥, σ[i]← ⊥
7: (K[j], σ[j], EDBA)← SE.Setup (1λ, A ∪ (w, id, op))
8: Send EDBA to server
Server:
9: Set EDBj ← EDBA
10: for i = 0, . . . , j − 1 do
11: Set EDBi ← ∅
DB(w)↔ Search(K, q, σ;EDB)
Client ↔ Server:
1: X ← ∅.
2: for all i such that EDBi 6= ∅ do
3: Let Xi ↔ SE.Search(K[i], q, σ[i];EDBi)
4: X ← X ∪ Xi
Client:
5: Decrypt entries of X with K and parse them as (id, op)
6: DB(w)← {id | (id, add) ∈ X ∧ (id, del) 6∈ X}
Figure 5.3: SDa: from static to dynamic (amortized version).
of a simulator SimSE = {SimSetupSE, SimSearchSE}. SimSetup returns empty
vector EDB and initializes and update counter upd = 0. During each update,
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SE for i = 0, . . . , j − 1, and increments upd. During a search for w,
let upd be the current update counter. SimSearch receives as input Updates(w).
It then initializes values t0, . . . , tblog updc to 0. For each entry u ∈ Updates(w), it
computes i as the index in which the update with timestamp u was stored (deter-
mined by upd, u) and increments ti by one. Finally for j = 0, . . . , blog updc, it runs
SimSearch
(j)
SE on input tj, and sends all the outputs to the adversary. Assuming SE
is secure and result-hiding, and each instance SimSE is spawned independently with
fresh randomness, and given that the timestamp of an update fully determines the
corresponding index structure for its entry, the transcript produced by Sim is indis-
tinguishable from the messages observed by the adversary during the real protocol
execution. 
Efficiency. After N updates, SDa consists of logN encrypted indexes, each of which
is either empty or stores exactly 2i items. Assuming SE has linear storage, SDa has
server storage O(N). If SE has optimal search time, the query cost for retrieving all
the updates for w is O(aw). Since there can be at most logN non-empty indexes
EDBi and a search needs to be performed in each of them, the total search time
for SDa is O(aw + logN). Finally, after 2
j updates the client will have run SE.Setup
once for size 2j and once for 2j−1, twice for 2j−2, etc., all the way down to 2j−1
times for size one. Assuming an underlying static scheme with linear setup time,
the amortized cost per update after N updates is O(logN).
One static scheme that satisfies these assumptions is the PiBas construction
of [1], which we describe in Figure 5.4. Moreover, with PiBas the client has to store
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Let RND = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a semantically-secure encryption scheme, F
be a PRF, and H be a collision-resistant hash function.
(K,EDB)← Setup(1λ, DB)
1: Initialize an empty map T
2: Set (k, k′)← KeyGen(1λ)
3: for each w ∈ DB do
4: Set counter c← 0
5: (key, value)← Map(K,w, id, c)
6: Store (key, value) to T ; c++
7: Set K ← (k, k′); EDB ← T
(k, k′)← KeyGen(1λ)
1: Choose random PRF key k for F
2: Set k′ ← RND.Enc(1λ)
(key, value)← Map(K,w, id, c)
1: key ← H(F (k, w), c)
2: value← RND.Enc(k′, w, id)
DB(w)↔ Search(K, q;EDB)
Client:
1: Send tk ← F (k, w) to server
Server:
2: Set X ← ∅; c← 0
3: while true do
4: Set res← T .get(H(tk), c)
5: if res = ⊥ then break
6: else X ← X ∪ res; c++
7: Send X to client
Client:
8: Decrypt entries of X with k′ and return them as DB(w)
Figure 5.4: Static searchable encryption PiBas [1].
one key for each instance and this requires from the client to store O(logN) keys. In
order to reduce the local storage to O(1), we can generate the key for each instance
pseudorandomly from a single master secret key using a PRF. Instantiated with
PiBas, SDa requires a single roundtrip for retrieving the result DB(w). Updates























Figure 5.5: SDd : from PiBas to DSE (de-amortized version). These are the en-
crypted indexes after 7 consecutive insertions 1− 7. Each level i contains 3 search-
able encrypted indexes (OLDEST, OLDER, OLD) and one index (NEW) that is used
for merging and rebuilding into a single index the OLDEST and OLDER indexes of
the previous level i− 1. The update algorithm passes through all levels and moves
one element using OMAPi from level i − 1 to level i. Searching for a keyword w
requires to search all the OLDEST, OLDER and OLD encrypted indexes and return
to the client all the individual search results.
message from the client to the server (possibly “piggy-backed” to the next operation)
for writing the new EDBj.
With SDa it is easy to clean-up deleted entries. During updates, before creating
the merged EDBj the client identifies all the entries in EDBi, for i < j, that have
corresponding deletions and removes them (padding with dummy records to fill up
EDBj).
5.2.2 De-amortized construction
Recall that our key goal is to design schemes with small client storage. SDa
has excellent performance, albeit in the amortized setting; during updates the client
needs to download and locally rebuild an encrypted index. Most times, that index
will be relatively small but once in a while this index will become very large (up
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Let (KeyGen, Setup, Map, Search) refer to the PiBas routines [1], as described in
Figure 5.4.
(K, σ;EDB)← Setup(λ,N)
1: Set `← blogNc
2: for i = 0, . . . , ` do
3: Initialize OMAPi with capacity 2
i
4: Set OLDESTi, OLDERi, OLDi and NEWi to ∅
5: Set cnti ← 0
6: Set EDB ← {OMAPi,OLDESTi,OLDERi,
OLDi,NEWi, cnti}`i=0
7: Set updcnt ← 0
8: Set σ ← {updcnt,cnti}`i=0 and the OMAP states
9: Set K an empty matrix of size 4 · (`+ 1)
10: for i = 0, . . . , 3 do
11: for j = 0, . . . , ` do
12: K[i][j]← PiBas.KeyGen(1λ)
DB(w)↔ Search(K, q, σ;EDB)
Client ↔ Server:
1: X ← ∅.
2: for i = ` · · · 0 do
3: if OLDESTi 6= ∅ then
4: X ← X ∪ PiBas.Search(K[i][0],OLDESTi)
5: if OLDERi 6= ∅ then
6: X ← X ∪ PiBas.Search(K[i][1],OLDERi)
7: if OLDi 6= ∅ then
8: X ← X ∪ PiBas.Search(K[i][2],OLDi)
Client:
9: Decrypt the entries of X with K and parse them as (id, op)
10: DB(w)← {id | (id, add) ∈ X ∧ (id, del) 6∈ X}
Figure 5.6: SDd: from PiBas to DSE (de-amortized version).
to the entire DB) as it is shown in Figure 5.14(c), which invalidates our key goal.
To overcome this obstacle, we present here a de-amortized version of our SDa con-
struction which we call SDd . Unlike our amortized scheme that can work with any
result-hiding static scheme, SDd requires the setup process of the static scheme to
be efficiently decomposable to discrete steps so that the necessary local state for
executing each step is small and efficiently retrievable—PiBas is again a natural
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Let (KeyGen, Setup, Map, Search) refer to the PiBas routines [1], as described in
Figure 5.4.
(K, σ;EDB)↔ Update(K, op, w, id, σ;EDB)
Client ↔ Server:
1: for i = `, . . . , 1 do
2: if OLDESTi−1 6= ∅ ∧ OLDERi−1 6= ∅ then
3: if cnti < 2
i−1 then
4: Server sends to client OLDESTi−1[cnti] who decrypts it
with K[i− 1][0] and parses it as (w′, id,′ op′)
5: else server sends to client OLDERi−1[cnti % 2
i−1] who decrypts it
with K[i− 1][1] and parses it as (w′, id′, op′)
6: cnti ← cnti + 1
7: Client computes num as the number of times NEWi has been fully
rebuilt and cw ←OMAPi.get(w′, num)
8: if cw′ = ⊥ then client sets cw′ ← 0
9: Client sets cw′ ← cw′ + 1 and runs OMAPi.put((w′, num), cw′)
10: Client sends to server (key, value)←PiBas.Map(w, id′, op′, cw′ , K[i][3])
11: Server runs NEWi.put(key, value)
12: if |NEWi| = 2i then . Client can deduce this from updcnt
13: Server sets OLDESTi−1 ← OLDi−1 and OLDERi−1 ← ∅
14: if OLDESTi = ∅ then server sets OLDESTi ← NEWi and
client sets K[i][0]← K[i][3]
15: else if OLDERi = ∅ then server sets OLDERi ← NEWi and client
sets K[i][1]← K[i][3]
16: else server sets OLDi ← NEWi and client sets K[i][2]← K[i][3]
17: Client sets K[i][3]← PiBas.KeyGen(1λ)
18: Client sets K[0][3]← PiBas.KeyGen(1λ)
19: Client runs PiBas.Setup(K[0][3], (w, id, op)) and sends the output to server
who stores it as NEW0
20: if OLDEST0 = ∅ then server sets OLDEST0 ← NEW0 and client sets
K[0][0]← K[0][3]
21: else if OLDER0 = ∅ then server sets OLDER0 ← NEW0 and client sets
K[0][1]← K[0][3]
22: else server sets OLD0 ← NEW0 and client sets K[0][2]← K[0][3]
23: Client sets updcnt ← updcnt + 1
Figure 5.7: SDd: from PiBas to DSE (de-amortized version).
candidate, hence SDd is specifically instantiated with it. The reason for this is that
the key technical idea is inspired by the classic lazy rebuild technique of Overmars
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and van Leeuwen [73]. The O(2i) steps necessary for running PiBas.Setup for a
database of 2i elements are split over the previous 2i updates, executed one at a
time.
With SDd, four encrypted indexes OLDESTi, OLDERi, OLDi, and NEWi are
maintained for each i = 0, . . . , logN − 1 (as it is shown in Figure 5.5). Each of the
“old” indexes is either empty or contains exactly 2i items. Moreover, if OLDESTi
is empty then so is OLDERi, and if OLDERi is empty then so is OLDi. The fourth
data structure NEWi is either empty or a partially built index. The setup process
of NEWi is executed over 2
i updates. In this manner, we guarantee that each entry
is stored in exactly one of the “old” encrypted index (across all sizes). Hence, the
search protocol (Figure 5.6) is almost unchanged—the server just needs to search in
at most three indexes per size.
Where SDd strongly deviates from the amortized construction SDa is during
updates (Figure 5.7). Recall that we are using PiBas (Figure 5.4) but we are storing
triplets of the form (w, id, del). The update algorithm passes through all sizes i
from largest to smallest and moves one element from the set of indexes of level i− 1
to the set of indexes of level i. For each level, if both OLDESTi−1, OLDERi−1 are
non-empty, this implies that within the next 2i updates an index of size 2i needs to
have been fully rebuilt—else we would run out of space at level i−1! Therefore, one
step of PiBas.Setup needs to be executed during each of these 2i updates, moving
one entry (w, id, op) from OLDESTi−1∪OLDERi−1 into NEWi. Moreover, to preserve
forward privacy we must guarantee that this step does not reveal any information
to the server. We explain how we achieve this next.
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The EDB encrypted index of each PiBas instance contains one map T the keys
and values of which are computed with the PiBas.Map function. For each of the 2i
updates, the client retrieves from the server and decrypts one entry from the maps
T corresponding to OLDESTi−1 and OLDERi−1, sequentially from beginning to end,
i.e., treating the maps as arrays (the position of the next entry to retrieve can be
computed efficiently based only on the current global update counter). The Map
algorithm takes as input K,w, id, op, c where K is a key for PiBas freshly chosen
every time the client starts rebuilding NEWi, w, id, op are read from the retrieved
entry, and c is a counter that counts how many times w has already appeared in
the NEWi index. Unfortunately, c cannot be stored locally in an efficient manner.
In order to retrieve it, we deploy one oblivious map OMAPi for each size 2
i that
maps w to c. At every step, the client queries the corresponding OMAPi, uses the
retrieved c to run Map, increments it, and stores it back to the same OMAPi.
This leaves one issue to be handled: Between rebuilds of NEWi, the counters
c need to be reset as PiBas searches always start from zero. Since the client can-
not do that in one pass efficiently, we use an alternative approach. OMAPi maps
(w, num) to c, where num is the number of times NEWi has previously been rebuilt
(computable from )the current global update counter). When querying OMAPi for
(w, num), the client treats all returned entries with num′ < num as null and can
safely overwrite them.
Every time NEWi is fully built (i.e., has size 2
i), the server moves it to the oldest
non-empty index among OLDESTi, OLDERi, OLDi. Moreover, both OLDESTi−1 and
OLDERi−1 are deleted since their purpose is served—all of their entries have been
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moved to NEWi. Then, if OLDi−1 exists, the server moves it to OLDESTi−1. Finally,
every update creates a “singleton” encrypted index at the oldest available slot for
size 0 for the newly inserted entry. All PiBas instances are always instantiated
with a freshly chosen key. Figure 5.5 illustrates the encrypted indexes after seven
consecutive inserts.
Security. The backward privacy of SDd is proven exactly in the same manner as
that of SDa since the search protocol is essentially the same. Forward privacy follows
from these observations. First, for each update (w, id, op) the server sees a new PRF
evaluation since we choose new PiBas keys for each instance and always increment
the keyword counter for that keyword-instance combination. Second, our modified
version of PiBas is response-hiding. Third, each update accesses a predetermined
position in at most 2 · logN map data structures, and logN read/write oblivious
map queries that do not reveal anything to the server about the accessed entries.
Theorem 5 Assuming PiBas is an adaptively-secure result-hiding static SE scheme,
and OMAPi are secure oblivious maps, SDa is an adaptively-secure DSE according
to Definition 2 with LUPDATE(op, w, id) = ⊥ and LSEARCH(w) = Updates(w).
Proof 6 (Sketch) Let SimPB = {SimInitPB, SimSearchPB} be the simulator for
Pibas. First, we observer that SimInitPB can be decomposed into calls to a stateful
SimInitOnePB that simulates just one step of the setup simulation at a time. The
input state of SimInitOnePB is the partially built table, and the leakage N . After
N executions, SimInitOnePB provides an output that is identically distributed with
that of SimInitPB on input N . This follows easily by the fact that the setup process
105
of Pibas consists of populating a hash table with N semantically secure encryptions,
stored at pseudorandomly computed positions. The simulator SimInitOnePB just
needs to remember its previous randomly chosen positions so that eventually he out-
puts the entire table.1
With that observation, we build our simulator Sim as follows. First, all calls
to OMAP, are replaced by simulated accesses. During setup, SimInit launches
4 ·(`+1) independent instances of SimInitOneiPB for i = 0, . . . , ` and corresponding
sizes 1, . . . , 2`, and initializes update counter upd = 0. For each update, whenever
OLDESTi, OLDERi are full (which can be computed from i and upd), SimUpdate
calls SimInitOnei+1PB . If SimInitOne
i+1
PB is full (after 2
i+1 + 1 calls), the simulator
terminates the existing SimInitOneiPB instances mapped to OLDESTi, OLDERi and
map the SimInitOneiPB instance of OLDi to OLDESTi (if it is not vacant). More-
over, it treats the SimInitOnei+1PB instance as mapped to the oldest vacant instance
for size 2i+1, and launches a new instance mapped to NEWi. Finally, it always
launches a new instance of SimInitOne1PB, maps it to the oldest non-vacant in-
stance for size 1, and increments upd. The search simulator SimSearch is identical
to that of SDa (it just has to call up to three instances of SimSearchPB per size,
depending on upd).
By the same reasoning as that for SDa above, and since OMAPi are inde-
pendently instantiated with secure oblivious maps, the transcript produced by Sim
is indistinguishable from the messages observed by the adversary during the real
1For simplicity, we assume that the first time SimInitOnePB is called, it just simulates (inter-
nally) the key generation process, hence SimInitOnePB will be called a total of N + 1 times to
emulate the execution of SimInitPB on input N .
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protocol execution. 
Efficiency. Updates require O(logN) OMAP queries. With the oblivious map
of [41], their total access overhead is O(log3N), which is the dominating cost for up-
dates. This is worst-case asymptotic update efficiency, as opposed to the amortized
performance of SDa. Search time is O(aw + logN), same as that of the amortized
version (up to three times slower due to multiple structures per size). Server storage
is linear to the number of total updates; more concretely, the client chooses an upper
bound on the total number of updates ahead of time and initializes the oblivious
maps—for better server space efficiency, the above initialization can be split into
multiple smaller steps, i.e., when the set of indexes of size i−1 becomes full we start
initializing with dummy values the oblivious maps for the indexes of size i+ 1.
Crucially, permanent client storage is Õ(log2N) in order to store all the OMAP
stashes and the PiBas keys. For appropriately chosen parameters, this is very small
in practice since these stashes are usually sparsely populated (see experimental eval-
uation in Section 5.4). If we want to minimize client storage, there are two addi-
tional tricks: (i) stashes are stored at the server and downloaded as necessary during
updates without affecting the update asymptotics, and (ii) the keys for PiBas are
generated with a PRF from a single master secret key. These make the client stor-
age O(1). While describing SDd in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, we assume parties store a
counter cnti that is used to deduce which are the next elements to be retrieved for
lazy rebuild. This is just for clarity of presentation; they can be efficiently computed
by keeping a global update counter. Finally, although SDd entails oblivious maps,
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they are only used during updates and not during searches. As a result of this, while
updates require O(logN) rounds of interaction, searches are still non-interactive.
Clean-up of is somewhat more involved with SDd but it only affects the per-
formance of updates and not searches. At a high level, the client maintains an
additional OMAP OMdel accessed with key (w, id). During updates, while writing
a record to NEWi, for i > 0, the client looks up OMdel. If he receives ⊥ he proceeds
normally, else he writes a dummy value to NEWi instead.
5.3 Efficient DSE with Quasi-Optimal Search
In this section, we present our third construction QOS that achieves quasi-
optimal search time, according to Definition 5. The only existing backward-private
constructions that achieve this are Orion and Horus from [66]. Both these schemes
replace each of the nw accesses necessary for retrieving the result DB(w) with an
oblivious map/oblivious RAM access. Contrary to this, QOS requires a single read
and write to an oblivious map during search (independently of nw); the remaining
computation for retrieving the result is executed at the server by traversing a tree
data structure that serves as a “pivot” to identify deleted entries.
The basic idea behind QOS is described in Figure 5.8. Consider a full binary
tree with N leafs, where N is an upper bound on the total number of insertions in
the DSE (N can also serve as a trivial bound for the number of deletions). The
function label(v) returns a value in [1, 2N − 1] which is the result of the “natural”
labeling of tree nodes as follows: The N leafs are labeled from leftmost to rightmost
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Figure 5.8: Update tree for QOS with maximum insertions N = 8. Nodes are labeled
with [1, 15] leafs-to-root and left-to-right. This is the tree state after five insertions
1-5, and three deletions for 1, 2, 4. A subsequent search starts from the Best Range
Cover of leafs [1, 5] = (13, 5) and proceeds downwards until it finds a black node or
a leaf. The result is (3, 5).
with 1, . . . , N . The remaining nodes are labeled in an increasing order per level and
from left to right, e.g., the parent of the two leftmost leafs is labeled with N + 1,
its right sibling with N + 2, and so on, all the way to the root that is labeled with
2N − 1. Every node has a corresponding color cv ∈ {white,black}; all nodes are
initially white. The client holds a “conceptual” tree like this for every keyword w.
In said tree, inserted entries correspond to leafs that are being populated from left
to right, i.e., after iw insertions (and without deletions), the result of the search is
related to the iw first leafs with labels 1, . . . , iw.
For each deletion, the client needs to mark one node as black. Assuming the
deleted entry was previously stored at the j-th leaf, this is the node that will be
marked as black. However, additional nodes may be marked black according to the
following simple rule: “if both children of a node are black, it is also marked black.”
Hence, for the above deletion the client needs to access the colors of all the ancestors
of the j-th leaf and their siblings. With this information, he can update their colors
accordingly. Simply, each deletion “eliminates” an entire subtree by marking its
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F is a PRF, RND = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a semantically secure symmetric en-
cryption scheme, and H,H ′ are hash functions.
(K, σ;EDB)← Setup(1λ)
1: Initialize OMAPs OMdel, OMstate of capacity N
2: Initialize OMAP OMcnt of capacity |W |
3: Initialize empty maps D, I
4: Set EDB ← {OMcnt, OMdel, OMstate,D, I}
5: kI ← F.Gen(1λ), kD ← F.Gen(1λ),
k ← RND.Gen(1λ)
6: State σ contains the OMAP states
7: Key K contains kI , kD, k
Figure 5.9: QOS: DSE with quasi-optimal search time O(nw log(iw)).
root black.
During a search after iw insertions, the leafs that contain the result can be
reached as follows. First, we compute the Best Range Cover for leafs with labels
[1, iw]. Then, starting independently from each node in the Best Range Cover the
search progresses downwards towards the leafs. If it encounters a black node it stops
(knowing that there is no undeleted entry below). Upon reaching a leaf that is not
black, the corresponding entry is added to the result. In our analysis we show that,
while the entire subtree that covers the leafs [1, iw] is of size < 2iw, the nodes that
are accessed during this process are O(nw log iw). Next, we describe our scheme in
detail and we explain the implementation decisions we made in order to hide the
necessary actions for manipulating this tree.
Setup. During Setup (Figure 5.9), the client initializes three empty OMAPs with
capacity |W |, N , N , respectively:
(i) OMcnt maps keywords w to cntw and iw, where cntw is the number of previous
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F is a PRF, RND = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a semantically se-
cure symmetric encryption scheme, and H,H ′ are hash functions.
DB(w)↔ Search(K, q, σ;EDB)
Client:
1: (cntw, iw)← OMcnt.get(w)
2: tkI ← F (kI , (w, cntw)); tkD ← F (kD, (w, cntw))
3: cntw ← cntw + 1; OMcnt.put(w, (cntw, iw))
4: Send (tkI , tkD, iw) to server
Server:
5: d0, . . . , dm ← labels of Best Range Cover for leafs [1, iw]
6: (X ,Y)← (∅, ∅) . X will contain encrypted result, Y the labels of black
nodes encountered in search
7: for i = 0 . . .m do
8: (X ,Y)← (X ,Y) ∪ RecSrc(EDB, tkI , tkD, di)
9: Send X ,Y to client
Client:
10: (DB(w),X ′,Y ′)← (∅, ∅, ∅)
11: for x ∈ X do
12: (id, leaf)← RND.Dec(k, x)
13: tk ← F (kI , (w, cntw)); key ← H(tk, (w, leaf))
14: value← RND.Enc(k, (id, leaf))
15: X ′ ← X ′ ∪ (key, value)
16: DB(w)← DB(w) ∪ id
17: for y ∈ Y do
18: tk ← F (kI , (w, cntw)), key ← H ′(tk, (w, y))
19: Y ′ ← Y ′ ∪ (key, 1)
20: Shuffle each of X ′, Y ′ and send them to server
Server:
21: for (key, value) ∈ X ′ do I.put(key, value)
22: for (key, value) ∈ Y ′ do D.put(key, value)
(X ,Y)← RecSrc(EDB, tkI , tkD, d)
1: if D.get(H ′(tkD, d)) = 1 then return (∅, d)
2: if d is a leaf then return (I.get(H(tkI , d), ∅)
3: Let dl, dr be the labels of the left and right child of d
4: (Xl,Yl)← RecSrc(EDB, tkI , tkD, dl)
5: (Xr,Yr)← RecSrc(EDB, tkI , tkD, dr)
6: return (Xl ∪ Xr,Yl ∪ Yr)
Figure 5.10: QOS: DSE with quasi-optimal search time O(nw log(iw)).
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F is a PRF, RND = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a semantically se-
cure symmetric encryption scheme, and H,H ′ are hash functions.
(K, σ,EDB)↔ Update(K, op, w, id, σ;EDB)
Client:
1: (cntw, iw)← OMcnt.get(w)
2: if op = add then
3: OMcnt.put(w, (cntw, iw + 1))
4: OMdel.put((w, id), iw + 1))
5: tk ← F (kI , (w, cntw))
6: key ← H(tk, (w, iw + 1)),
value← Enc(k, (id, iw + 1))
7: else B op = del
8: pos← OMdel.get(w, id)
9: d0 . . . dp ← labels of ancestors of pos B d0 = pos
10: d′0 . . . d
′
p ← labels of siblings of d0 . . . dp B d′p = ⊥
11: for each di do color ci ← OMstate.get(w, di)
12: for each d′i do color c
′
i ← OMstate.get(w, d′i)
13: cnew0 , . . . , c
new
p ← Update the colors ci
14: Let j ← max{ i | cnewi 6= ci ∧ cnewi = black}
15: OMstate.put((w, dj), c
new
j )
16: tk ← F (kD, (w, cntw))
17: key ← H ′(tk, (w, dj)); value← 1
18: Send (key, value) to server
Server:
19: if op = add then I.put(key, value)
20: else D.put(key, value)
Figure 5.11: QOS: DSE with quasi-optimal search time O(nw log(iw)).
searches for w, and iw is number of previous insertions for w.
(ii) OMdel maps each keyword-file identifier pair w, id to label(v) where v is the
leaf to which it was inserted; during deletions, this is used to retrieve the
“position” of the entry to be deleted.
(iii) OMstate maps a keyword-node label pair w, label(v) to the color of the node v.
The encrypted index EDB stored at the server consists of the oblivious maps and
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two empty maps I,D of capacity N,D respectively (D is an upper bound on dele-
tions that can also serve as the capacity of OMstate; trivially it can be set to O(N)).
The client stores locally the states of the three oblivious maps, two PRF keys kI , kD
and a symmetric encryption key k.
Update. For updates (Figure 5.11), the client first retrieves the number of previous
searches cntw and the insertion count iw via OMcnt. Then, we describe the two cases
separately. For insertions (lines 2-6), the client increments the update count and
writes it to OMcnt. He also writes an entry at OMdel that maps (w, id) to the
leaf location where it is stored in I (this will be used for deleting this entry in the
future). Finally, the client encrypts id, iw + 1. The resulting ciphertext is stored at
the server in map I at a location computed by the hash function H, using a token
tk that the client computes pseudorandomly with kI for (w, iw + 1).
For deletions (lines 7-17), the client retrieves the label pos of the tree leaf at
which w, id has been stored via OMdel. Then, he computes the labels of all the
ancestors and the siblings of the ancestors of pos, and retrieves their colors from
OMstate (lines 9-12). With these, he can update the colors of all the ancestors of
pos (in the simplest case, pos is set to black, more generally this deletion may cause
some of its ancestors to become black too). Finally, the client finds dj, the furthest
ancestor of pos that was first set to black during this deletion. He then marks an
entry at D (at the server) at a location computed by the hash function H ′, using
a token tk that the client computes pseudorandomly with kD for (w, dj), as well as
store its new color at OMstate.
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Search. During searches Figure 5.10, the client first retrieves cntw, iw from OMcnt
and pseudorandomly computes two search tokens for w, cntw: (i) tkI is computed
with kI and will be used to retrieve the result, and (ii) tkD is computed with kD and
will be used to identify black nodes encountered during the search, corresponding
to deletions. These tokens and iw are sent to the server. The client also increments
the search counter cntw and stores it to OMcnt.
The server first computes the set of tree nodes d0, . . . , dm that constitute the
Best Range Cover of leaf nodes [0, iw]—each entry of DB(w) will be related to a
descendant of one of di. The search process is quite simple and it entails a recur-
sive search process starting from each of di and progressing downwards at the tree
(Figure 5.9, Algorithm RecSrc). At each node d, the server checks whether the lo-
cation H ′(tkD, d) has been written at D, in which case, this is a “black” node, i.e.,
any previously inserted entries at the subtree with root d have since been deleted.
Hence, the server can simply record its node label and return. Otherwise, he pro-
ceeds to parse its children. Upon reaching a leaf that is not black, the server returns
the encrypted entry from I at position H(tkI , d)—since d is a non-deleted leaf, it
corresponds to an entry of DB(w).
The server returns to the client all retrieved values from I and all marked
entries from D that correspond to black nodes encountered during the tree traversal
(and removes them from I,D). The client computes DB(w) by decrypting the first
ones. Finally, he “re-maps” all the entries of I and D, using new pseudorandom
tokens with keys kI , kD respectively but increased search counter cntw, and sends
them back to the server who stores them at I and D.
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Security. QOS is forward-private because during updates the server observes two
types of accesses: (i) a fixed number of oblivious map operations (depending on the
type of update) that reveal nothing, and (ii) a pair (key, value) that consists of the
outputs of a hash function modeled as a random oracle, and a semantically secure
ciphertext. The latter clearly reveals nothing. For the former, note that we ensure
that the same input is never passed to the random oracle twice during updates.
This follows from incrementing iw during insertions and from the fact that deletions
never mark the same node as black. Since the input to the random oracle contains
a token computed from a PRF for which the server does not have the key (and
is only revealed during a future search), querying the oracle for “valid” values not
previously seen is infeasible. Finally, note that after every search both tokens are
changed so the server cannot connect future updates with ones prior to the search.
Regarding backward privacy, during searches the server learns the PRF tokens
kI , kD which allows him to compute the I,D locations that he needs to access. This
also allows him to recall when these entries in I,D where made, i.e., the timestamp
and type for all update operations for the queried keyword w. Moreover, since the
topology of the tree is revealed to the server and the leafs of the tree are naturally
mapped to timestamps of insertions, the server can deduce exactly which deletion
canceled which prior insertion. As a result of this, QOS achieves BP-III.
Theorem 6 Assuming F is a PRF, RND is a semantically secure encryption
scheme, and the three OMAPs are secure oblivious maps, QOS is an adaptively-
secure DSE according to Definition 2 in the programmable random oracle model,
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with LUPDATE(op, w, id) = op and LSEARCH(w) = (Updates(w),DelHist(w)).
Proof 7 We prove the security of QOS by defining a sequence of games as follows:
• Game−0: This is the RealSSE game as defined in Section 5.1.
• Game−1: This is the same as Game−0 but during setup the OMAP ini-
tializations are replaced with calls to the OMAP simulators for sizes W,N,N
respectively. All future OMAP accesses are emulated by calls to the corre-
sponding access simulators. Game−1 is indistinguishable from Game−0 due
to the security of the oblivious maps.
• Game−2: This is the same as Game−1, except that the encryptions value
computed during update and search are all replaced with dummy zero encryp-
tions. Game−2 is indistinguishable from Game−1 due to the semantic security
of RND.
• Game−3: This is the same as Game−2, except that the tokens tkI , tkD gen-
erated during update and search are generated uniformly at random from the
range of the PRF F , {0, 1}λ. The first time a token is created for a cer-
tain w, cntw combination it is appended to one of the two lists TokensI(w),
TokensD(w) (for insertions and deletions respectively), that are different for
every keyword. Game−3 is indistinguishable from Game−2 due to the security
of the PRF.
• Game−4: This is the same as Game−3, except that calls to H are replaced
with a programmable random oracle as follows. For general H-calls from the
adversary, if the input has not be queried before and the result has not been
programmed, return a value chosen uniformly at random from the range of
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H and store the input-result pairs for future consistency. Else, return the
previously stored result for this input.
During insertion updates (line 6), H− calls are entirely eliminated and instead
key is chosen uniformly at random from the range of H. The client holds a
list TI where he appends the chosen key. If the update is a deletion he appends
⊥. Note that this also eliminates token generation at line 5.
Then, during search, let U = (u1, op1), . . . , (uaw , opaw) be the list of timestamp-
update type pairs corresponding to all previous updates for the queried keyword
w, sorted by timestamp in increasing order. Let u′1, . . . , u
′
iw be the sub-list of
U such that opi = add, again sorted in increasing order, and let d1, . . . , diw be
the natural ordering of u′i from 1 . . . , iw. The client then programs the oracle
such that H(tkI , di) = TI [u
′
i]. If H(tkI , di) has been set previously (due to an
adversarial query involving tkI before this token was revealed), then the game
aborts. Finally, line 13 of the search algorithm is replaced with choosing key
uniformly at random from the range of H. Let dj = leaf , then client sets
TI [u
′
j] = key, in preparation of future searches.
First, note that unless the game aborts it produces a transcript identical to
Game−3, in the programmable random oracle model for H. Given that the
range of H is {0, 1}λ, whereas the total number of H-calls that the adversary
can do beyond the ones required during searches is polynomial in λ (since the
adversary is PPT), the probability of aborting is negligible in λ, hence Game−4
is indistinguishable from Game−3.
• Game−5: This is the same as Game−4 but we now also replace H ′ with
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a programmable random oracle. For general H ′-calls from the adversary, if
the input has not been queried before and the result has not been programmed,
return a value chosen uniformly at random form the range of H and store
the input-result pairs for future consistency. Else, return the previously stored
result for this input.
During deletion updates (line 17), H ′− calls are entirely eliminated and instead
key is chosen uniformly at random from the range of H ′. The client holds a
list TD where he appends the chosen key. If the update is an insertion he
appends ⊥. Note that this also eliminates token generation at line 16.
Then, during search, let Dels = (v1, v
′
1), . . . , (vdw , v
′
dw
) be the list of all timestamp-
pairs that match each deletion timestamp vi to the timestamp v
′
i of the previous
insertion it cancels out, sorted in increasing order such that vi > vi−1. Us-
ing U (from Game−4) and Dels the client builds the entire update tree for w
as follows. First create an empty binary tree with 2dlog iwe leafs. Match each
leaf [1, iw] to an insertion operation’s timestamp u
′
i (as computed in Game−4)
starting from the leftmost leaf. Then, for every vi ∈ Dels, mark the leaf with
timestamp v′i as black and then keep moving upwards, reading at every level
its ancestor and the sibling of its ancestor. If both children of a node is black
mark it black. After finishing all steps for deletion with timestamp vi, let d
′
i
be the node closest to the root that you just marked black. The client then
programs the oracle such that H ′(tkD, d
′




set previously (due to an adversarial query involving tkD before this token was
revealed), then the game aborts.
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Finally, line 18 of the search algorithm is replaced with choosing key uniformly
at random from the range of H ′. Let d′j = y, then client sets TI [vj] = key, in
preparation of future searches.
First, note that unless the game aborts it produces a transcript identical to
Game−3, in the programmable random oracle model for H. This holds since
the combination of U,Dels uniquely define the colors of the nodes of the update
tree for w. Then, using the same argument as above but for H ′, we conclude
that Game−5 is indistinguishable from Game−4.
• Game−6 : This is the same as Game−5 but client receives op instead of
op, w, id during updates, and Updates(w),DelHist(w) instead of w during
searches. Since he does not have access to w, he populates lists TokensI, To-
kensD as follows. For a search at timestamp ŵ, the client first checks whether
the input update history Updates(w) is an extension of one observed during
a previous search that took place during timestamp ŵ′. If so, this implies that
the searches at times ŵ and ŵ′ are for the same keyword and he retrieves
tkI , tkD as the latest entries from TokensI(ŵ
′), TokensD(ŵ′). Else, he chooses
fresh random tokens tkI , tkD and appends them to TokensI(ŵ), TokensD(ŵ).
The client’s code as described in Game−6, is essentially the code of the sim-
ulator in the IdealSSE game since it only takes as input the leakage specified
in Theorem 6. By a standard hybrid argument, the produced transcript is in-
distinguishable from the one produced in Game−0, and the result follows.

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Efficiency. Updates with QOS require O(logN) OMAP queries resulting to a total
of O(log3N) operations and logN roundtrips, using the OMAP of [41]. Setup is
linear to N,D, the upper bound on insertions and deletions, as is the server’s storage.
The search time can be computed as follows. The OMAP queries take O(log2 |W |)
operations. Computing the Best Range Cover takes O(log iw), same as the cover
size itself. Parsing the tree in order to retrieve the result, takes O(nw log iw) since
nw leafs will be reached and the maximum height from each of them to the one of
the nodes in the Best Range Cover is log iw. Even if every node along this traversal
has a black sibling (which is a huge overestimation), the total number of black nodes
encountered is O(nw log iw) as well. From all the above, the total search overhead
with QOS is O(nw log iw + log
2 |W |) and it takes O(log |W |) rounds of interaction.
The client’s permanent storage is O(log2N) due to the OMAP stashes. If
necessary, this can again be reduced to O(1) at no asymptotic cost by storing the
stashes at the server.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented our three schemes in C++ in order to benchmark their per-
formance and compare them with previous works. We used the OpenSSL [74] library
for AES for our PRF and semantically secure encryption. For our experiments we
used r5.8xlarge AWS machines with 32-core Intel Xeon 8259CL 2.5GHz processor,
running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, with 256GB RAM, 100GB SSD (GP2), and AES-NI en-

























































































































Figure 5.12: Synthetic Dataset—Search (a) computation time vs. variable result
size for |DB| = 1M, (b) computation time vs. variable |DB| for result size 100, (c)
communication size vs. variable result size for |DB| = 1M.
We compared SDa and SDd with the previous state-of-the-art schemes with
small client storage which can be achieved by the “word counter + oblivious map”
approach. As described in the introduction, several schemes can be used in this
manner, but Mitra [66] is simultaneously the most efficient and most secure (BP-
II). For QOS, the main competitor is Horus [66] which is the fastest existing quasi-
optimal scheme. Orion achieves BP-I but it is considerably slower in practice. For




































































Figure 5.13: Crime Dataset—Search (a) computation time vs. variable result size,
(b) communication size vs. variable result size.
Since we do not adopt a “clean-up” phase for SDa and SDd, for fairness we
also run Mitra without clean-up (this is faster than the Mitra∗ numbers reported
in [66] by up to 50%). We stress that both schemes are compatible with clean-up,
with an additional update cost for SDd and at no additional search cost for either
one. For SDa and SDd we used one additional optimization, by storing the first 10
levels of the index collections locally. As we demonstrate below, the effect of this
on local storage is small enough to be negligible, but it helps further improve their
performance otherwise.
Our basic efficiency measurement is computation time and total communi-
cation size for search and update operations. In our experimental evaluation, we
consider as unit-size a record/tuple (e.g., x-axis in Figures 5.12(b), 5.14(a) and
5.14(b))—the database in bytes can be obtained by multiplying the number of tu-
ples with the tuple size (e.g., in crime dataset [46] the tuple-size is 210 bytes). For



























































































































Figure 5.14: Synthetic Dataset—Update (a) computation time vs. variable |DB|,
(b) communication size vs. variable |DB|, (c) computation time with SDa for 1000
updates staring from empty DB.
section we focus only on the index costs/overheads, i.e., find the tuple/record identi-
fiers that satisfy the encrypted queries, ignoring the costs for locating-downloading-
decrypting the actual tuples/records, since the latter cost is common for all DSE
schemes.
We consider variable datasets of synthetic records and size |DB| = 102–108
records, setting |W | (i.e., the total number of keywords) to one-hundredth of |DB|.
We also vary the search result size between 10–105. Each record, i.e., keyword-
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document id pair, of our synthetic datasets consists of a 4-byte integer index file
and an alphanumeric keyword of size ≤ 11 characters. We create the dataset to
contain keywords with variable result sizes between 10–105 records. For instance,
for a tested result size x, we create a random keyword with x random files identifiers
and we distribute uniformly at random the remaining records to the remaining
keywords. We also repeated the experiments on a real dataset (see Figures 5.13 and
5.16) consisting of 22 attributes and 6, 123, 276 records of reported crime incidents
in Chicago [46]. The used query attribute is the location description which contains
170 distinct keywords. Among these keywords the one with minimum frequency
contains 1 record, while the one with maximum frequency comprises 1, 631, 721
records.
In our experiments, before searching for w we delete at random 10% of its
corresponding entries (unless stated otherwise), in order to show the impact of
deletions in the search performance. The average of 10 executions is reported.
5.4.1 Search performance
Computation time. Figure 5.12(a) shows the execution time when searching for
different result sizes and Figure 5.12(b) for different database sizes. First, we note
that the time increases more steeply with larger result sizes than with larger |DB|, as
expected. Second, for small result sizes SDa and SDd are much faster than Mitra.
E.g., for |DB(w)| = 10 they are 85× and 20× faster than Mitra, respectively. This
comes naturally as, for such sizes, the OMAP overhead of Mitra is dominating.
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Concretely, for retrieving 100 result records from a dataset of size 106, SDa takes
0.09ms, SDd 0.12ms, and Mitra 1.11ms. As |DB(w)| grows, the OMAP overhead
becomes less important, and the performance of the three schemes converges, e.g.,
for 104 and |DB| = 106, SDa takes 9.8ms, SDd 13.3ms, and Mitra 13.2ms.
QOS has tremendously better search performance compared to the previous
best quasi-optimal scheme Horus, ranging from 4.4 up to 16531× faster. This
comes naturally as the number of oblivious operations for Horus is O(|DB(w)|)
ORAM accesses, whereas for QOS it is a single OMAP access to retrieve the counter
aw. E.g., for |DB(w)| = 104 and |DB| = 106, Horus takes approximately 50sec
and QOS takes 33.5ms. The performance of QOS is worse than Mitra, which is
explained from the relatively small deletion rate (10%)—quasi-optimal schemes like
QOS perform better for large deletion rates (for 10% deletions aw is very close to
nw).
Communication size. Figure 5.12(c) shows the search communication size when
|DB(w)| varies between 10-105 for |DB| = 106. For all schemes, communication
is increasing almost linearly with the result size. One exception is QOS and Mi-
tra where for small result sizes (e.g., < 1000) because the communication cost is
dominated by the OMAP operations. In practice, QOS requires 19-53× less com-
munication than Horus whose overhead is dominated by the ORAM accesses. For
|DB(w)| = 1000, QOS sends 40KB whereas Horus sends 2MB. Furthermore, SDd
requires 2-10× and SDa 14× smaller communication size for search than Mitra ,






























































































































Figure 5.15: Synthetic Dataset—Search computation time for |DB| = 1M and
variable deletion percentage for: (a) iw = 100 using OMAP, (b) iw = 20K using
OMAP, (c) iw = 100 storing word counters locally, (d) iw = 20K storing word
counters locally.
same result size as above, SDa sends 19.7KB, SDd 19.9KB, and Mitra 44KB.
In addition to the results presented in Figure 5.12, we also compared our
schemes with Mitra with local storage (which can be up to O(N) as we have
discussed in the Introduction). We measured the search computation time and
communication size of variable database size between 102 − 106 and we report that


































































































































Figure 5.16: Crime dataset—Search computation time and variable deletion per-
centage for: (a) iw = 78 using OMAP, (b) iw = 24698 using OMAP, (c) iw = 78
storing word counters locally, (d) iw = 24698 storing word counters locally.
worse than SDa . In Figure 5.13, we repeated the above experiments for the search
costs, i.e., communication time and computation size, for the crime dataset and we
observe similar conclusions.
5.4.2 Update performance
Computation time. Figure 5.14 shows (a) the update computation time and (b)
the update communication size for variable database sizes for all schemes except for
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SDa, which has amortized update cost. The update performance of SDa is reported
in Figure 5.14(c), which shows the update time (step-by-step) for a sequence of 103
consecutive updates (insertions/deletions), starting from empty DB. As explained
above, we store the first 10 levels of SDd locally to optimize performance, hence for
small database sizes the update time is negligible (less than 0.01ms).
For our tested sizes, Mitra is 1 to 21× faster than SDd (e.g. for |DB| = 106
its update time is 1ms while SDd takes 14ms). We stress that the update time of SDd
is increasing with the number of updates, as more OMAP accesses are necessary.
Regarding QOS, we consider only delete operations since they are costlier than
insertions. Compared to Horus our deletion time is, as expected, slightly worse—
up to 1.7× slower for the tested sizes (e.g., for |DB| = 108 QOS takes 281ms and
Horus 233ms). Figure 5.14(c) shows the SDa update time for 10
3 consecutive
updates. For each update, the client has to fetch and merge some of the previously
filled indexes, which corresponds to the variable cost shown in the plot. For 103
updates, the minimum and maximum observed times are 1µs and 777µs, and the
average is 7µs.
Communication size. Figure 5.14(b) shows the update communication size which
(not surprisingly) has similar patterns with Figure 5.14(a). For SDd, due to our
optimization (keeping 10 levels locally) the communication size for |DB| ≤ 103 is
zero. For |DB| > 103, the cost of SDd is larger than Mitra (e.g., 508KB vs. 12KB
for |DB| = 108). Regarding QOS versus Horus, the first requires 0.9 to 3.1× more
communication than the latter (e.g. for |DB| = 108 QOS sends 1.6MB, whereas
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Horus sends 536KB).
As it is expected, Mitra with local storage has significant more efficient
update costs compared to our schemes, since it takes advantage of storing locally
the word counters (assuming up to O(N) local storage)—for each update Mitra
with local storage requires to compute two PRF evaluations and to store the new
value on the server.
5.4.3 Client storage
For all schemes, we store the OMAP stashes and all the keys in K locally
at the client. We are interested in measuring the permanent local client storage,
in order to ensure it remains reasonably small. Throughout our experiments, the
permanent local storage for QOS , Horus , and Mitra was never above 2.5KB,
even for |DB| = 106. With our optimization of storing the 10 smallest levels locally
at the client, SDa and SDd needed at most 33KB and 150KB local client storage,
respectively (without this optimization, the corresponding sizes were 400B and 18KB
respectively). Recall that we can further reduce the local storage to few bytes (O(1))
by storing the stashes on the server and generating the keys from a PRF. However,
we consider these sizes essentially negligible for modern devices, even for tablets and
mobile phones.
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5.4.4 Quasi-optimal search performance for variable deletion per-
centages
Our main motivation for studying DSE with quasi-optimal search time is to
avoid paying the cost of past deletions during searches. In all the above experiments,
we assume a 10% deletion ratio, rendering the effect of deletions for search negligible.
Now, we focus on our new quasi-optimal scheme QOS and we provide experiments
for variable deletion ratios.
As is evident from the experiments so far, QOS vastly outperforms the previous
state-of-the-art quasi-optimal DSE Horus for searches. In this set of experiments,
we compare QOS with SDd and Mitra (the latter two schemes had better perfor-
mance for 10% deletions). In this setting, we first insert a fixed number of entries
iw for keyword w and then report the search time after deleting a percentage of
iw between 0-90%. We focus on two cases iw = 100 (small results) and iw = 20K
(large results). Since both SDd and Mitra have search Ω(aw) their performance
should worsen as the deletion rate increases. On the other hand, the search time
of QOS should be better. Hence, we want to find at which deletion ratio QOS will
outperform the others.
Figure 5.15 shows the results for small (a) and large (b) iw respectively. First,
for iw = 100 QOS and Mitra have similar search times since the main bottleneck
for both is the OMAP accesses. However, QOS becomes slightly faster and Mitra
slightly slower as the deletion ratio increases; the first outperforms the second after
roughly 60%. On the other hand, SDd remains much faster than both of them
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throughout the experiment since it does not need to perform OMAP accesses. The
results are different for iw = 20K in Figure 5.15(b). QOS starts off much slower
(as was the case in the experiments above), however, it becomes faster very quickly
as deletions increase. It outperforms Mitra at 65% and even SDd at 80%! The
reason is that for large iw the OMAP cost becomes a small percentage of the search
process.
We believe that these results serve as a good indication for the practical po-
tential of schemes with (quasi-)optimal search time while there is still room for
improvement. To further support this point, we consider another scenario in which
permanent client storage is not a bottleneck and we implement both QOS and Mi-
tra to store the word counter maps locally (avoiding the OMAP overhead) The
results are shown in Figures 5.15(c) and (d) for iw = 100 and 20K, respectively. They
follow the trends of the corresponding Figures 5.15(a),(b), but the crossover points
are moved to the left. QOS becomes better than Mitra for ~40% deletions for
iw = 100, and for ~60% for iw = 20K. Compared to SDd, it becomes better in both
cases at ~80% (in the previous scenario, SDd was strictly better for iw = 100). In
Figure 5.16, we repeated the experiments for the search costs with variable deletion
percentage for the crime dataset and we observe similar conclusions.
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Chapter 6: SEAL: Attack Mitigation for Encrypted Databases via
Adjustable Leakage
We have discussed in the previous sections that SE-based encrypted databases
are quite practical at the expense of well-defined leakage. This leakage information
includes the search pattern (whether a query q has been made in the past or not) and
the access pattern that consists of the volume pattern (number of database tuples
contained in the query result) and the overlapping pattern (which database tuples,
if any, in the result for query q appeared in the result of a previous query).
The aforementioned leakages exposed by SE can be harmful, enabling the re-
covery of the encrypted database or/and the posed queries. In particular, the works
of Islam et al. [76] and Cash et al. [77] were the first to exploit access pattern
leakage and prior knowledge about the dataset to recover the queried keywords.
Zhang et al. [64] propose file injection attacks for encrypted email applications to
improve the recovery rate of queried keywords. Blackstone et al. [78] revisit various
assumptions of existing leakage-abuse attacks. For private range search, effective
access pattern and volumetric attacks through which the attacker learns the plain-
text order and value of encrypted records, without any prior knowledge, have been
proposed [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87]. This growing body of leakage-abuse at-
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tacks has already alerted the community about using SE for implementing encrypted
databases [88].
To provably defend against leakage-abuse attacks on SE-based systems one has
to (i) use expensive cryptographic tools to eliminate the search/overlapping patterns,
i.e., Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [5] (introducing a polylogarithmic search overhead)
and (ii) perform worst-case padding (resulting in worst-case linear search time [89]
or quadratic index size) for eliminating the volume pattern. Both approaches above
incur large overheads leading to quite impractical protocols. We present other, more
practical, but less effective defenses in Section 6.1.
In light of the above, we ask in this Chapter whether practical SE primi-
tives can still somehow be used to implement secure encrypted databases. Towards
this goal, we propose SEAL1, a family of new SE schemes with adjustable leakage
which allow the client to define a trade-off between efficiency and leaked informa-
tion. We show that hiding only a few bits of the search/overlapping/volume pat-
tern significantly reduces the success of existing as well new, even more aggressive,
leakage-abuse attacks. At the same time SEAL’s practical performance is close to
traditional SE. In particular our contributions are as follows:
To better motivate SEAL, we first present new attacks on existing SE-based
encrypted databases. In particular, we show that the same inference attacks on
DET systems [15] can be used by a persistent adversary to recover the database
values in SE-based systems, such as those implementing point queries (e.g., [2, 32]),
and group-by and join queries (e.g., [68]). The high-level reason is that after the
1SEAL stands for Searchable Encryption with Adjustable Leakage.
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adversary observes a certain number of SE queries in these constructions, tuples with
the same values are revealed and therefore frequency information is readily available
to the adversary. Even for more robust SE-based range query schemes [2, 34], we
present new attacks that can work under certain assumptions about the dataset (see
Section 6.2).
We present SEAL(α, x), a family of SE schemes with adjustable leakage.
SEAL is based on two other “adjustable” primitives, an adjustable ORAM, pa-
rameterized by a value α and an adjustable padding algorithm, parameterized by a
value x. The adjustable ORAM, ADJ-ORAM-α, hides only α bits of the access
pattern by partitioning the accessed N -sized array into N/2α regions of 2α size each
and by applying an individual standard ORAM per region. The adjustable padding
algorithm, ADJ-PADDING-x, reduces the volume pattern leakage by padding ev-
ery list to the the closest power of x, leading to a dataset with at most logxN
distinct sizes. Clearly, larger values for α and x yield slower but more secure SEAL
(see Section 6.3).
We use SEAL to build encrypted databases with adjustable leakage. We
first present three new construction POINT-ADJ-SE-(α, x) (for point and group-
by queries), JOIN-ADJ-SE-(α, x) (for join queries) and RANGE-ADJ-SE-(α, x)
(for range queries) that use SEAL(α, x) as black box, instead of plain SE. Finally, we
present a more efficient adjustable construction for ranges, RANGE-SRC-SE, that
reduces access pattern leakage and volume pattern leakage implicitly by modifying
an existing constructions [2] and not by using our (more expensive) SEAL(α, x).
(see Sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5).
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We evaluate the robustness of our SEAL-based encrypted databases for vari-
ous values α and x against particularly powerful adversaries that observe the leaked
search/overlapping and volume patterns and have plaintext access to the entire in-
put dataset. Such strong threat model offers additional credibility to our proposed
mitigation techniques. We consider two new attacks. The first is a query recovery
attack that aims at decrypting the encrypted queries posed by the client. The sec-
ond is a database recovery attack that aims at mapping plaintext values (for the
queried attribute) to the tuples of the encrypted database. Note that since SEAL
hides some bits of access pattern via ADJ-ORAM, database recovery can be quite
challenging (see Section 6.4).
We observe that for all above attacks we can find certain values for α and x that
reduce the attacker’s success rate significantly while maintaining good performance.
For instance we show that if we use SEAL to hide three bits of access pattern while
at the same time pad the keyword lists to powers of 4 (thus hiding a few bits of
volume pattern as well), we can defend against our powerful attackers only at the
expense of an acceptable slowdown from plain SE—around 32×.2
6.1 Other Relevant Works
Wagh et al. [90] introduces an ORAM with a tunable trade-off between the
search/storage efficiency and security. This trade-off is controlled by an (ε, δ)-
2In Section 6.4, we report for certain parameters of α and x the performance of SEAL compared
with the most secure solution (sequential scan) and the one that leaks access and search patterns
(SE scheme). We highlight that both sequential scan and SE are not competitors of SEAL since
they provide different security, but we used those two schemes only as reference points.
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differential privacy modification of PathORAM [5]. Their construction could po-
tentially be used as a drop-in replacement in our proposed encrypted database
algorithms (instead of our adjustable ORAM). It would be interesting to explore
how different choices of ε and δ affect the performance of existing leakage-abuse
attacks—we leave this as future work.
The works of Cash et al. [77], and Bost and Fouque [91] propose padding tech-
niques for keyword search that can hide a portion of the volume pattern. Unlike
our proposed padding in Section 6.3.2, their padding depends on the distribution
of the input dataset, which results in leakage even prior to query execution. Simi-
lar padding approaches have been also proposed in other areas, e.g., [92] proposes
padding approaches for preventing snapshot attacks on deterministically encrypted
data and [93] proposes padding for traffic analysis attacks. Bost and Fouque [91]
also propose new security definitions for SE aiming at capturing existing leakage
abuse attacks. These theoretical definitions could potentially provide some intu-
ition on how we can modify existing schemes in order to make them robust against
such attacks.
Recently, Kamara et al. [94] showed how to suppress the search pattern leak-
age without using ORAM. However suppressing only the search pattern leakage is
not enough for mitigating leakage-abuse attacks. Kamara and Moataz [89] showed
theoretically how to perform worst-case padding without requiring quadratic index
size, while sometimes assuming certain properties for the input dataset, such as a
Zipf distribution or highly-concentrated multimaps.
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6.2 Encrypted Databases from Searchable Encryption & Attacks
In this section we first show how SE can be used to support various queries
on encrypted databases, such as point/group-by/join/range queries and then show
various attacks (some existing and some new) on these constructions. Our findings
systematically re-establish that using SE to implement encrypted databases [2, 34,
68] is particularly risky when the adversary is persistent and also has access to
prior information about the underlying encrypted database (e.g., distribution of
first names/gender). For snapshot adversaries that have no prior information about
the encrypted database, there could be value in SE-based systems, however these
are assumptions that are unlikely to hold in the real world [15, 95].
6.2.1 SE-based Point Queries
The most basic database query is the point query for a value v. A point query
retrieves all the tuples from table T that contain value v in attribute x, i.e.,
SELECT * FROM T WHERE T .x = v;
We can use an SE scheme to implement private point queries (e.g., see Demertzis et
al. [2], and Kamara and Moataz [68]) by viewing attribute values as keywords, and
database tuples as document identifiers. In this case an SE-based point query will
return the encrypted tuples that match this value. We call this scheme POINT-SE.
Note that POINT-SE can also be used to implement group-by queries (e.g., see
Kamara and Moataz [68]), where a client can compute the group-by query through
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point queries for all distinct values of attribute x.
Attacks on POINT-SE. When using POINT-SE, the attacker can identify
which encrypted tuples have the same value v, after he observes the execution of
a query. Finally, after he observes the execution of all queries, the attacker can
group the encrypted database tuples by value, and can therefore compute the size
of each group. By running a frequency analysis attack or an `p-optimization attack
(described in Section 2), it is easy to map plaintext values to encrypted tuples. Note
that the above attack requires the attacker to see all queries. However, in the case
of group-by queries, the very nature of the query reveals all possible point queries,
resulting in total leakage exposure with just a single query.
To conclude, observing all possible results from point queries (either one by one
or via a group-by query) turns an SE-implemented database into a deterministically-
encrypted database, making it vulnerable to simple attacks.
6.2.2 SE-based Join Queries
A fundamental query type for relational databases is the join query. A simple
join of two tables T and R on attribute x returns all pairs of tuples from T and R
that agree on x, i.e.,
SELECT * FROM T , R WHERE T .x = R.x;
A simple approach that allows us to support private join queries using SE is
the following: We encrypt T with a semantically-secure encryption scheme and R
with POINT-SE for private point queries on attribute x. Then we stream all the
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tuples of T to the client. Then the client decrypts each tuple t in T and queries the
SE index for R (on attribute x) to retrieve the matching tuples of R. Clearly this
approach has high bandwidth since it requires streaming a large number of tuples to
the client. We call this scheme JOIN-SE. To address the above bandwidth issue,
Kamara and Moataz [68] propose a construction that, in the case of two tables T
and R, precomputes the answers to join queries on each possible attribute x. Then
they store with SE a mapping from “keyword” x to the precomputed answer (i.e.,
pairs of pointers to tuples from T and R that have the same value on attribute x).
This approach requires both significant amount of storage and setup time. We call
this scheme JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE.
Attacks on JOIN-SE, JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE. It is easy to see that
JOIN-SE and JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE leak the encrypted join graph. That
is, for each encrypted tuple t of T , the respective encrypted tuples t′ of R that have
the same value on x with t are leaked (if such tuples exist).
We propose a simple attack that recovers the values of the encrypted tuples:
Assuming we have access to (part of) the plaintext dataset, we can compute the
plaintext join graph by connecting with an edge tuples from T and tuples from R
that have the same plaintext value on attribute x. If all tuples in T and R have at
least one incident edge the attacker can perform the frequency analysis attack on
both T and R and recover the plaintext values for the encrypted values of attribute
x. In this case JOIN-SE and JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE provide exactly the
same security properties for joins as more efficient encrypted systems based on de-
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terministic encryption (e.g., CryptDB [11]). Otherwise the attack can be performed
only on the leaked frequencies and JOIN-SE and JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE
have potentially less leakage than systems based on deterministic encryption.
6.2.3 SE-based Range Queries
In the case of range queries, we want to retrieve all tuples from table T that
contain value v ∈ [l, u] in attribute x, i.e.,
SELECT * FROM T WHERE T .x ≥ l and T .x ≤ u;
One way to support private range queries is to treat each numeric value of at-
tribute x as a keyword and use SE. Then, private range queries can be supported by
transforming the range [l, u] to series of private point queries, i.e., searching for the
individual values l, l + 1, . . . , u− 1, u. We call this scheme RANGE-SE. Many at-
tacks that exploit the overlapping and volume patterns exist against RANGE-SE—
see [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84]. In general, these attacks first compute an ordering of
the encrypted tuples and then retrieve the actual values after observing a certain
number of queries.
To address this leakage, Faber et al. [34] and Demertzis et al. [2, 3] have
proposed new private range constructions that use SE and are response-hiding, in
that they do not leak overlaps between different range queries. Their main idea,
called LOGARITHMIC-SRC in [2], builds a binary-tree data structure with some
extra “internal” nodes (see Figure 6.1) on top of the database. Each leaf corresponds
to a value k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} (where M is the size of the domain of attribute x)
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and stores all tuples that have value k at attribute x (i.e., a leaf can store more than
one tuples). Data stored in a leaf is also copied to its parents. To answer a range
search query, we select the root of the smallest subtree fully covering the query. The
above data structure defines a natural key-value relationship, where each tree node
is a key with the value being its respective database tuples. This allows us to query
the data structure privately using SE.
LOGARITHMIC-SRC yields up to O(N) false positives where N is the
size of the database table. For example, if the range [3, 5] is being queried in Fig-
ure 6.1 and there is a single tuple in the range but the rest of the dataset has
value 2, node N2,5 will be returned and therefore the response will be the entire
dataset. LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i, proposed for this problem [2], maintains two
LOGARITHMIC-SRC-type binary trees, one on the domain {0, . . . ,M − 1} that
stores constant-size metadata in the leaves (let us call this tree T1) and one on the
domain {0, . . . , N − 1} that stores the actual database tuples in the leaves (one per
leaf) sorted by the search attribute (let us call this tree T2). In particular, for every
value of the domain i ∈ {0, . . . ,M−1}, T1 stores the subrange of {0, . . . , N−1} that
corresponds to database tuples with value i in T2. Therefore, a range query [a, b] is
transformed into two queries: One range query [a, b] in T1 that returns information
that allows one to reconstruct the range [a′, b′] of T2 that contains the desired tuples,
and finally one range query [a′, b′] in T2 that returns those tuples. This approach
brings down the worst-case query cost from O(N) to O(R+ r), where R is the size
of the queried range (and is due to querying T1) and r is the size of the result (and
is due to querying T2).
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Figure 6.1: LOGARITHMIC-SRC [2, 3] consists of a full binary tree over the
domain with an extra internal node between every two cousins. Red values denote
the number of tuples each node contains (used for the proposed attack).
Do existing attacks apply? It seems that existing (volumetric) attacks on
RANGE-SE [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87] do not apply to the above, response-
hiding, schemes. However we must note that LOGARITHMIC-SRC and
LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i leak the volume pattern of a restricted set of queries and
may be vulnerable to new volumetric attacks. In particular, the very recent and con-
current work of Gui et al. [86] proposed new volumetric attacks that can handle cases
of missing/spurious queries, and cases that return noisy results. These attacks for
missing and noisy queries could potentially be used against LOGARITHMIC-SRC
by setting a small window size and treating all volumes from large windows as noise.
However, it is not clear how this noise would affect the attack output since the miss-
ing queries are not chosen at random as is assumed in [86]. Below, we describe our
new attacks tailored to LOGARITHMIC-SRC that could be extended also for
LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i.
New attacks on LOGARITHMIC-SRC. The main idea is that if the attacker
observes the volumes of all queries, then she could potentially reconstruct the tree
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and map encrypted database tuples to plaintext values. For simplicity, let us focus
on a LOGARITHMIC-SRC tree with Dom = {0, 1, 2, 3} (and therefore 8 nodes,
including the one “extra” internal node—see Figure 6.1). Assume the adversary
observes the following sizes of results (he actually sees the respective encrypted
tuples as well): 20, 1, 26, 18, 8, 5, 7 and 13. His goal is to map these sizes (and the
respective encrypted tuples) to the nodes N0, N1, N2, N3, N01, N12, N23 and N03 of
the tree. The tuples that map to leaf i will therefore have value i!
To do the mapping the adversary exploits the fact that the size of a parent is
equal to the sum of the sizes of its children and therefore sets up 4 linear equations
with 8 unknowns |N0|, |N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N01|, |N12|, |N23| and |N03|. Of course these
equations have an infinite number of solutions but the one we are interested in is a
permutation of the observed sizes 20, 1, 26, 18, 8, 5, 7 and 13. In our example, due
the fact that all pairwise sums are different, there is a unique assignment (up to a
mirror arrangement), in particular the assignment |N0| = 1, |N1| = 7, |N2| = 13,
|N3| = 5, |N01| = 8, N12 = 20, N23 = 18 and N03 = 26. We note here that the
described attack would not work in the case where pairwise-sums are not unique
(e.g., when all leaves have size 1) but other information could be potentially used
in that case. To conclude, this simple attack shows that concealing the overlapping
pattern (as LOGARITHMIC-SRC is doing) is not enough for fully defending
against range attacks.
Generalization of attack to LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i. Recall that in
LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i we maintain two LOGARITHMIC-SRC-type trees:
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one for the metadata (T1) and one for the actual data (T2). Every leaf in T1 has size
at most one since a specific domain value may not be present at all in the database.
Thus the above attack that exploits distinct sizes of leaves might not work very well.
However there are still ways to launch an attack. Coming back to Figure 6.1,
consider the tree T1 on the domain {0, 1, 2, 3}, with the difference that all leaf nodes
have size either zero or one. Suppose after all queries have been issued on T1 the
adversary observes only three nodes of size one (and all other nodes have size zero).
Looking into this information carefully, one can tell that these nodes have to be
either N0, N0,1 and N0,3 or N3, N2,3 and N0,3 which implies that all database tuples
have the same value and this value is either 0 or 3. Note that at that point, it will
be easy to recover the topology of T2 since for each range query one node of T1 and
one for T2 will be accessed together.
The above attacks are not analyzed in full detail since we want to use them
mainly as a way to manifest the weaknesses of the Logarithmic-SRC and Logarithmic-
SRC-i schemes [2]. We also use them as a motivation to introduce our new RANGE-
SRC-SE-(a, x) scheme (see Section 6.3.5). Exploring these attacks against Logarithmic-
SRC and Logarithmic-SRC-i in more detail is left as future work.
6.3 SEAL: Adjustable SE & Derived Constructions
Most of the attacks on SE-based encrypted databases that were presented in
section 6.2 exploit the leakage of SE such as the search, overlapping and volume
pattern. In this section we propose SEAL, a family of new SE schemes with ad-
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justable leakage with the hope that these can be used to implement more secure
(yet efficient) encrypted databases that withstand leakage-abuse attacks. Our main
building blocks are an adjustable ORAM, an ORAM that allows one to define the bits
of leakage of the index being accessed in a tunable manner, as well a an adjustable
padding algorithm that adds noise to the actual size of the list being accessed.
6.3.1 Adjustable Oblivious RAM
An adjustable ORAM (ADJ-ORAM-α) is parameterized by a parameter α
that defines the number of leaked bits of the accessed memory location (α = 0 for a
traditional ORAM). We define the ADJ-OramInitialize and ADJ-OramAccess
protocols of our ADJ-ORAM-α scheme:
• (σ,EM)↔ ADJ-OramInitialize((1λ,M, α),⊥), takes as input a security pa-
rameter λ, a memory array M of n values (without loss of generality lets
assume n is a power of 2) (1, v1), . . . , (n, vn), a parameter α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , log n}
and outputs secret state σ (for client), and encrypted memory EM (for server).
• ((vi, σ),EM)↔ ADJ-OramAccess((op, i, vi, σ, α),EM) is a protocol between
the client and the server, where the client’s input is the type of operation op
(read/write), an index i and the value vi—for op = read client sets vi = ⊥.
Server’s input is the encrypted memory EM. Client’s output consists of the
updated secret state σ and the value vi assigned to the i-th value of M if
op = read (for op = write the returned value is ⊥). Server’s output is the
updated encrypted memory EM.
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bit← RealADJ-ORAM-α(λ):
1: M0 ← Adv(1λ).
2: (σ0,EM0)↔ ADJ-OramInitialize((1λ,M0, α),⊥).
3: for k = 1 to q do . q: polynomial #queries
4: ik ← Adv(1κ,EM0,m1,m2, . . . ,mk−1).
5: ((vik , σk),EMk)↔ ADJ-OramAccess((op, ik, vik , σk−1),EMk−1).
6: return bit← Adv(1k,EM0,m1,m2, . . . ,mq).
bit← IdealADJ-ORAM-αLα1 ,Lα2 (λ):
1: M0 ← Adv(1λ).
2: (stS ,EM0)← ADJ-SimOramInitialize(1λ,Lα1 ).
3: for k = 1 to q do
4: ik ← Adv(1κ,EM0,m1,m2, . . . ,mk−1).
5: (stS ,EMk)↔ ADJ-SimOramAccess( stS ,EMk−1,Lα2 (ik)).
6: return bit← Adv(1k,EM0,m1,m2, . . . ,mq).
Figure 6.2: ADJ-ORAM-α real-ideal security experiments. With m0,m1, . . . , we
denote the messages exchanged at Line 5 of both experiments.
Next, we define the security of ADJ-ORAM-α in the real/ideal game of Figure 6.2
parametrized by leakage functions Lα1 ,Lα2 .
Definition 6 ADJ-ORAM-α is (Lα1 ,Lα2 )-secure if for any PPT adversary Adv,
there exists a PPT simulator containing algorithms (ADJ-SimOramInitialize,
ADJ-SimOramAccess):
|Pr[RealADJ-ORAM-α(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealADJ-ORAM-αLα1 ,Lα2 (λ) = 1]|
is at most neg(λ), where the above experiments are defined in Figure 6.2 and where
the randomness is taken over the random bits used by the algorithms of the ADJ-
ORAM-α scheme, the algorithms of the simulator and Adv.
The leakages Lα1 ,Lα2 are defined in a manner similar to those of SE, i.e.,
Lα1 (M) = (n, α) and Lα2 (i) = idα(i), where idα(i) returns the α most significant
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(σ,EM)↔ ADJ-OramInitialize((1λ,M, α),⊥)
1: Let M be in the form (1, v1), . . . , (n, vn) and µ = 2
α.
2: Sample a secret key k ←$ {0, 1}λ .
3: Let πk be a PRP: {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}log2 n → {0, 1}log2 n.




5: for i = 1, . . . , n do
6: Let ` be the integer representation of the α most significant bits of πk[i]
and φ be the integer representation of the remaining bits of πk[i].
7: S`+1[φ+ 1] = vi.
8: for i = 1, . . . , µ do
9: (σi,EMi)↔ OramInitialize((1λ, Si),⊥).
10: Let EM to be EM1, . . . ,EMµ and σ to (σ1, . . . , σµ).
11: return (σ,EM).
((vi, σ),EM)↔ ADJ-OramAccess((op, i, vi, σ, α),EM)
1: Parse σ as (σ1, . . . , σµ) and EM as (EM1, . . . ,EMµ) where µ = 2
α.
2: Let ` be the integer representation of the α most significant bits of πk[i] and
φ be the integer representation of the remaining bits of πk[i].
3: ` = `+ 1 and φ = φ+ 1.
4: ((vi, σ`),EM`)↔ OramAccess((op, φ, vi, σ`), EM`).
5: return (vi, σ,EM).
Figure 6.3: ADJ-ORAM-α using any ORAM as a black box.
bits of a random log n-bit alias assigned to tuple (i, vi). Intuitively, if two queries
for index i are made on an ADJ-ORAM-α, the adversary should only figure out that
the α most significant bits of the queried index are the same—but nothing else.
Construction of ADJ-ORAM-α. The main idea behind our approach is that the
memory array will not be stored in one ORAM, but it will be partitioned into multi-
ple disjoint subsets, each of which will then be stored in a separate smaller ORAM.
We use as a black box any secure ORAM= (OramInitialize,OramAccess)
to store each subset. Our construction works by building 2α different ORAMs
ORAM1,. . .,ORAM2α , each of which will store a part of M of size n/2
α.
One possible way to partition M into these ORAMs would be to determin-
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istically assign (i, vi) based on their location in M, i.e., the first 2
α entries will be
stored in ORAM1, the next 2
α entries will be stored in ORAM2 and so on. However,
this might reveal sensitive information for certain application settings, e.g., if the
server knows that M stores vi in a sorted manner, then accessing ORAM1 reveals
that one of the smallest values in M was accessed. Hence, before performing the
partitioning, we randomly permute M using a PRP P over [1, n] (implemented with
a small-domain PRP [96, 97, 98]), for which the key k is chosen and stored by the
client. Let πk be the corresponding mapping after k has been chosen. Then, the
partitioning of M is performed using the integer representation of the α most sig-
nificant bits of the permuted index and the remaining bits of πk(i) correspond to
the index πk(i) of tuple (i, vi) inside the small ORAM. Our construction is given in
Figure 6.3.
Theorem 7 Assuming (OramInitialize,OramAccess) is a secure ORAM and
πk is a secure PRP, then ADJ-ORAM-α presented above is (Lα1 ,Lα2 )-secure, accord-
ing to Def. 6.
Proof 8 The ORAM scheme used is secure and therefore we use its algorithms
SimOramInitialize and SimOramAccess. In particular, the ADJ-SimOramInitialize
takes as an input Lα1 = (n, α) and the security parameter λ, and it creates EM1, . . .EMµ
and σ1, . . . , σµ using SimOramInitialize(1
λ, n
µ
) for µ = n
2α
. The ADJ-SimOramAccess
takes as an input idα(i), from L2 leakage, which determines in which encrypted mem-
ory EMi must be accessed, and performs a random access using SimOramAccess(σi,EMi).
Then, the simulator properly updates EMi and σi..
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Performance and leakage of ADJ-ORAM-α. The higher the value of α is, the
more efficient ADJ-ORAM is (ORAM is applied on a smaller parts of the array) and
the larger the leakage becomes (more accesses will be made on the same small parts
of the array). Concretely, if we assume that the ORAM used as a building block
has T (n) access overhead (e.g., T (n) = O(log n) for the most efficient ORAM [99]),
then ADJ-ORAM-α has an improved T (n/2α) overhead. In Section 6.3.3 we discuss
how ADJ-ORAM-α can be instantiated using [5] and oblivious data structures [41]
and we provide a more concrete performance analysis.
6.3.2 Adjustable Padding
In this section we propose adjustable padding, another primitive that will help
us build more secure SE schemes. Recall that existing SE schemes leak the query
result size, i.e., |D(w)|. In particular, in a dataset with size N a keyword list can
have N different sizes. One way to eliminate this leakage is by padding all the
keyword lists D(w) to the same size N (worst-case padding). However, this would
introduce a prohibitive storage/search overhead. To avoid this overhead, one could
pad to the closest power of two, forcing the adversary to observe at most logN + 1
sizes—leaking log logN + 1 bits, at most doubling the search and storage overhead.
Our proposal is a generalization of the above idea. Our padding can be param-
eterized by a value x that defines the number of different sizes (which are exactly
dlogxNe + 1) that the adversary can observe. Our padding algorithm works as
follows (see Figure 6.4). Given a keyword list D(w) of size, we find the integer i
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D ← ADJ-Padding(x,D)
1: N = |D|.
2: for each keyword w in D do
3: Find the smallest i: xi−1 < |D(w)| ≤ xi.
4: Pad D(w) with xi − |D(w)| dummy values.
5: Pad D with dummy records so that the total size is x ·N .
6: return the padded dataset.
Figure 6.4: ADJ-Padding-x leading to logxN different sizes.
such that xi−1 < |D(w)| ≤ xi. Then we pad the list D(w) with xi − |D(w)| dummy
entries. Note that this padding strategy can increase the space and search overhead
by a factor of x and yields leakage of log logxN + 1 bits! In other words the larger x
is, the less efficient the scheme becomes and the less leakage the adversary observes.
We note here that for simulation purposes, after all lists are padded, our algorithm
pads the dataset to a total of x ·N entries so that to avoid leaking any information
about the dataset.
We note here that padding techniques have been used before for concealing
the size of the accessed result (e.g., see Cash et al. [77] and Bost and Fouque [91],
as well as Lacharite et al.[92] and Liberatore et al.[93]). However, these approaches
depend on the distribution of the input dataset, which leads to more leakage, even
prior to query execution. Instead our padding algorithm is distribution-agnostic and




1: Let D be the input dataset and let W be the set of keywords in D.
2: D ← ADJ-PADDING(x,D). . Parameter x is public.
3: Let M be an array of N entries storing (w, id) pairs of D in lexicographic
order and iw be the index of w’s first occurrence in M.
4: (T, σodict)← ODictSetup(1λ, N).
5: for all w ∈W do
6: Let cntw = |D(w)|.
7: (σodict, T )↔ ODictInsert((w, iw||cntw, σodict), T ).
8: (σoram,EM)← ADJ-OramInitialize(1λ,M, α). . Parameter α is public.
9: stC = (σoram, σodict) and I = (EM, T ).
10: return (stC, I).
((X , stC), I)↔ Search((stC, w), I)
1: Parse I as (EM, T ) and stC as (σodict, σoram) and let X be empty.
2: ((value, σodict), T )↔ ODictSearch((w, σodict), T ).
3: Parse value as (iw||cntw).
4: for i = iw, . . . , iw + cntw do
5: ((vi, σoram),EM)↔ ADJ-OramAccess((read, i,⊥, σoram, α),EM).
6: X ← X ∪ vi.
7: return (X , stC, I).
Figure 6.5: Our SEAL(α, x) scheme using ADJ-ORAM-α, ADJ-PADDING-x,
and an oblivious dictionary as black boxes.
6.3.3 SEAL
We now present SEAL(α, x), our adjustable SE construction that uses ADJ-
ORAM-α, ADJ-PADDING-x and an oblivious dictionary ODict described in
Section 2 as black boxes.
We recall that parameter α is defined in the range [0, logN ] and that for α = 0
all the search/overlapping pattern bits are protected, and for α = logN all bits are
leaked. Also for larger x values, less volume pattern bits are leaked—e.g., for value
x = N no volume pattern bits are leaked.
Construction of SEAL(α, x). SEAL(α, x) is defined similarly with SE (see Sec-
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tion 2) and has algorithms/protocols Setup and Search. Our construction is de-
scribed in Figure 6.5.
SEAL’s setup takes as input dataset D. Parameters α and x are consid-
ered public and we do not provide them as input explicitly. First, it uses ADJ-
PADDING(x,D) in order to transform D to a new dataset with at most logxN + 1
distinct results sizes (see Line 2 of setup). Then, it sorts all the (w, id) pairs in lex-
icographical order (see Line 3 of setup) and places them sequentially in a memory
array M which is then given as input to the ADJ-OramInitialize algorithm (see
Line 8 of setup). The sorting guarantees that all (w, id) for the same keyword w will
be placed in consecutive memory locations. All entries for w can then be retrieved
if one knows the index of the first appearance of w and the size of the padded list
|D(w)|. For every keyword w, this information is stored in an oblivious dictionary
T (see Line 7 of setup).
SEAL’s search takes as input the queried keyword w, client’s secret state stC
and the encrypted index I, which contains the small oblivious memories EM1, . . .
as well as the oblivious dictionary T . For a given queried keyword w, the client
first performs an access to the oblivious dictionary to retrieve the index of the first
appearance of w in M and the padded result size (cntw) (see Lines 2-3 of search).
Then, it performs cntw accesses in the ADJ-ORAM-α in order to retrieve the result
X (see Lines 4-7 of search). Note that, due to padding, X may contain “dummy”
records which will be filtered out by the client afterwards.
Leakage definition for SEAL(α, x). SEAL(α, x) is secure according to the stan-
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dard SE/OSE definition described in Section 2 with the following leakage functions
Lα,x1 (D) = (N,α, x) and Lα,x2 (D, w) = Dxα(w) ,
where Dxα(w) contains the α most significant bits of the aliases of the document
identifiers in the padded list D(w) as output by algorithm ADJ-PADDING(x,D).
For the rest of the chapter we simply denote these leakages as L1 and L2.
Theorem 8 Assuming that ODict is a secure oblivious data structure according
to [41] (Def. 1) and ADJ-ORAM-α is secure according to Def. 6, then SEAL(α, x)
is (L1,L2)-secure according to Def. 1.
Proof 9 ADJ-ORAM-α is secure—our proof uses simulator algorithms
ADJ-SimOramInitialize and ADJ-SimOramAccess. The security parameter
λ is given. The SimSetup takes as an input L1 = (N,α, x). SimSetup initializes
(T, σodict) ← ODictSetup(1λ, N) and it inserts N random entries of the form
(w, iw||cntw) in the oblivious dictionary T using ODictInsert. Then, it com-
putes N ′ = x · N . Finally, it uses ADJ-SimOramInitialize(1λ, N ′, α) to create
the encrypted memory EM and state σoram. The SimSearch algorithm takes as
an input L2 and performs one random access in the oblivious dictionary T using
ODictSearch, and calls |Dxα(w)| times the ADJ-SimOramAccess with input the
α-bit identifiers in Dxα(w) (Dxα(w) has the required leakage for ADJ-SimOramAccess).
Then, the simulator updates EM, T and the states σodict, and σoram. 
153
Asymptotic performance. Let (T (n), C(n), S(n)) be the access complexity, client-
space complexity and server-space complexity respectively of the underlying ORAM
used and let (t(n), c(n), s(n)) be the access complexity, client-space complexity and
server-space complexity respectively of the underlying oblivious dictionary used.
The server space required is always S(x · N) + s(N). Now, assuming the client
keeps, along with the oblivious dictionary state, the ORAM states locally, the search
complexity for a keyword w is





and the client space is 2α · C(x ·N/2α) + c(N). Assuming the client does not keep
ORAM states locally and just downloads and re-encrypts to the server, the search
complexity for w is












and the client space is just c(N). Whether one chooses to store the local states
locally or outsource them depends on the parameter α. For small values of α it is
better to keep them locally, while for larger values of α it might worth outsourcing.
Implementing ADJ-ORAM-α. We implement each small ORAM in ADJ-ORAM-
α with Path-ORAM [5]. Recall that the cost of Path-ORAM for accessing n blocks
of size B is B log n for accessing the path and O(log3 n) for recursively updating
the position map. In our case we apply Path-ORAM on N/2a blocks of size around
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2 logN bits (logN bits for storing keyword w and logN bits for storing the id) and
therefore our total cost is O(logN log(N/2a) + log3(N/2a)).
Implementing SEAL(α, x). For SEAL(α, x), apart from ADJ-ORAM-α as de-
scribed above, we also use an oblivious dictionary ODict (for storing iw||cntw) im-
plemented with an oblivious AVL tree [41] (this requires b log2N additional additive
cost where b is the bitsize of iw||cntw). In case the number of keywords/attributes
|W| in small, we choose to keep the dictionary locally—this requires around 3|W| logN
bits which in practice is a few megabytes and is a common assumption in Dynamic
SE [28, 65, 66, 71]. Our experiments in the next section assume the dictionary is
kept locally. Note that even if we do not keep the dictionary locally, we only re-
quire one oblivious access to it per query w. This is most of the times subsumed
by the required |D(w)| ADJ-ORAM-α queries, especially when |D(w)| is large (e.g.,
Ω(log2N)). In any case we can always reduce the above cost with an adjustable
oblivious dictionary at the expense of leaking α bits of the search pattern. Finally,
in case the worst-case overhead of SEAL(α, x) becomes higher than sequential scan
(which has no leakage), we perform a sequential scan.
6.3.4 New Constructions for Point/Join Queries
In Section 6.2 we presented/reviewed three constructions for point and join
queries on encrypted databases that use SE as a black box : (i) POINT-SE, a con-
struction for point queries on encrypted data; (ii) JOIN-SE and JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE,
two constructions for join queries on encrypted data.
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Our proposed new constructions reduce the leakage of the above constructions
by using SEAL(α, x), instead of simple SE. By doing this replacement we have the
following constructions, for various parameters of α and x,
1. POINT-ADJ-SE, and 2) JOIN-ADJ-SE.
Note that JOIN-ADJ-SE can be instantiated either by using JOIN-SE or
JOIN-SE-PRECOMPUTE as basis. We denote also that POINT-ADJ-SE can
also be used in the case of group-by queries.
6.3.5 New Constructions for Range Queries
The first adjustable construction that we propose for range queries, RANGE-
ADJ-SE-(a, x), is based on the “naive” construction RANGE-SE from Section 6.2.3,
where instead of simple SE we use SEAL(a, x).
Our second construction, RANGE-SRC-SE-(a, x) comprises two modifica-
tions of LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i [2] so that the potential attack presented in
Section 6.2.3 is mitigated. Recall the attack works by exploiting volumes exposed
by tree T1 (the tree T1 stores metadata required to search tree T2).
Our first modification of LOGARITHMIC-SRC-i is a simple one: Instead
of outsourcing tree T1 using SE, keep tree T1 locally unencrypted and therefore
previously exposed volume information will not be available. The only downside is
the O(|W|) client storage that is required to store T1, where W is the set of values
of the range attribute. In practice this storage is minimal, e.g., none of the ranges
of the attributes shown in Table 6.1 of our evaluation exceed 1MB. (Of course, if
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strictly necessary, we can outsource tree T1 to the server via an oblivious dictionary
without any leakage, increasing the search time by a polylog factor.)
RANGE-SRC-SE-(α, x). However, the above modification addresses the leakage
only in T1. But T2 can also leak information. For example, (a) if the same tree
node is accessed twice, there is nonzero probability that the same range is being
queried, and (b) the result size (or an upper bound of it) is leaked from accessing
T2. To reduce the effect of leakages (a) and (b), one could reduce the number of
sizes observed by the adversary by implementing the encrypted index for T2 using
SEAL(α, x) instead of simple SE.
Our second modification that yields our final scheme RANGE-SRC-SE-(α, x)
does almost that, but it does not use ADJ-Padding for reducing the volume pattern
leakage—this would blow up the space to O(xN log(xN)). Instead RANGE-SRC-
SE-(α, x) reduces the number of sizes that are being observed to logxN + 1 by
storing only as many equally distributed levels from T2. E.g., for x = 2 all levels are
stored, for x = 4 half of the levels are stored, while for x = 16 one fourth of the
levels are stored. Note that by this approach the search complexity is O(x · r) and
the space is O(N logxN).
6.4 Evaluation Against Attacks
To benchmark the effectiveness of our proposed adjustable constructions POINT-
ADJ-SE, JOIN-ADJ-SE and RANGE-SRC-SE, we could use existing state-of-
the-art leakage-abuse attacks [76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82]. However, these attacks are
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very sensitive to the exact overlapping or volume pattern (e.g., for ordering the
records in range queries), which is not available in our adjustable constructions.
We introduce instead a new class of attacks where the adversary tries to work with
only the available bits of leakage, and at a high level, tries to guess the rest of the
bits. Also, our adversary is quite powerful, having plaintext access to the input
dataset. We stress that this is a “heavy” benchmark that already covers known at-
tacks [76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82]. This is because if our adjustable constructions reduce
the success rate of such a powerful attacker, a more realistic attacker with par-
tial knowledge of the dataset would perform even worse (assuming the same attack
strategy is followed). We now describe the attacker model in detail.
6.4.1 Attacker Model
Our model considers a single-client setting (we do not support a multi-client
scenario with multiple parties accessing the data). We assume that our adversary:
(i) is the system provider that hosts the encrypted database (including the encrypted
index) and performs the encrypted query execution; (ii) is honest-but-curious (i.e.,
tries to infer information during the execution of the protocol, but does not deviate
from the protocol, e.g., to give a “tampered” answer); (iii) has full visibility of the
server-side execution and memory; (iv) acquires all the possible leaked information
from query execution—observing all possible queries at least once; (v) has access to
100% of the plaintext database. Our adversary has two goals:
1. First, to perform a query recovery attack, namely decrypting the client en-
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crypted queries;
2. Second, to perform a database recovery attack, that requires to map plaintext
values (for the queried attribute) to the tuples of the encrypted database.
We stress that this a strong attacker model, one that we believe is beyond most real-
world adversaries’ capabilities. This was a deliberate design decision as our main
goal is to evaluate our proposed mitigation techniques against a strong adversary.
On the other hand, our analysis does not capture cases where the attacker has
information about the query distribution. Note here that a database recovery attack
in the case of SE (α = logN) is trivial, since the identifiers of the encrypted records
reveal the desired mapping to the plaintext records directly. This task becomes more
challenging for smaller values of α where this information is not given in its entirety.
In addition, note that the database recovery attack becomes also trivial if SEAL
does not re-randomize or assign new tuple ids to encrypted tuples; which is not the
case in SEAL (see Line 6 of the used ADJ-ORAM-α). For our experiments, we
define the query recovery success rate QRSR as the ratio of the number of correctly
decrypted queries over the total number of considered queries. We also define the
database recovery success rate DRSR as the ratio of the number of encrypted tuples
that have been correctly mapped to the plaintext tuples.
6.4.2 Experimental Setup
Our experiments were conducted on a 64-bit machine with an Intel Xeon
E5-2676v3 and 64 GB RAM. We utilized the JavaX.crypto and the bouncy castle
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QRSR ← QueryRecoveryAttack(T , {tq, |q|}q∈Q)
Input: Plaintext tuples T and tokens tq along with their volumes |q|.
Output: The success rate QRSR of the attack.
1: Set T ← ADJ-Padding(x, T ).
2: Set correct = 0.
3: for each token tq do
4: Choose q′ at random from the set {q′ : |T (q′)| = |q|}.
5: Remove q′ from T .
6: if q′ is the correct decryption for tq then
7: correct++.
8: return correct/|Q|.
Figure 6.6: Query Recovery Attack for Point Queries.
DRSR ← DatabaseRecoveryAttack(T , enc(T ), {tq, Sq}q∈Q)
Input: Plaintext tuples T , encrypted tuples enc(T ) and tokens tq along with
respective set Sq of encrypted tuples (and their α-bit identifiers).
Output: The success rate DRSR of the attack.
1: Set T ← ADJ-Padding(x, T ).
2: Set correct = 0.
3: for each pair (tq, Sq) do
4: Choose q′ at random from the set {q′ : |T (q′)| = |Sq|}.
5: for each encrypted tuple e ∈ Sq do
6: Let id be the α-bit identifier of e.
7: Choose at random a tuple t from enc(T ) that has id as the first α
bits of its identifier.
8: Remove t from enc(T ).
9: if encrypted tuple t has value q′ at the queried attribute then
10: correct++.
11: Remove q′ from T .
12: return correct/
∑ |Sq|.
Figure 6.7: Database Recovery Attack for Point Queries.
library [53] for the cryptographic operations. Our java implementation does not use
hardware supported cryptographic operations. However, this does not affect our
conclusions. The use of hardware supported cryptographic operations can further
improve the absolute time for construction and search, but it will not affect the
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comparison for different parameters α and x. We consider the following two datasets
in our experimental evaluation. For attacking POINT-ADJ-SE-(α, x), we use a
real dataset consisting of 6,123,276 tuples with 22 attributes of reported incidents
of crime in Chicago [46]. For attacking POINT-ADJ-SE-(α, x), JOIN-ADJ-SE-
(α, x), and RANGE-SRC-SE-(α, x), we used the TPC-H benchmark [49] with
scaling factor 0.1 which is widely used by the database community3. TPC-H consists
of eight separate tables (PART, SUPPLIER, PARTSUPP, CUSTOMER, NATION,
LINEITEM, REGION, ORDERS). Our attacks take as input the leakage of all
possible queries (worst-case leakage). The same attacks can be run with less queries,
leading to lower success rate. When evaluating the performance of SEAL(α, x) we
store the oblivious dictionary locally. We denote with x = ⊥ the lack of padding,
where the attacker can observe up to N distinct result sizes.
6.4.3 Attacking POINT-ADJ-SE
We evaluate the effectiveness of POINT-ADJ-SE-(α, x) against our new
query/database recovery attacks. In both attacks we consider one attribute of one
table at a time. Our query recovery attack (see Figure 6.6) is very simple and uses
only volume pattern leakage. Having access to the plaintext table T , the adversary
computes the new padded table for the queried attribute (Line 1 in Figure 6.6)
using the padding parameter x. Now, for a given encrypted query q with size |q|
the adversary uses T to find the candidate plaintext values which have size |q|, and
3We do not provide an evaluation for group-by queries since the results are identical to those
for point queries (after observing all the distinct queries).
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chooses one of them at random (see Line 4 in Figure 6.6). Note that the higher the
value of x is, the larger the set of possible values in Line 4 is therefore reducing the
success rate of the attack. The database recovery (see Figure 6.7) works as follows.
First the adversary decrypts which keyword we are querying, as before—say this
keyword is q′. Now, the goal is to map the value q′ to the correct encrypted tuples
in enc(T ), where enc(T ) is the encrypted database produced by the SETUP algo-
rithm of SEAL. The adversary knowing from L2 leakage the α-bits of each returned
encrypted tuple, chooses at random for each of them one tuple from enc(T ) with
same α bits as prefix and maps q′ to this tuple. Finally, the adversary removes the
chosen tuples t from enc(T ). The adversary is successful if after this process the
encrypted tuple t has value q′ at the queried attribute. Clearly, the smaller α is, the
more bits the adversary will have to guess (the larger the set of tuples with same α
bits as prefix is) and therefore the less successful the attack is going to be.
Query recovery attack evaluation. Figures 6.8(a), and 6.8(b) show the evalu-
ation of POINT-ADJ-SE-(α, x) against the query recovery attack. We only vary x
since α does not affect the effectiveness of the attack. Figure 6.8(a) demonstrates
the evaluation for the LINEITEM table (TPC-H), while Figure 6.8(b) presents the
results for the Crime dataset. In all figures, we report the attacker’s query recovery
success rate if she just maps encrypted queries to plaintext values at random, i.e.,
1/|W|—ideally, the success rate of our attack should be as close as possible to this
“Random” approach. In Figure 6.8(a), for x = 2 (only a 2× overhead in search time
and storage), we see that our scheme forces the attacker to perform very close to
“Random” for 14 out of 16 attributes. We observe that QRSR for attribute 8 is close
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Figure 6.8: Query Recovery Attack against POINT-ADJ-SE for various x.
to Random for x = 16, while for attribute 4 greater values of x are needed. Let us
look why this is the case for, say, attribute 8: There are only three values that can
be queried with highly-skewed result sizes |q1| =1, |q2| =1,000 and |q3| =100,000.
Therefore the larger the number of padded sizes is, the more likely it is that each qi
will be mapped to a distinct padded size, allowing the attacker to still distinguish
them. We observe similar patterns for the tables of TPC-H and we report the results
for tables ORDERS and PART in Figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: Query Recovery Attack against POINT-ADJ-SE for various x.
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In Figure 6.8(b) we repeat the same experiment for the 22 attributes of the
crime dataset, and we observe that in 17 out of 22 attributes for x = 4 (up to 4×
performance degradation) the attacker’s QRSR significantly drops and is close to the
Random approach. For attributes 6, 8, 10, 12, 15 greater values of x are needed again
due to the small number of values that these attributes have. Finally, we observe
that in attributes 15 and 18, QRSR is higher for x = 64 than for x = 4, which is
counterintuitive. This is because the query sizes of the values in these attributes are
distributed in a way that for x = 4 there are less distinct sizes than for x = 64.
Database recovery attack evaluation. The database recovery attack is based on
the query recovery one. Thus, due to lack of space we focus on the 22 attributes of
the crime dataset in which QRSR is higher than the one in the TPC-H dataset. Fig-
ure 6.10 shows the attacker’s success rate for the database recovery attack (DRSR)
for α = (17, 19, 21, 23) (α = 23 corresponds to SEAL(logN, x)) and for x = ⊥ and
x = 2. Recall that in our threat model the attacker has plaintext access to the
input dataset, so for the database recovery attacks we report as a reference point
a greedy strategy that the adversary may follow, in which she maps all encrypted
tuples to the most frequent plaintext value (guessing heuristically). E.g., for a bi-
nary attribute if the most frequent value appears in the 70% of the tuples/tuple-ids
then the adversary achieves DRSR = 70% by following the greedy strategy. Ideally,
the goal is to find α as close as possible to logN and the smallest possible value
of x, while DRSR is below the greedy strategy. As is shown in Figure 6.10 for
α = logN−2 = 21 and x = 2 the attacker’s success rate is always below the success
rate of the greedy strategy. In Figure 6.11, we provide a more detailed evaluation
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(a) x = ⊥
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(b) x = 2
Figure 6.10: Database Recovery Attack against POINT-ADJ-SE for the Crime
Dataset. We show all attributes.
for 4 specific attributes of the crime dataset for α ∈ [0, logN ] and x = ⊥, 2, 3, 4.
6.4.4 Attacking JOIN-ADJ-SE
We evaluate the effectiveness of JOIN-ADJ-SE-(α, x) using the database recov-
ery attack proposed for point queries (see Figures 6.7). Since the database schema
and the size of each table are usually not considered private information, we do not
consider join query recovery attacks.
Attack evaluation. Figure 6.12 demonstrates the database recovery attack for
foreign-key join queries. We consider foreign-key joins between tables (i) SUPPLIER
and NATION—Figure 6.12(a), and (ii) CUSTOMER and NATION; the TPC-H
benchmark contains only foreign-key joins. We observe in Figure 6.12(b) the DRSR
for α = [0, logN ], and x = ⊥, 2, 3, 4. For α = 0 and x = ⊥, DRSR is 65% in
Figure 6.12(a) and 97% in Figure6.12(b), but for α = logN − 1 and x = 2, DRSR



















































































































Figure 6.11: Database Recovery Attack against POINT-ADJ-SE for the Crime
Dataset. Attributes 4,7,11,20.
6.4.5 Attacking RANGE-SRC-SE
We evaluate the effectiveness of RANGE-SRC-SE-(α, x) scheme for various
x against slightly modified versions of the attacks for point queries (Figures 6.6 and
6.7). In particular in Line 2 of both Figure 6.6 and 6.7, we do not perform padding
but we recreate T2 in plaintext with only logxN + 1 evenly distributes levels. We
report as a baseline a scheme that does not perform padding but hides the entire
overlapping pattern leakage. For the case of query recovery attack we set α = logN
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Figure 6.12: Database Recovery Attack for Foreign-key Join Queries for the TPC-H
Benchmark.
for RANGE-SRC-SE-(α, x), since varying α does not affect the effectiveness of the
attack.
Attack evaluation. We focus on numeric attributes PS SupplyCost from ta-
ble PARTSUPP; P Size and P RetailPrice from PART; L TAX, L QUANTITY,
L DISCOUNT from LINEITEM. Table 6.1 presents for each attribute the number
of all possible range queries and the number of the correctly decrypted ones using
the baseline (Column 3 of Table 6.1), and RANGE-SRC-SE for x = 2, x = 4 and
x = 8 (Columns 4, 5, 6 of Table 6.1). We observe that x = 8 drastically reduces the
number of correctly decrypted queries. We omit the presentation of the database
recovery attacks for ranges, since DRSR is primarily based on the result of the query
recovery attack, and we see in Table 6.1 that even for x = 2 QRSR is small.
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Attribute #Queries # Correctly Decrypted Queries
Baseline RANGE-SRC-SE
x = 2 x = 4 x = 8
PS SupplyCost 500500 73446 14 6 2
P Size 1275 1184 10 5 2
P RetailPrice 519690 19555 18 5 2
L Tax 45 45 8 5 3
L Quantity 1275 1263 10 4 3
L Discount 66 66 8 4 1
Table 6.1: Query Recovery Attack for Range Queries QRSR = # Correctly De-
crypted Queries /# Queries)
6.4.6 Efficiency of Adjustable Constructions
In Figure 6.13(a), we fix a database with size 222 records, and we show the
largest slowdown (across all the possible result sizes—1, 2, 3 . . . N) of SEAL(α, x)
compared to a SE scheme which has the maximum leakage. Similarly, in Fig-
ure 6.14(a), we show the smallest speedup achieved by our construction SEAL(α, x)
(for various values of α and x) compared to an approach that performs sequential
scan and has no leakage. Because, we consider the worst-case speedup from the
most secure solution (α = 0 and x = N), sequential scan provides a more efficient
approach than the use of worst-case padding with ORAM which is also achieves
the same security. We do an analysis of these plots in the next section. We high-
light again that neither SE nor sequential scan are competitors of SEAL, since (i)
SEAL encapsulates those schemes (e.g., for α = 0 and x = N becomes sequential
scan and for α = logN and x = ⊥ becomes SE scheme), and (ii) for non-trivial
α and x they provide different security level. We provide those experiments only
as reference points of SEAL’s performance compared with the most and least se-
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Figure 6.13: Slowdown from SE.
cure solutions. In addition, Figures 6.13(a),6.14(a) can be used in combination with
Figures 6.8-6.12 and Table 6.1: For a given query type and attack we can specify
good values for α, x (for mitigating the attack) from Figures 6.8-6.12 and Table
6.1,and for those values we can see the relative performance of SEAL compared
with SE and sequential scan in Figures 6.13(a),6.14(a). Figure 6.13(b) and 6.14(b)
evaluate RANGE-ADJ-SE-(0, x) and RANGE-SRC-SE-(logN, x). Note that
both schemes hide the overlapping pattern, the first by using ORAM, the second
by construction. Also both schemes are using the same x, allowing the adversary
to observe the same number of different sizes (but not necessarily the same sizes).
Note that RANGE-SRC-SE performs much better than RANGE-ADJ-SE. This
is to be expected given RANGE-SRC-SE has more leakage—the search pattern,
which however we do not know how to use in an attack here.4
We provide additional experiments regarding the performance of our SEAL
4Although the search pattern (combined with the access pattern) has been used in recent work
























































Figure 6.14: Speedup from sequential scan.
Dataset Size (#tuples)
×106















































Figure 6.15: Index Costs - Crime Dataset
scheme for the crime dataset. We show experiments for values of α and x that
significantly mitigate the proposed attacks and achieve good performance (as we
also discuss in the next section). In Figure 6.15, we evaluate the required index size
and construction time of SEAL for x = ⊥, 2, 3, 4. Finally, in Figures 6.16 and 6.17
we evaluate the end-to-end search time of our SEAL scheme for two attributes of
the crime dataset for α = 20, 21, 22, 23 and x = ⊥, 2, 3, 4.
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(a) x = ⊥
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(b) x = 2
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(d) x = 4
Figure 6.16: Search costs - Crime Dataset (Attribute 5)
6.4.7 Setting Parameters α and x in Practice
From the above findings, it should be evident that finding appropriate pa-
rameter values is heavily data-dependent. In particular, it depends on the size of
the database, number of distinct values, and the distribution of a given searchable
attribute. One way for users to tune these parameters is to use our attacks as an
estimator, e.g., provide their databases as input and try different values of α and
x in order to set their desirable success rate thresholds against our attacks (before
outsourcing the database). Below, we provide more general guidelines on how one
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(d) x = 4
Figure 6.17: Search costs - Crime Dataset (Attribute 8)
can set these parameters based on our evaluation.
Setting parameter x. Parameter x solely controls the success rate of the query
recovery attack for point, range (RANGE-SRC scheme) and group-by queries. The
query recovery attack tries to map the encrypted queries to plaintext ones based on
the volume leakage. For instance, if a database contains only two values a and b and
the volume of the former value is greater than the latter, i.e., |q(a)| > |q(b)|, the
adversary can correctly map with certainty the encrypted query with the greater
volume to a and the other one to b. Now, assuming that both values have the
same volume, the adversary cannot distinguish the encrypted queries and is forced
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to guess. Increasing the parameter x, we try to have more queries with the same
size in order to increase the adversary’s uncertainty, but finding a good value of
x also depends on the distribution of the searchable value. For instance, attribute
9 of the crime dataset is a binary attribute (it has 2 distinct values), in which
|q(a)| = 4374175 and |q(b)| = 1749100. We observe that for x = 2 these queries
still will have different volumes, but for x = 3 they obtain the same volume (i.e.,
|q′(a)| = |q′(b)| = 4782969) and they will be indistinguishable. Attribute 10 of the
crime dataset, which is also a binary attribute, has |q(a)| = 5337429 and |q(b)| =
785846 and in order to make these sizes indistinguishable higher values of x are
needed, i.e., x = 14. Again, this kind of analysis can be performed locally, prior to
outsourcing the dataset.
Setting parameter α. Parameter α affects the success rate of the database re-
covery attacks for point, range (RANGE-SRC scheme), join and group-by queries.
The success of this attack firstly depends on the outcome of the query recovery
attack. Thus, tuning the parameter x in order to increase the uncertainty of the
adversary is very important. Nevertheless, parameter α controls how many tuples
are indistinguishable from each other. For example, setting α = logN − 1 our
scheme creates N/2 ORAMs of size 2—thus every tuple is indistinguishable from
another one (all the tuples that are in the same ORAM are indistinguishable from
each other). Therefore, even if the query recovery attack has 100% success rate and
we are trying to find the correct mapping of plaintext tuples to encrypted ones, the
success rate of this attack will be at most 50% for α = logN − 1. However, in our
proposed database recovery attack, we treat the case when encrypted and plaintext
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tuples have the same searchable value but differ in the rest of the attributes as a
success. Due to this, the distribution of an attribute will also affect the success
of the database recovery attacks. For instance, for point queries attribute 9 of the
crime dataset (which has 2 values— |q(a)| = 4374175 and |q(b)| = 1749100) for
x = ⊥ and α = logN−1 = 22, our attack has success rate around 87%, because the
success rate of the query recovery attack is 100% and the adversary has uncertainty
only when the same ORAM contains both tuples with value a and b.
Finally, we provide some general conclusions from the analysis that we per-
formed on our chosen datasets. We observe that for point and join queries setting
α = logN − 3 and x = 4 significantly reduces both QRSR and DRSR (e.g., at-
tributes 4,5 of LINEITEM and attributes 13,14 of crime dataset for point queries;
SUPPLIER1NATION and CUSTOMER1NATION for join queries), while for these
values the smallest speedup from sequential scan is more than 262, 000× and the
maximum slow-down from SE is 32×. There are rare cases that attributes with
skewed distribution and small number of distinct values, e.g., binary attributes, re-
quire higher values of x, such as x = 16 or x = 64 (e.g., attribute 9 of LINEITEM and
attributes 9,10 of the crime dataset for point queries). In the cases of range queries,
we observe that our RANGE-SRC-SE-(logN, x) for x = 8 significantly mitigates
our all-powerful query recovery attack (e.g., L Tax and L Discount attribute—the
success rate of the attack drops from 100% below 7% and 2% respectively) and
achieves a maximum 48× slowdown from plain RANGE-SE.
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6.5 Challenges for Dynamic Databases
Our work only focuses on static databases. We believe that a very interesting
problem for future work is to extend this work for dynamic databases, an approach
that introduces more leakage and makes the problem more challenging. Towards this
goal, we know from the literature of SE how we can support dynamic point queries
(there is an extensive literature on dynamic schemes that achieve forward/backward
privacy[24, 36, 65, 66, 67, 72]—the state-of-the-art security definitions for dynamic
SE. A first challenge towards dynamic databases is to study if these security defini-
tions for point queries are suitable for other query types (such as range, joins and
group-by queries), as well as to find schemes that achieve those definitions. A second
challenge is that prior ORAM and our ADJ-ORAM schemes require initializing at
setup the worst-case memory size—modifying them for the dynamic case (without
having to set a-priori a large upper bound) is a non-trivial problem. A third chal-
lenge is how we could efficiently use our ADJ-Padding technique, since new updates
will continuously change the distribution of the searchable attribute. Predicting
the required padding size (without extra costly bookkeeping) for a certain keyword
without knowing future updates would be very challenging.
One approach for handling dynamic point queries would be to explore whether
our ADJ-ORAM can be used as a drop-in replacement in existing dynamic ORAM-
based SE schemes (e.g., ORION from [66]), obtaining a good efficiency/security
trade-off. However, this would require addressing the aforementioned second and
third challenges. An alternative direction that avoids these challenges is to use ex-
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isting techniques that transform static SE to dynamic ones (e.g., SDa from [36]). At
a high level, this requires storing the result of N updates in a sequence of logN + 1
separate indexes (with size 20, . . . , 2logN), where each update is first stored in the
smallest index and whenever two indexes of the same size exist they are downloaded
and merged to a larger new index by the client. Search queries are executed at
all encrypted indexes independently. Such techniques that periodically rebuild the
encrypted indexes do not require defining a maximum capacity during setup. More-
over, they allow the client to update the parameters α and x depending on how the
database has evolved. However, the main drawback of this approach is updates,
since it has a (amortized) O(logN) update cost. While de-amortization is possible,
it is not trivial, especially in our adjustable setting, and we believe that it is a very
interesting problem for future work.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we focus on building cryptographic solutions for encrypted search
and computation that are simultaneously practical and provable secure.
Towards this goal, we propose novel, more efficient SE schemes with better
search/computation time that improve in practice the locality of SE schemes and
reduce the number of required cryptographic operations during search. Combining
together these approaches can lead to search time improvements of up to 3-4 orders
of magnitude compared with prior state-of-the-art SE schemes.
Furthermore, this thesis also focuses on extending SE to support new, more
expressive private queries in an efficient and secure manner. In particular, we pro-
pose novel forward-and-backward private DSE schemes with small client storage,
which outperform prior state-of-the-art schemes by up to 4 orders of magnitude.
We also propose the state-of-the-art private range scheme, which is efficient and ro-
bust against not only previously proposed access/volume attacks, but also new very
powerful attacks (in which the attacker has access to the input plaintext database).
Finally, we present SEAL, a family of new, more secure SE schemes with
adjustable leakages that can be used to support basic database queries, such as
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point, range, join and group-by queries. In SEAL, the amount of privacy loss is
expressed in leaked bits of search or access pattern and can be defined at setup. As
our experiments show, when protecting only a few bits of leakage (e.g., three to four
bits of access pattern), enough for existing and even new more aggressive attacks
to fail, the query execution time of SEAL is within the realm of practical for real-
world applications. Our findings show that SEAL could be a promising approach
for building efficient and robust encrypted databases.
7.2 Future Work
Next Generation Encrypted Databases. There is a long line of research on
privacy preserving databases that attempts to strike a desirable balance between
security and practical efficiency. Previous approaches, especially encountered in
database venues, provide practical solutions, while offering a wide range of different
functionalities commonly offered in plaintext databases. However, these approaches
either lack provable security guarantees, or permit unacceptable leakages. At the
same time, there are other approaches primarily inspired by the crypto community
that provide well-defined security guarantees, but their solutions are not practical
for large-scale database applications. Bridging the gap between these two worlds
to build real-world encrypted databases and encrypted systems that will simulta-
neously provide reasonable in practice security and efficiency guarantees, remains
an open problem. Towards this goal, the last couple of years we observe new, more
efficient, expressive and secure solutions for encrypted search, and we are ready to
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start building the next generation of encrypted systems/databases. However, the
challenges that arise from building such solutions are two-fold: (i) leveraging and
further improving the existing solutions, (ii) addressing new security and efficiency
research challenges that will appear when attempting to combine existing state-of-
the-art schemes in a single system. For instance, it is an open problem to combine
different private query operators and define the leakage of composite queries (e.g., a
combination of join, range and group-by queries). At the same time, we observe the
need for a new query optimizer that takes into consideration, not only the efficiency,
but also the security of a query plan. Furthermore, we need to study the existence
of new attacks for these systems and find a way to efficiently mitigate them, e.g.,
extending SEAL ([37]) for more complex queries.
Practical oblivious primitives. A standard way to transform a non-oblivious al-
gorithm to an oblivious one is to perform all the memory accesses obliviously using
an ORAM scheme. Thus, the question of “how can we further improve the practical-
ity of ORAM schemes” arises. For instance, in [31, 37, 38], we proposed new, more
efficient ORAM schemes that are locality-aware, provide an adjustable trade-off be-
tween security and efficiency, and comprise the state-of-the-art schemes for secure
hardware. However, there are various other ways to further improve ORAM schemes,
such as by designing: (i) efficient dynamic ORAM schemes—current state-of-the-art
approaches require pre-allocating the maximum required memory during the setup
process, (ii) new parallel and distributed practical ORAM schemes—current ap-
proaches are mainly of theoretical interest, (iii) new ORAM schemes for searchable
encryption—current approaches are optimized for retrieving one memory location
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at a time; however searchable encryption requires accessing results of variable sizes.
Towards a more practical searchable encryption. Since the first work by
Song et al.[16] in 2000, various dimensions of SE have been studied, such as se-
curity, dynamism, better security for dynamic schemes, parallelism, locality, read
efficiency, index size, number of cryptographic operations per query, and expres-
siveness. The existence of these dimensions paves the way to interesting research
questions, such as how to further improve previous state-of-the-art results, or how
to combine these different dimensions in order to further enhance the practicality of
SE schemes. For instance, while in the last two years we have observed numerous
works on dynamic and locality-aware SE schemes, there is limited knowledge on the
impact of combining these dimensions. In addition, the majority of the efficiency
advancements mainly focuses on the keyword search problem, and there are many
unanswered questions regarding the impact of combining the efficiency/security di-
mensions with other query types. For instance, it remains an open problem to see
if for more expressive query types, e.g., range, join, group-by, graph queries, we
can extend current state-of-the-art static approaches to dynamic with forward and
backward privacy guarantees. Finally, another important next step for the future
of SE is to find other important dimensions for this problem—attempting to extend
SE to a multi-user scenario will raise new security and efficiency challenges, such
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[65] Raphaël Bost, Brice Minaud, and Olga Ohrimenko. Forward and backward
private searchable encryption from constrained cryptographic primitives. In
CCS, 2017.
[66] Javad Ghareh Chamani, Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou,
and Rasool Jalili. New constructions for forward and backward private sym-
metric searchable encryption. In CCS, 2018.
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[92] Marie-Sarah Lacharité and Kenneth G Paterson. Frequency-smoothing encryp-
tion: preventing snapshot attacks on deterministically encrypted data. IACR
Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2018.
[93] Marc Liberatore and Brian Neil Levine. Inferring the source of encrypted http
connections. In CCS, 2006.
[94] Seny Kamara, Tarik Moataz, and Olya Ohrimenko. Structured encryption and
leakage suppression. In CRYPTO, 2018.
[95] Paul Grubbs, Thomas Ristenpart, and Vitaly Shmatikov. Why your encrypted
database is not secure. In Proceedings of the 16th Workshop on Hot Topics
in Operating Systems, HotOS 2017, Whistler, BC, Canada, May 8-10, 2017,
pages 162–168, 2017.
[96] Louis Granboulan and Thomas Pornin. Perfect block ciphers with small blocks.
In International Workshop on FSE, 2007.
[97] Emil Stefanov and Elaine Shi. Fastprp: Fast pseudo-random permutations for
small domains. IACR, 2012.
[98] Ben Morris and Phillip Rogaway. Sometimes-recurse shuffle - almost-random
permutations in logarithmic expected time. In EUROCRYPT, 2014.
[99] Sarvar Patel, Giuseppe Persiano, Mariana Raykova, and Kevin Yeo. Panorama:
Oblivious ram with logarithmic overhead. In FOCS, 2018.
187
